Early Life Adversities and Well-being Later in Life: Evidence from China by Wang, Jiyuan
 
 
 University of Groningen




IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2020
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Wang, J. (2020). Early Life Adversities and Well-being Later in Life: Evidence from China. University of
Groningen, SOM research school. https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.134514701
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the




Well-being Later in Life:
Evidence from China
Jiyuan Wang
Publisher: University of Groningen
Groningen, The Netherlands




c© 2020 Jiyuan Wang
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system of any nature, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying







Early Life Adversities and  
Well-being Later in Life:  














to obtain the degree of PhD at the 
University of Groningen 
on the authority of the 
Rector Magnificus Prof. C. Wijmenga 
and in accordance with 
the decision by the College of Deans. 
 
This thesis will be defended in public on  
 










born on 19 October 1990 
in Gansu, China 
Supervisors 
Prof. R.J.M. Alessie  





Prof. G. Pasini  
Prof. M.G. Knoef 
 




Dedicated to my dear mother Rongmei Li, and my beloved girlfriend Ya Gao

Acknowledgements
Once I was 23 years old, I fell in love with Econometrics and had a dream to become
an econometrician/economist. Then I made a decision to start my training at the
University of Groningen. Most of the time, the training was enjoyable because I
could feel that I was making progress everyday. Nevertheless, it was also a tough
journey. I had once doubted my goal I was pursuing and the meaning of my life.
Luckily, when I felt low, there were many people cheering me up and encouraging
me to move on.
First of all, I want to express my great gratitude to my supervisors Rob Alessie
and Viola Angelini. We have had a lot of formal meetings and lunch talks about
my curriculum studies, research projects, job seeking, and so on. They are very
knowledgeable in both theoretical and empirical economics. I have gained a lot of
research experience under their supervision. They always encourage me to think
outside the box, ask critical questions to develop my data and economic intuition,
and guide me to be a good economist. They are also wonderful people personally.
They both care about my work-life balance and help me relax when I experience
stressful moments. When I visited the job market, they provided a lot of support
and encouragement. Rob inspires me with his insights into many economic and
econometric models, and he always encourages me to explore beyond that. One of
my favourite things in the past few years was to ask him economic/econometric
questions. If he was not busy, he would ask me to sit beside him, take out a notepad
under several empty coffee cups, and enthusiastically show me how to play around
with the models. This experience has deeply influenced my research attitude. Now,
when I have interesting ideas, I can quickly immerse myself into the world of models.
Rob is also very humorous and approachable. It often made my day when he greeted
me on the seventh floor. When I felt stressed, Rob often made friendly jokes to help
me relax. Viola has taught me how to develop research stories convincingly and
cohesively. More importantly, she has profoundly improved my way of conducting
research. When I got distracted by extra information aside from the main story, she
vii
would directly point it out that I should focus on the main research question. The
word ‘focus’ is now the top word in my mind when I conduct research, and it is
the most valuable word I have learned in the past six years. She has also taught me
many useful presentation and collaboration skills. Besides research, Viola is also a
wonderful life advisor. She always recommends excellent food and places. When I
receive good news or make progress, she is always the first person to congratulate
me and encourage me to move on. They are my role models, and I feel extremely
lucky to have both of them as my supervisors.
I would like to thank my assessment committee: professor Robert Lensink,
professor Marike Knoef, and professor Giacomo Pasini. Thank you very much for
your valuable comments on my thesis. The thesis has also benefited from many
useful comments and suggestions by Arthur van Soest (Tilburg), Hanz Bloemen
(UV), Justina klimaviciute (Vilnius), Mauro Mastrogiacomo (UV), Max Groneck
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As living conditions and healthcare technologies improve, individual life expect-
ancy increases. The pattern is not only evident in developed countries but also in
developing countries such as China. According to the World Population Prospect 2017
report by the United Nations, average life expectancy at birth in China has risen
from 69.7 between 1990 and 1995 to 76.5 between 2015 and 2020, and it is projected
to rise to 81.1 in the period 2045-2050. Yet, the goals of public health are not only
about quantity but also about quality of life. Even though people now live longer,
they wish to live in good health and financial well-being.
An expanding body of literature has documented that conditions early in life
are important determinants of well-being at older ages. Therefore, if we want to
understand how to improve financial, physical and mental health of older individu-
als, it is crucial to take a life-cycle perspective. In this thesis, I study the early life
determinants of well-being at older ages in China.
I mainly focus on two factors that might affect old-age well-being: children’s
support and early life adversities. Covered by less generous social insurance plans,
poor households in China have to seek alternative support to finance their old-
age consumption. One natural solution for parents is to find supports from their
children. Children’s economic support for their parents might be further determined
by parental human capital investment in children when they were at schooling ages.
The second factor is the role of early life adversities. In China, the current cohort of
older people might have experienced the Chinese Great Famine and/or the Cultural
Revolution, potentially resulting in income losses during life and long-term negative
health effects.
2 Chapter 1
The main data is drawn from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal
Study (CHARLS). CHARLS is a nationally representative survey focusing on in-
dividuals aged above 45 years old, including data on intergenerational transfers,
individual lifetime work histories, and blood-based biomarker information.
1.1 Why do Parents Underinvest in their Children’s Edu-
cation?
In chapter 2, we examine children’s old-age support to their parents. Children’s
support to their old-age parents is believed to be a good supplement to public
social insurance programs, especially in developing countries (see, e.g., Cai et al.,
2006; Oliveira, 2016). To what extent children support their old parents depends on
the children’s income capacity which had been determined by educational human
capital invested by the parents when their children were at schooling ages (see, e.g.,
Alessie et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2006; Raut & Tran, 2005). The relationship between
parental human capital investment in children and children’s support to their parents
can be also affected by certain socio-economic and environmental conditions when
parents had to make decisions about investing in their children’s human capital.
Liquidity constraints and the presence of educational fixed costs are two main
conditions (see, e.g., Keane & Wolpin, 2001; Lochner & Monge-Naranjo, 2011). For
example, even if the parents are willing to invest, they invest insufficiently as they
are financially too weak to borrow from banks or neighbours. Or because there are
high entry costs for parents to invest in children’s human capital. As a consequence,
their children’s human capital is underinvested. Incorporating these two conditions
into the intergenerational transfer framework and using Chinese data to test the
predictions are very important, as we can learn which conditions hinder parents
from investing in their children’s education. Then the government can implement
targeted interventions. Therefore, the first research question is:
To what extent are the parental investment in children’s human capital and the old-age
support by children affected by the presence of liquidity constraints and educational fixed
costs?
To study this research question, this chapter employs a two-sided altruism
intergenerational transfer framework proposed by Raut & Tran (2005). We extend
the model by incorporating the parental liquidity constraint and educational fixed
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costs, and we empirically test the predictions using the 2013 China Health And
Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) survey data.
The results first show that, even with non-binding liquidity constraints and in
the absence of fixed costs, children’s human capital is underinvested because of the
bargaining process between parents and children who are both imperfectly altruistic.
Second, the binding liquidity constraint on the parental side reduces the human
capital investment even further. Finally, we show that the presence of educational
fixed costs increases the children’s transfer to their parents during old-age.
1.2 The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on Lifetime
Income
In chapter 3, I look at the effect of exposure to adverse political events early in life
(aged 5-19) on lifetime income using the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
as a natural experiment. The Cultural Revolution hit prefectures differently, hence
I can make use of the variation in violence across prefectures to identify the long
run effect of the Cultural Revolution. There are also different parties involved in
the Cultural Revolution: the general population as victims and the individuals
who created violence by joining the so-called Red Guard Army. Therefore, it is
also important to investigate whether the Red Guard Army members are affected
similarly to those non-Red Guard Army members. In terms of measuring income,
while existing studies use cross-sectional income information (see, e.g., Meng &
Gregory, 2007), I consider lifetime income which measures human capital over the
life cycle. In chapter 3, my research question is:
What is the effect of exposure to the Cultural Revolution during schooling ages (5-19)
on individual lifetime income? Are there any different effects between the Red Guard Army
members and the non-Red Guard Army members?
To study this research question, I use data from the CHARLS life history survey
data set. The CHARLS life history survey collects information on all life events
such as work and education episodes from the respondents who have been initially
interviewed in 2011 and 2013. The data allow constructing two measures of lifetime
income: average lifetime income per worked year and income growth between the
first and last jobs in the working life. I then merge the prefecture-level variations
in violence during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) with the individual level
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lifetime income data using the residence information in 1966 when the Cultural
Revolution began.
The results show that males who were exposed to a 1% higher violence experience
an 8 percentage points decrease in their average lifetime income per worked year,
whereas this effect is insignificant for females. In addition, not everyone was affected
to the same extent. Males who actively joined the Red Guard Army actually benefited
from the Cultural Revolution, resulting in a 16% increase in their average lifetime
income per worked year. I also find that individual income growth over the life
cycle is not affected by exposure to the Cultural Revolution.
1.3 Exposure in utero to Adverse Events and Health
Late-in-life
In this chapter, we look at the effects of in utero exposure to adverse events on health
late in life. We employ two natural experiments in this study: the Chinese Great
Famine, which mainly affected rural areas, and the Cultural Revolution, which
mainly affected urban areas. To measure health, we use blood-based biomarker
information, and we construct risk scores for diabetes and cardiovascular diseases.
This is important as it allows us to capture the underlying risks of getting diabetes
and cardiovascular diseases, especially when these chronic diseases have not yet
manifested. In addition to physical health, we also construct measures of mental
health such as depression and cognition. As the biomedical literature suggests that
boys develop tissues and organs in utero differently than girls (see, e.g., Eriksson et
al., 2010), we also conduct analyses separately by gender. Hence, the third research
question is:
What are the effects of exposure in utero to the Chinese Great Famine and the Cultural
Revolution on physical and mental health at older ages? Do the effects have gender-specific
patterns?
To prepare the data set, we measure the severity by the province-level excessive
death rates which are constructed by subtracting the average death rates in the non-
famine years from the death rates during the famine years, and we use the prefecture-
level violence measures which are also employed in chapter 3. Then we merge these
data with individual health outcomes constructed from the CHARLS 2011 and 2013
surveys using information on the place and year of birth. In terms of health outcomes,
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we construct an 8-year risk score for diabetes using the algorithm in Wilson et
al. (2007), a 10-year risk score for cardiovascular diseases using the algorithm in
D’agostino et al. (2008), and several measures of cognition and depression.
The results show that female babies who were exposed in utero to a 1% higher
famine-induced excessive death rate have a 0.06 percentage point higher chance of
getting type-2 diabetes. The effects are not significant for male babies. Moreover,
male babies who were exposed to a higher level of violence during the Cultural
Revolution are shown to have worse cognitive abilities.
The thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. Chapter 2 extends the
model in Raut & Tran (2005) and studies two crucial mechanisms: liquidity constraint
and fixed costs. The empirical results support both mechanisms, so focusing on these
mechanisms and designing proper interventions will be beneficial to the society.
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by considering lifetime income as the measure
of economic well-being. This measure captures income over the lifecycle rather than
at one point in time. Besides, this chapter also finds that not everyone exposed to the
CR was affected in the same way. Red Guard Army members have benefited from
this event. Chapter 4 uses biomarkers to compute risk scores as health outcome
measures, which are better health proxies when chronic diseases such as diabetes
and CVD are not entirely developed. We also find that the Cultural Revolution and
the Chinese Great Famine affect different health outcomes.
1.4 Policy Recommendations
To meet the challenges imposed by population ageing and the associated rising
healthcare costs, governments need to propose and implement proactive policies.
My thesis offers some insights in the design of relevant policies. The main take-
away message is simple: interventions at early stages of life generate more long run
benefits, especially for people who have experienced adversities early in life.
1.4.1 General Policy Recommendation
In chapter 2 of my thesis, we find that both binding liquidity constraints and the
presence of educational fixed costs can explain the underinvestment of parents in
their children’s education. Therefore relaxing the binding liquidity constraint on
the parental side and removing the fixed costs can help improve the educational
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investment in the children. In terms of easing the household liquidity constraint,
the current poverty alleviation programs (see, e.g., Meng, 2013) implemented
nationwide might increase the educational attainment of children from poor families.
Governments could, however, do more to reduce educational fixed costs. These
costs could be tangible barriers such as transportation costs and tuition fees, which
can be mitigated by expanding low-interest rate student loan programs or other
policy instruments. Some developed countries have implemented certain policies
already. The Netherlands, for example, provides college students with discounted
public transportation (Studentenreisproduct).1 The fixed costs can also be intangible
such as inequality of opportunity for students from low-income families to receive
a high-quality college education. For example, coastal provinces provide more
opportunities for local students to enter good universities, while students from
western or central provinces have to compete fiercely for limited opportunities
(see, e.g., Zhang & Kanbur, 2005). If the human capital investment level increases
towards optimum, the results of chapter 2 suggest that old-age transfers to parents
will also increase. This is important as in a country with a not well developed
pension system such as China, older people strongly rely on the financial support
from their children.
From chapter 3 of my thesis, I find that males who were exposed to the Cultural
Revolution during their schooling ages have experienced a lifetime income loss.
The results imply that, the effect due to the Cultural Revolution on income persists
over the life cycle. In other words, once the human capital investment process has
been interrupted, it is difficult to ”pick up the losses” during work after the Cultural
Revolution. Therefore, if children are experiencing interrupted education, either
due to domestic conflicts or school shutdowns, it is important to devote effort and
resources for children who could benefit the most from on-site teaching. Chapter 3
also finds that individuals who joined the Red Guard Army and who were already
more likely to come from an advantaged socio-economic background have much
higher lifetime income. This result suggests that events like the Cultural Revolution
might increase long run inequality.
In chapter 4, we find females exposed in utero to the famine have a higher
chance of getting type-2 diabetes, and individuals who were exposed to the Cultural
Revolution have lower cognitive abilities later in life. The general conclusion is that
adverse conditions experienced around birth can have an important negative effect
on health at older ages. This suggests that prevention should start very early in life,
1 See, for example, https://www.duo.nl/particulier/aanvragen-studentenreisproduct.jsp.
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even during pregnancy. In some developing countries which are now experiencing
domestic conflicts or famines, it is therefore important to first sustain food supply
and maintain safe shelters to pregnant mothers.
1.4.2 Policy Recommendation Regarding COVID-19
The recent global pandemic outbreak of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has im-
posed severe health and economic threats to many countries. Most European and
Eastern Asian countries have lost many lives due to this pandemic. After imple-
menting lockdowns and social-distancing policies, the situations in these countries
seem to be under control.
If we switch our attention to the other part of the globe, the situation is be-
coming worse. Currently, millions of civilians in African and the Middle Eastern
(developing) countries are experiencing not only health pandemic but also severe
hunger pandemic, according to a recent report by the World Food Programme.2 In
addition to lockdowns and social-distancing policies, it is extremely important for
the governments to implement immediate interventions to sustain the food supply,
especially for the pregnant mothers. This is because, according to the results in
chapter 4, when the mothers experience severe food shortage, their babies will be
more likely to develop chronic diseases such as diabetes once they become old.
The potential hunger pandemic will not only affect newborns but also has the
potential to produce lifetime income losses for the current generations of school-aged
children. As this World Food Programme report points out, the countries which
have higher risks of shaping large-scale famines are mostly conflict-riven. According
to the result in chapter 3, individuals who were exposed to higher conflicts during
their early lives are more likely to have lower lifetime income. Therefore, when the
governments are handling food shortages, they should also provide safe living and





Why do Parents Underinvest in
their Children’s Education?*
2.1 Introduction
Human capital accumulation is of crucial importance for both individual welfare
and economic growth (Schultz, 1961). Besides the governments’ efforts in increasing
human capital investment, parental investment in children’s human capital is also
important (see, e.g., Barro, 1974). The traditional theory predicts that the optimal
amount of human capital investments is determined by equating its marginal re-
turns to the market return (see, e.g., Becker, 2009). Many papers, however, found
that parents often underinvest in the human capital of their children, especially in
developing countries such as China (Psacharopoulos, 1985; Heckman, 2005).
Raut & Tran (2005) model the human capital investment behaviour of (extended)
families living in developing countries. In such countries with rudimentary pension
systems and not well developed capital markets, there exists a link between the
parental investment in human capital of children and old-age financial support
provided by children. Raut & Tran (2005) take this link explicitly into account by
formulating two alternative two-sided altruism models of parental investment in
children in which it is assumed that the parents are altruistic towards children and
vice versa.1 According to the first model, parents and children have a pure loan
*This chapter is based on Wang et al. (2017).
1 Alternative explanations have been offered in the literature. Brown et al. (2011), for example, find
that the parents will rationally underinvest in their children’s human capital strategically because the
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contract in which the parental investment in education is paid back by means of
old-age support by the child. Children will take out the loan of the parents, as long
as they are not made worse-off by the terms of the contract. The first model assumes
that the intergenerational contract is enforced by means of social norms. By contrast,
the second model is based on reciprocity and the child autonomously decides how
much (s)he transfers to parents. In the second model, the level of parental investment
in children’s education and the amount of transfers from children to old parents
are determined simultaneously in a Nash equilibrium. In the empirical part of their
paper using data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey, Raut & Tran (2005) find
that the two-sided altruistic model fits the data in a better way.
In this chapter, we extend the theoretical model of Raut & Tran (2005) by includ-
ing parental liquidity constraints and fixed costs of investment as two potential
explanations for the underinvestment in education. First, binding liquidity con-
straints might prevent the parents from investing sufficiently in the education of
their children (see Barham et al., 1995). Second, parents might face fixed costs when
they perform such investments. One can think of direct costs, such as tuition fees
and transportation costs, but also opportunity costs in terms of foregone wages
because a full-time student cannot contribute to the income of the household. We
construct a two-period theoretical model in which children and parents are both
altruistic. In the first period, parents decide how much to invest in their children’s
education, subject to liquidity constraints and a fixed cost of investment. In the
second period, children can provide old-age financial support to their parents. We
then test the theoretical predictions of our model on data from the China Health and
Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS). The 2013 wave and the retrospective
life-history survey provide us with very rich information on 17,311 children and
their older parents, aged 45 and over. Our results support the idea that both fixed
costs and binding liquidity constraints play an important role in explaining human
capital underinvestment.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, the theoretical
model and its corresponding predictions will be presented. Section 2.3 provides
information on the CHARLS data and on the variables of interest. Section 2.4
summarizes our estimation strategies, and section 2.5 presents the empirical results.
Section 2.6 concludes.
parents might not be able to claim returns from strategic-concerned children. Parental risk aversion is
also revealed to have a negative impact on the children’s human capital investment (see Checchi et al.,
2014).
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2.2 Model
In this subsection we extend the two-period model of Raut & Tran (2005) by allowing
for liquidity constraints and fixed costs. The model distinguishes two types of agents:
parents and children who are both altruistic. No distinction is made between father
and mother so that they are treated as a single representative parent. Moreover, the
parent has n children which are assumed to be identical in preferences, endowment
of abilities and in altruism towards parents.
Parents and children both live for three periods but we focus on two overlapping
periods between the parent and the child. Figure 2.1 provides a description of the
timing structure of the model. In the first period, the parent is in the labour market
and the child is at school age. In the second period the parent is retired and the child
has joined the labour market. In the first period, the parent earns Ep1, consumes cp1,
and invests T1 in each child’s schooling. If T1 > 0, the parent faces also fixed costs C
of education. In the second period, the parent receives Ep2 as pension benefits and
consumes cp2, and each child is liquidity constrained, i.e. (s)he earns Ek2, consumes
ck2, and transfers T2 to support his/her parent and does not save. The parameters
Born Work Retire End






Figure 2.1. Parent-Child Transfer Scheme
γp and γk measure the degree of the parent’s and child’s altruism respectively. Due
to imperfect altruism, the parameters γp and γk are strictly positive but smaller than
one.
Raut & Tran (2005) construct two models where in the first model the parent is the
dominant decision maker: she makes every choice, including parental and child’s
consumption across two periods, parental human capital investment to children
(T1) and the children’s old-age transfer to parents (T2). The second model allows for
some bargaining power for the children in the second period so they can decide on
T2 and ck2 in a Nash equilibrium framework. By using a data set from Indonesia,
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they find that the second model fits the data better. We therefore only consider the
second model in this study. We extend this model by allowing for fixed costs and
a liquidity constraint. In other words, we assume that the parent takes the child’s




u(cp1) + β[u(cp2) + γpνp(ck2)] (2.1a)
s.t. cp1 = Ep1 − (s + nT1 + nC1(T1 > 0)) (2.1b)
cp2 = (1 + r)s + Ep2 + nT2 (2.1c)
s ≥ 0 (2.1d)
T1 ≥ 0, (2.1e)
where β is the time preference parameter and 1(T1 > 0) is an indicator function being
equal 1 if the parent invests and 0 if she does not, and C is the fixed cost. s denotes
net worth at the end of period 1. The parameters γp and γk measure the degree
of the parent’s and child’s altruism respectively. Due to imperfect altruism, the
parameters γp and γk are strictly positive but smaller than one. νp(ck2) represents
the parent’s perception of child’s utility from his/her consumption in period 2.
Liquidity constraint (2.1d) says that the parent cannot borrow without collateral.
Constraint (2.1e) says that human capital investment cannot be negative.
Taken her parent’s decision on T1 and cp1 as given, each child solves the utility
maximization problem subject to the budget constraint only in the second period:
max
ck2,T2≥0
ν(ck2) + γkuk(cp2) (2.2a)
s.t. ck2 = Ek2(T1, τ)− T2, (2.2b)
where Ek2(T1, τ) denotes a Mincerian earnings function and τ is the talent of the
child. uk(cp2) denotes the child’s perception of her parent’s utility of consumption at
old age. The model above represents a sequential game and we solve it by using the
backward induction approach, namely the child first optimizes her problem with
respect to his/her consumption and the transfer amount to the parent and then the
parent solves his/her optimization problem given the child’s optimal decisions.
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2.2.1 Closed Form Solution
To provide the intuition behind the model, we follow Raut & Tran (2005) in making
several additional assumptions. First, we assume that both the children and the
parents have the perfect perception on each others’ utilities, namely uk(cp) = u(cp)
and νp(ck) = ν(ck). Second, we impose the restriction that parents and children
have the same within-period utility function of the Cobb-Douglas type: u(c) =
ν(c) = α ln c, with preference parameter α > 0.
With this assumption, we restrict the degree of CRRA (Constant Relative Risk
Aversion) of all households to be one.2 Third, we assume a Mincerian earnings
function of the children, that is, the log earnings is a function of school-related
human capital investment and has a hump-shaped relationship with working ex-
perience. Contrary to Raut & Tran (2005), we do not impose the Inada conditions.
Consequently, we allow for corner solutions for the human capital investment T1.
Intuitively, those with no human capital investment could also work and earn some
money.
If the liquidity constraint (2.1d) is not binding in the first period and no fixed
costs appear (C = 0) in (2.1b), then we will obtain the benchmark predictions as Raut
& Tran (2005) on the optimal human capital investment and the optimal old-age
transfers. The optimal investment amount is reflected in the corresponding marginal







where the numerator denotes the market returns. The general marginal returns
to human capital investment are higher since both the parent and the child are
assumed to be imperfectly altruistic (0 < γkγp < 1). The marginal returns are
negatively associated with the level of human capital investment due to the rule of
diminishing rate of returns, see Figure 2.2. The underinvestment is a consequence of
the bargaining between the child and the parent. If the parent’s bargaining power is
large enough to determine both T1 and T2, then the marginal returns are equal to
1 + r (see appendix 2.A).
Another prediction is that the optimal level of old-age transfer from the child to
2 We leave the general risk averse cases in future research. Some research such as Checchi et al. (2014) has

















Ek2(T∗∗1 , τ)− Ek2(0, τ)
Figure 2.2. Rate of Returns to Human Capital Investment


















This equation deserves some explanation. First, notice that the child’s transfer to
the parent does not depend on the degree of parental altruism γp. Second, equation
(2.4) also says that T2 is positively related to the income of the child Ek2. The impact
of Ek2 is larger if the child is more altruistic. There is also a positive effect of human
capital investment T1 on T2: parents who invested in their children’s human capital
are more likely to receive financial support from their children during retirement.
This effect is negatively related to γk.
Third, the higher the lifetime income of the parents (Ep1 +
Ep2
1+r ), the less will be
transferred. Finally, the model predicts zero transfers by the child if γk = 0.3
2.2.2 Binding Liquidity Constraint
We now add an extra liquidity constraint (2.1d) to the optimization problem which
says that the parents cannot borrow against future income due to imperfect capital
3 In appendix 2.A we also derive the analogy to (2.4) if the parent decides both T1 and T2. The signs of
the variables are the same, but the coefficients are functions of parental altruism γp instead of γk .
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market.
The extended model produces the following prediction on human capital invest-










where µ denotes the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the restriction (2.1d). The second
term on the right hand side is therefore positive if the liquidity constraint is binding.
This implies that the optimal human capital investment level is even lower for
liquidity constrained households.4
As we will argue in section 2.4, we can empirically test for the existence of
binding liquidity constraints by following a similar approach as in Zeldes (1989).
Equation (2.5) forms the basis of this test.
2.2.3 Fixed Costs
If human capital investment involves fixed costs, i.e. C > 0 in equation (2.1b),
then the choice problem is not standard due to the fact that the choice set is non-
convex. Finding the optimal solution requires several steps (see, e.g., Hausman,
1980 and Cogan, 1981). First, one solves the Nash Bargaining problem presented
above under the restriction that the parent does not invest in the human capital of
the child (T1 = 0). In that case the parent does not incur any fixed costs and obtains
a maximum intertemporal utility level of U0p. Then one solves the same problem
imposing the condition that the parent invests in the schooling of the child (T1 > 0)
and as a consequence faces fixed costs. Let U1p and T∗1 the optimal solution in case of
investment. The decision to invest in the education of the children involves a utility
comparison: if U1p > U0p, the parent invests T∗1 , otherwise not.
The child’s decision on the old-age transfer T2 depends the parent’s decision on
















+ C · 1(T1 > 0)
]
, (2.6)
4 Actually the optimal transfer decision can also be derived, but it cannot be tested empirically because
the variables entering into the equations are the same as in equation (2.4). The derivations and complete
results can be found in appendix 2.A.
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and it holds if the parental liquidity constraint (2.1d) is not binding. If the parents
face a binding liquidity constraint, T2 only depends on income of the children and
parents in the second period and not on fixed costs C (see equation (2.A.19) in
appendix 2.A). Compared with (2.4), equation (2.6) contains one extra term which
reflects the impact of fixed costs associated with human capital investment. Notice
that T2 is positively related to those fixed costs provided that the child is altruistic
(γk > 0). As before, T2 = 0 if the child is not altruistic. Empirically, we can just
test whether the estimated coefficient corresponding to the dummy for positive
human capital investment (I(T1 > 0)) is positive and significant. Since transfers
from children to parents are often observed with corner solutions and children also
might face fixed costs if they transfer money to the parents, it is worthwhile to
consider both the intensive and extensive margins. In section 2.4 we will discuss the
empirical strategy in more detail.
2.3 Data
We draw data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS),
which collects information on a nationally representative sample of Chinese residents
aged 45 and older. The baseline wave of CHARLS was fielded in 2011 and includes
about 10,000 households and 17,500 individuals in 150 counties/districts and 450
villages/resident communities.5 The individuals are then followed every two years.
Currently, three regular waves of CHARLS are available, in addition to a life history
survey which was administered to the households interviewed in the first two waves.
In this chapter, we use data from the second wave6 and the life history survey of
CHARLS, which were collected in 2013 and 2014 respectively. From the second
wave we obtain information on parental investment in children’s human capital,
cash transfers that parents receive from their children, and socio-demographic
characteristics, while we use the life history of CHARLS to construct a measure of
permanent income and gather data on the financial situation of the household when
the children were at college ages.
We first construct a child-level data set from CHARLS 2013 where each obser-
vation is a child and then we merge it with data from the life history survey. After
dropping observations with missing values on some key variables, and keeping only
5 Detailed information on the data and sampling procedure can be found in Zhao et al. (2012).
6 We also conduct a sensitivity analysis using data from the first wave (results available upon request).
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children with completed education, we obtain a sample of 17,311 children.7
The main variables of interest for our analysis are parental investment in chil-
dren’s human capital (T1), financial transfers from children to their ageing parents
(T2), children’s current income, and parental lifetime income. The human capital
investment variable is obtained by asking the main respondent8 how much money
(s)he and his(her) spouse have invested on each of their children’s college education.
As an alternative, we also include the child’s number of years of college education
as a proxy for the human capital investment. Old-age transfers are measured in net
values and are obtained by asking the parents how much they received in total from
each non-coresiding child in the last year. Another proxy for the transfer term is a
dummy (“Depend on This Child”) which is equal to 1 if the respondent plans to
rely on the child as a source of financial support during retirement. The income of
the child is obtained by directly asking the parents how much each of their children
earned last year. The permanent income of the parents is more difficult to measure.
We consider four measures to proxy for it: net financial wealth, net durable
wealth, net income, and lifetime income. Net financial wealth is the sum of cash,
deposits, stocks, bonds and other financial holdings subtracted by financial debts.
Net durable wealth includes housing assets minus debts, gold, treasures and an-
tiques. We only include those housing assets which can be sold immediately on the
market,9 and we do not include other durable goods such as vehicles and televisions
since the depreciation rates of these assets are extremely high, hard to evaluate,
and are determined by the complexity of the local second-hand markets. Yearly
net income consists of the wage income and the pension income for employed and
retired workers respectively, and the net income of the farmers and self-employers.
Lifetime income is obtained from the life history of CHARLS and are calculated
by summing up the inflation-adjusted wages during the working years (see, e.g.,
Alessie et al., 2013).10 The correlations between different measures of lifetime income
are displayed in Table 2.1.
The core explanatory variables are the liquidity constraint dummies.11 Liquidity
7 The detailed sample selection strategies can be found in appendix 2.B.
8 The main respondent is randomly selected among all age eligible respondents in the household.
9 In the last century, many housings are allocated by the employers in urban areas such as governments
and state-owned enterprises. Some of them can be traded while some cannot.
10 We use urban/rural-specific CPI data from 1950-2015 across 31 provinces from Chinese National
Statistics Bureau as the earnings deflater. Some data points in early years are missing and we use local
general CPI or nationwide rural/urban CPI in those cases.
11 When constructing liquidity constraint indicators, we employ the basic idea from Zeldes (1989) who
proposes splitting the whole sample into liquidity constrained sub-sample and the unconstrained sub-
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Table 2.1. Cross-correlation between Wealth Variables
Variables Net Durable Wealth Net Total Wealth Net Income Lifetime Income Net Financial Wealth
Net Durable Wealth 1.000
Net Total Wealth 1.000 1.000
Net Income 0.025 0.035 1.000
Lifetime Income 0.003 0.006 0.241 1.000
Net Financial Wealth -0.078 -0.061 0.082 0.014 1.000
Note: In the estimation process we use mainly financial wealth and total wealth instead of durable wealth, since as the
table shows, the correlation between total wealth and real wealth is almost perfect. This also implies that the durable
assets are the majority of the total assets in elderly Chinese households. The net financial assets are more fluctuated
and therefore negatively correlated with the total wealth.
constraints are measured by six indicators, namely (1) whether the family lived in a
shack when the child was at college ages; (2) whether the income of the respondent
was in the lowest 25% group of the sample when the child was at college ages; (3)
whether the family had a shared toilet or a private one; (4) whether the family had a
water closet or not; (5) whether the family was using clean water or not; (6) whether
the family used electricity or not. The correlations among the liquidity dummies are
shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2. Cross-correlation between Liquidity Variables
Variables Income in Bottom Quartile Living in a Shack Private Toilet Water Closet Clean Water Electricity
Income in Bottom Quartile 1.000
Living in a Shack 0.088 1.000
Private Toilet -0.058 -0.139 1.000
Water Closet -0.118 -0.264 0.398 1.000
Clean Water -0.136 -0.271 0.178 0.395 1.000
Electricity -0.058 -0.184 0.027 0.058 0.185 1.000
Note: Living in a shack or earning the income in bottom quartile show the cases where liquidity constraints are
binding while having private toilet, water closet, using clean water and electricity shows the cases where liquidity
constraints are non-binding.
In addition, we also construct several socio-demographic controls, such as the
number of children of both the main respondents and his or her children, their
genders, the household registration types (Hukou), marriage status of both the main
respondents and their children, their ages, and cohort dummies. The descriptive
statistics can be found in Table 2.3.
sample using whether households with low savings or financial wealth as the classification criterion.
Jappelli et al. (1998) criticize this approach and introduce whether the households were refused loans or
discouraged from borrowing as the proxy for liquidity constraints. Guiso et al. (1996) provide a similar
proxy, namely the credit status of the individuals, to test the impact of liquidity constraints on income
uncertainty.
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics of Child-Level Data
VARIABLES N Mean S.D. Min Max Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3
Female 17,311 0.511 0.500 0 1 0 1 1
Age 17,311 64.53 10.29 36 95 57 64 72
Agric. Hukou 17,311 0.801 0.399 0 1 1 1 1
Married or Cohabited 17,311 0.785 0.411 0 1 1 1 1
Num. of Children 17,311 3.384 1.616 0 16 2 3 4
Parent Years of Schooling1 17,311 5.758 4.303 0 19 2 6 9
(Every Respondent Answer) HH Income2 17,311 1.166 4.578 -299.7 92 0 0.192 1.595
Net Financial Wealth3 17,311 -0.0215 8.854 -289.9 210.5 0 0.0500 0.500
Net Durable Wealth 17,311 73.13 539.4 -2,999 28,000 0 0.01000 0.150
Net Total Wealth 17,311 74.27 539.1 -3,035 27,992 0.0902 0.635 3.530
HH Income Children at College Age 17,311 1.175 4.585 -299.7 92 0 0.190 1.600
HH Lifetime Income 17,311 31.93 91.53 0 4,932 4.481 12.22 30.32
(Life History CHARLS)
Female 17,311 0.461 0.498 0 1 0 0 1
Age 17,311 35.75 9.682 16 77 28 35 42
No Work 17,311 0.161 0.363 0 1 0 0 0
Urban Jobs 17,311 0.148 0.355 0 1 0 0 0
Public Servants 17,311 0.243 0.429 0 1 0 0 0
Rural Jobs 17,311 0.445 0.497 0 1 0 0 1
Num. of Children 17,311 1.280 0.915 0 6 1 1 2
Depend on This Child 17,311 0.496 0.500 0 1 0 0 1
Coresiding with Family4 17,311 0.266 0.442 0 1 0 0 1
Child Years of Schooling 17,311 8.544 4.096 0 23 6 9 12
(Family Respondent Answer) Agric. Hukou 17,311 0.759 0.428 0 1 1 1 1
Married or Cohabited 17,311 0.810 0.392 0 1 1 1 1
Biological Child 17,311 0.991 0.0933 0 1 1 1 1
Work Experience5 17,311 21.20 11.41 0 67 12 20 29
Have Received Transfer 17,311 0.500 0.500 0 1 0 0 1
Positive Net Transfer 8,654 0.213 0.613 1.00e-04 30 0.0350 0.0900 0.200
Net Transfer from Child 17,311 0.0131 3.152 -394.6 30 0 0 0.0900
Have Received Investment 17,311 0.102 0.303 0 1 0 0 0
Hum. Cap. Cons.6 1,770 0.0689 0.0754 1.23e-06 1.514 0.0362 0.0582 0.0849
Years of College Schooling 17,311 0.263 0.860 0 10 0 0 0
Income 17,311 3.040 3.449 0 30 0.750 1.500 3.500
Marginal Returns Schooling Based 17,311 0.542 0.615 0 5.350 0.134 0.267 0.624
of Human Capital(Predicted) Investment Based 17,311 0.0475 0.0566 0 0.616 0.0116 0.0308 0.0719
No Access to Electricity 17,311 0.743 0.437 0 1 0 1 1
Private Toilet 17,311 0.140 0.347 0 1 0 0 0
Liquidity Water Closet 17,311 0.118 0.322 0 1 0 0 0
Constraints Clean Water 17,311 0.279 0.449 0 1 0 0 1
(Life history CHARLS) Income in Bottom Quartile 17,311 0.211 0.408 0 1 0 0 0
Living in a Shack7 17,311 0.425 0.494 0 1 0 0 1
Note: 1. Years of schooling is calculated based on the legislated years at each education level. 2. All the monetary
amounts are at 2010 constant price of ten thousand China yuan which is approximately 1296.546 euros. 3. All wealth
are in net terms and at the household level. 4. Coresiding means that the child is living with the parents, regardless
whether the child is economic independent or not. 5. Work experience is calculated based on Mincer (1974), namely
age minus years of schooling and 6. Human capital investment at constant price of ten thousand 2010 China yuan. 7.
This dummy equals 0 if the family lived in houses with concrete structure, built with bricks and wood, while equals 1
if lived in adobe, thatched house, cave, Mongolian yurt or boat house.
20 Chapter 2
2.4 Empirical Strategy
To test against the prediction of the presence of binding liquidity constraint, we first
need to predict the marginal returns to human capital based on the estimation of
children’s earnings function (see equations (2.3) and (2.5)). For the earnings function,
we estimate the following model by gender separately:
ln(ChildInci) = α0 + α1HCinvesti + α2 Abilityi + α3Exp.i + α4Exp.Sq.i + x′iδ+ εi,
(2.7)
where ChildInci is the current income of a child and HCinvesti is the human capital
investment during school for which we use two measures: the logarithm of one plus
the actual money invested in college education and the number of years of college
schooling. To mitigate the selection bias, we control for the innate ability Abilityi of
the child, which is proxied by the parental years of schooling. In addition, we employ
Mincer (1974)’s idea to incorporate the working experience Exp.i which is equal to
the current age minus years of schooling and 6, and Exp.Sq.i is the squared term of
experience. Other demographic controls are contained in xi such as job categories
and hukou status. Notably, the children’s earnings function is for approximation
and prediction instead of causal inference purpose. The estimated parameter α̂1 is
employed to predict the marginal returns to human capital investment. It can be




use the logarithm of one plus the actual amount invested as a measure of human
capital. When we use the number of years of schooling instead, the marginal
return is MRi = α̂1 × ChildInci. The summary statistics on the predicted marginal
returns for each individual can be found in Table 2.3. Then we first test whether the
binding liquidity constraint induces underinvestment of human capital. According
to equation (2.5), the liquidity constrained child has a positive excess return. We
therefore estimate the following model:
MRi = β0 + β1HHInci + β2Num.i + β3Num.Sq.i + z′iθ+
β4 ∗ Consi + Consi × (β5HHInci + β6Num.i + β7Num.Sq.i + z′iδ) + ui, (2.8)
where MRi represents the marginal returns to college human capital investment,
HHInci is the household income when the child was at college age, Num.i is the
number of children in the household and Num.Sq.i is the squared term which
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proxies for the altruistic parameters γpγk, and the vector zi contains demographic
and social-economic control variables such as age, gender, hukou and marriage status
of both parent and child, and parental education. The liquidity constraint dummy is
represented by Consi which is measured by the six indicators in the previous section
which equals to one if the individual is liquidity constrained and zero otherwise.
The final step is to estimate the transfer equation with fixed costs namely equation
(2.6). The old-age transfer term allows for both positive and negative values, but in
this section we care more about the children’s decisions of positive transfers to their
parents, hence we transform the transfer variable into a corner solution response
which is censored at zero.12 Theoretically, the fixed costs will prevent the parents
from making investing decisions, while whether the fixed costs matter for both the
intensive and extensive margins is unclear. Therefore, empirically, it is important
to investigate which decision is affected by the fixed costs. We will use a double
hurdle (two-part) model as our main model for the transfer equation, demonstrating
the marginal effects at both the extensive margins (children deciding on whether
to transfer to parents) and the intensive margins (if the children decide to transfer,
then how much to transfer). The participation equation is a Probit specification,
and the second part is a log-linear specification since the positive transfer is highly
skewed.13
According to equation (2.6), the estimated coefficients for the child’s income and
the human capital investment are expected to be positive, and the one for household
lifetime income is expected to be negative. The coefficient on the fixed costs term,
both at the extensive and intensive margins, is expected to be positive if fixed costs
are relevant in explaining the underinvestment in human capital.
12 Raut & Tran (2005) employ a Tobit specification considering the sample selection where T1 > 0, since in
their data, only positive transfers are observed. We censored the data below zero but no sample selection
problem appears.
13 Even though we take the log transformation of the positive transfer, we do not assume the log-terms to
be normally distributed. Therefore, in estimating the marginal effects, we use the smearing estimator of
Duan (1983) to overcome the potential bias problem. When estimating standard errors of the smearing
estimator, we use the bootstrapping method with 200 replications.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Binding Liquidity Constraint
We first estimate equation (2.7) by gender and use α̂1, which is the estimated coef-
ficient on human capital investment, to predict the marginal returns MRi. We use
two measures of human capital investment, namely the number of years of college
schooling and the logarithm of one plus the money invested by the parents in the
college education of their children. By using the six liquidity indicators selected
in the Life history of CHARLS, we further test the role of liquidity constraints in
explaining the underinvestment of human capital. The six liquidity constraint in-
dicators are employed to split the whole sample into the liquidity constrained and
unconstrained subsamples as Zeldes (1989) suggests.
We estimate model (2.8) by assuming that the selection of liquidity constrained
behaviour is uncorrelated with the error term. We test for the presence of liquidity
constraints by testing the difference between the estimates of the constrained and
unconstrained sample. If the estimates are significantly different, then binding
liquidity constraints matter. Therefore, Chow tests are constructed to test whether
the slope coefficients of the two subsamples are the same. The Chow statistics
and corresponding p-values can be found in the last two rows of Table 2.4 and
Table 2.5. The results in Table 2.4 are obtained by using the marginal returns which
are predicted based on the human capital investment amount while the results in
Table 2.5 employ the years of college schooling. When marginal returns are predicted
on the basis of the investment measure, liquidity constraints play an important role
when using the indicators “Income in Bottom Quartile”, “Water Closet” and “Clean
Water”. When the marginal returns are predicted through the schooling measure,
liquidity constraints matters for the indicators “Income in Bottom Quartile”, “Living
in a Shack” and “Private Toilet”. The evidence on the importance of liquidity
constraints is therefore somewhat mixed.
2.5.2 Fixed Costs
In this section, we discuss whether fixed costs affect the human capital investment
decisions of parents on their children. In theory, fixed costs affect human capital
investment through the old-age transfer equation. The expected sign of the coeffi-
cient on the fixed costs is positive. As usual, we show the results for two different
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measures of the human capital investment: the actual years of college schooling
and the money that parents invested in their children’s college education. Table 2.6
shows the estimation results using investment amount as the measure of human
capital, while Table 2.7 provides the results using years of college schooling.
The first columns in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the marginal effects of the Probit
estimation using the “Depend on This Child” indicator. Column (2) reports the
coefficient estimates from the Tobit model in which the dependent variable is the
value of the monetary transfers received by parents from their children. Columns (3-
4) exhibit the marginal effects of the participation equation and the amount equation,
and the unconditional marginal effects in the two-part models. Notably again, the
transfers are in log forms.
Table 2.4. Testing for Binding Liquidity Constraint, Investment Measure for T1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Income in Bottom Quartile Living in a Shack Private Toilet Water Closet Clean Water Electricity
Poor -5.898 1.791 4.513 2.288 -6.362 -9.050
(8.108) (8.361) (11.91) (14.19) (9.711) (8.520)
Age 0.637*** 0.781*** 0.715*** 0.960*** 0.683*** 0.644***
(0.0966) (0.108) (0.201) (0.255) (0.163) (0.102)
Age Squared -0.00759*** -0.00903*** -0.00917*** -0.0122*** -0.00832*** -0.00734***
(0.00115) (0.00135) (0.00268) (0.00366) (0.00226) (0.00133)
Female -0.298 -0.374 -0.904* 0.0596 -0.508 -0.426**
(0.214) (0.256) (0.519) (0.666) (0.373) (0.215)
Agric. Hukou -1.257*** -0.970** -1.585 0.0195 -0.253 -1.050**
(0.444) (0.486) (0.965) (1.063) (0.712) (0.412)
Married or Cohabited 5.145*** 4.977*** 4.994*** 5.721*** 5.230*** 4.952***
(0.237) (0.266) (0.474) (0.549) (0.380) (0.237)
Child Coresiding with Family -2.244*** -2.214*** -2.371*** -2.862*** -1.996*** -2.088***
(0.224) (0.255) (0.503) (0.563) (0.341) (0.223)
Biological Child 1.680* 0.706 2.878** 3.181 0.379 0.910
(0.875) (1.034) (1.374) (1.989) (1.270) (0.856)
Age × Poor 0.0233 -0.207 -0.0340 -0.300 0.0469 -0.0281
(0.166) (0.161) (0.220) (0.269) (0.189) (0.178)
Age Squared × Poor -4.65e-05 0.00222 0.00116 0.00451 -0.000109 0.000119
(0.00184) (0.00187) (0.00287) (0.00380) (0.00250) (0.00204)
Female × Poor -0.270 -0.0326 0.631 -0.461 0.185 0.213
(0.400) (0.365) (0.554) (0.693) (0.432) (0.413)
Agri-Hukou × Poor -0.982 -1.009 0.110 -1.524 -1.578* -1.536
(0.906) (0.800) (1.057) (1.149) (0.843) (1.039)
Married × Poor -1.382*** -0.430 -0.143 -1.055* -0.484 -0.282
(0.417) (0.401) (0.524) (0.588) (0.439) (0.445)
Num. Children Squared × Poor -0.0537 -0.213 0.120 0.701 -0.394 -0.709*
(0.420) (0.370) (0.543) (0.599) (0.409) (0.416)
Biological × Poor -0.635 1.792 -1.734 -1.824 1.602 2.539*
(1.433) (1.326) (1.615) (2.142) (1.564) (1.508)
Note: 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Chow tests (F statistics) and corresponding p-values are given in the last two
rows. 2. The dependent variable is the marginal returns to human capital investment and it is predicted by using the
actual investment amount, which is obtained by directly asking the parents, as the human capital investment T1. 3.
Poor indicates whether the household faced binding liquidity constrained when the children were at college age (age
of 18). 4. Six liquidity dummies are employed to proxy for the liquidity situations, namely whether the household
income was in the bottom quartile of the sample (Column (1)), whether the family lived in a shack (Column (2)),
whether the family had a private toilet (Column (3)), whether the family had a water closet (Column (4)), whether the
family had access to clean water (Column (5)), and whether the family had electricity (Column (6)).
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Table 2.4 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Income in Bottom Quartile Living in a Shack Private Toilet Water Closet Clean Water Electricity
Age -0.0791 -0.0879 -0.0448 -0.302 -0.321 -0.231
(0.159) (0.185) (0.393) (0.497) (0.308) (0.171)
Age Squared 0.000633 0.000658 0.000529 0.00297 0.00281 0.00188
(0.00127) (0.00151) (0.00329) (0.00433) (0.00263) (0.00138)
Female -0.964*** -1.052*** 0.171 0.810 -0.245 -0.660**
(0.283) (0.315) (0.591) (0.713) (0.413) (0.274)
Agric. Hukou 0.410 0.168 0.915 1.171 0.542 0.0973
(0.501) (0.551) (1.055) (1.079) (0.766) (0.506)
Married or Cohabited 0.395 0.548 1.351* 1.669 0.524 0.434
(0.406) (0.502) (0.778) (1.221) (0.674) (0.416)
HH Income 0.184** 0.170* 0.342*** 0.315*** 0.414*** 0.174*
(0.0897) (0.0888) (0.0817) (0.0810) (0.136) (0.0994)
Years of Schooling 0.130*** 0.0873** 0.0424 0.0368 0.119* 0.108***
(0.0381) (0.0438) (0.0865) (0.109) (0.0631) (0.0371)
Num. of Children -0.546* -0.591* -0.931 -0.192 -0.215 -0.382
(0.316) (0.352) (0.882) (1.255) (0.378) (0.280)
Parent Num. of Children Squared 0.0578 0.0657 0.134 0.0599 0.0502 0.0265
(0.0412) (0.0486) (0.144) (0.221) (0.0515) (0.0368)
Age × Poor 0.127 -0.0161 -0.0676 0.236 0.247 0.282
(0.264) (0.279) (0.419) (0.516) (0.346) (0.291)
Age Squared × Poor -0.000844 0.000144 0.000323 -0.00254 -0.00238 -0.00235
(0.00202) (0.00219) (0.00348) (0.00446) (0.00290) (0.00223)
Female × Poor 0.652 0.387 -1.292** -1.922** -0.948* -0.917
(0.491) (0.477) (0.645) (0.755) (0.501) (0.558)
Agri-Hukou × Poor 1.424 1.321 -0.726 -0.666 -0.0999 1.420
(1.155) (0.930) (1.168) (1.185) (0.939) (1.030)
Married × Poor 0.209 -0.393 -1.042 -1.308 -0.135 -0.170
(0.653) (0.645) (0.859) (1.264) (0.768) (0.688)
HH Income Child College Age × Poor 1.024*** 0.408** -0.176 -0.156 -0.252 0.175
(0.247) (0.196) (0.130) (0.128) (0.164) (0.126)
Schooling × Poor -0.0942 0.0457 0.0940 0.0753 -0.0171 0.0146
(0.0693) (0.0637) (0.0927) (0.113) (0.0726) (0.0782)
Num. Children × Poor -0.417 -0.126 0.213 -0.608 -0.623 -0.696
(0.428) (0.494) (0.922) (1.280) (0.474) (0.456)
Num. Children Squared × Poor 0.0212 0.00338 -0.0644 0.0214 0.0308 0.0942*
(0.0483) (0.0634) (0.148) (0.223) (0.0623) (0.0539)
Admission Rate -1.394 -0.802 -2.942 -6.059 -1.695 -0.496
(1.476) (1.748) (3.668) (4.514) (2.609) (1.460)
Admission Rate × Poor 2.984 -0.0424 2.652 5.785 1.487 -0.573
(2.782) (2.523) (3.898) (4.698) (3.012) (2.877)
Constant -3.118 -4.379 -6.508 -5.417 2.077 1.365
(4.737) (5.393) (11.10) (13.58) (8.394) (5.151)
Observations 17,311 17,311 17,311 17,311 17,311 17,311
R-squared 0.088 0.088 0.084 0.088 0.086 0.086
lnL -66425 -66431 -66466 -66423 -66445 -66444
Chow Test 2.868 1.308 0.933 3.056 1.499 1.299
Prob ≥ F 6.84e-05 0.176 0.534 2.19e-05 0.0848 0.182
Note: 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Chow tests (F statistics) and corresponding p-values are given in the last two
rows. 2. The dependent variable is the marginal returns to human capital investment and it is predicted by using the
actual investment amount, which is obtained by directly asking the parents, as the human capital investment T1. 3.
Poor indicates whether the household faced binding liquidity constrained when the children were at college age (age
of 18). 4. Six liquidity dummies are employed to proxy for the liquidity situations, namely whether the household
income was in the bottom quartile of the sample (Column (1)), whether the family lived in a shack (Column (2)),
whether the family had a private toilet (Column (3)), whether the family had a water closet (Column (4)), whether the
family had access to clean water (Column (5)), and whether the family had electricity (Column (6)).
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Table 2.5. Testing for Binding Liquidity Constraint, Years of College Schooling
Measure for T1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Income in Bottom Quartile Living in a Shack Private Toilet Water Closet Clean Water Electricity
Poor 0.108 0.322 0.678 0.938 0.450 -0.211
(0.417) (0.421) (0.600) (0.727) (0.492) (0.437)
Age 0.0415*** 0.0547*** 0.0504*** 0.0809*** 0.0565*** 0.0468***
(0.00485) (0.00555) (0.0106) (0.0139) (0.00854) (0.00505)
Age Squared -0.000478*** -0.000624*** -0.000574*** -0.000928*** -0.000662*** -0.000531***
(5.62e-05) (6.71e-05) (0.000131) (0.000187) (0.000113) (6.39e-05)
Female -0.0364*** -0.0428*** -0.0425 -0.0163 -0.0279 -0.0423***
(0.0109) (0.0133) (0.0261) (0.0360) (0.0193) (0.0110)
Agric. Hukou -0.286*** -0.302*** -0.317*** -0.226*** -0.260*** -0.294***
(0.0249) (0.0272) (0.0569) (0.0611) (0.0399) (0.0238)
Married or Cohabited 0.224*** 0.212*** 0.250*** 0.255*** 0.221*** 0.211***
(0.0130) (0.0148) (0.0293) (0.0343) (0.0210) (0.0129)
Child Coresiding with Family -0.169*** -0.174*** -0.182*** -0.252*** -0.172*** -0.155***
(0.0122) (0.0139) (0.0282) (0.0331) (0.0192) (0.0119)
Biological Child 0.0861* 0.0409 0.106 0.0624 0.0357 0.0490
(0.0441) (0.0529) (0.0704) (0.0954) (0.0755) (0.0434)
Age × Poor -0.00423 -0.0260*** -0.0106 -0.0440*** -0.0178* -0.0174*
(0.00824) (0.00810) (0.0115) (0.0146) (0.00978) (0.00894)
Age Squared × Poor 5.53e-05 0.000288*** 0.000116 0.000509*** 0.000221* 0.000175*
(9.08e-05) (9.12e-05) (0.000140) (0.000193) (0.000124) (9.94e-05)
Female × Poor -0.0144 0.00437 0.00330 -0.0248 -0.0174 0.00951
(0.0199) (0.0184) (0.0279) (0.0372) (0.0221) (0.0206)
Agri-Hukou × Poor -0.0135 0.0456 0.0309 -0.0611 -0.0369 0.0287
(0.0510) (0.0449) (0.0618) (0.0657) (0.0476) (0.0518)
Married × Poor -0.0482** -4.76e-05 -0.0407 -0.0468 -0.0100 0.00822
(0.0210) (0.0213) (0.0316) (0.0361) (0.0242) (0.0244)
Num. Children Squared × Poor 0.0349* 0.0272 0.0229 0.103*** 0.0126 -0.0222
(0.0211) (0.0195) (0.0302) (0.0347) (0.0225) (0.0222)
Biological × Poor -0.0337 0.0837 -0.0341 0.0215 0.0695 0.135*
(0.0712) (0.0688) (0.0826) (0.104) (0.0864) (0.0754)
Note: 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Chow tests (F statistics) and corresponding p-values are given in the last two
rows. 2. The dependent variable is the marginal returns to human capital investment and it is predicted by using the
years of college schooling as the human capital investment T1. 3. Poor indicates whether the household faced binding
liquidity constrained when the children were at college age (age of 18). 4. Six liquidity dummies are employed to
proxy for the liquidity situations, namely whether the household income was in the bottom quartile of the sample
(Column (1)), whether the family lived in a shack (Column (2)), whether the family had a private toilet (Column (3)),
whether the family had a water closet (Column (4)), whether the family had access to clean water (Column (5)), and
whether the family had electricity (Column (6)).
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Table 2.5 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Income in Bottom Quartile Living in a Shack Private Toilet Water Closet Clean Water Electricity
Age -0.00210 -0.00656 0.00691 0.000452 -0.0103 -0.0125
(0.00793) (0.00965) (0.0193) (0.0264) (0.0160) (0.00873)
Age Squared 1.96e-05 5.25e-05 -5.50e-05 -1.60e-05 9.33e-05 9.84e-05
(6.29e-05) (7.90e-05) (0.000158) (0.000227) (0.000137) (7.06e-05)
Female -0.0559*** -0.0645*** -0.00676 0.0332 0.00146 -0.0478***
(0.0147) (0.0168) (0.0322) (0.0391) (0.0217) (0.0144)
Agric. Hukou 0.117*** 0.128*** 0.141** 0.153** 0.141*** 0.112***
(0.0283) (0.0313) (0.0620) (0.0614) (0.0416) (0.0294)
Married or Cohabited 0.0125 0.0272 0.0774* 0.0833 0.0303 0.0224
(0.0198) (0.0250) (0.0406) (0.0629) (0.0343) (0.0203)
HH Income 0.0108* 0.00984* 0.0176*** 0.0181*** 0.0277*** 0.0104
(0.00575) (0.00570) (0.00395) (0.00467) (0.00858) (0.00668)
Years of Schooling 0.0123*** 0.0111*** 0.0107** 0.0153*** 0.0139*** 0.0112***
(0.00198) (0.00231) (0.00449) (0.00544) (0.00315) (0.00193)
Num. of Children -0.0634*** -0.0676*** -0.134*** -0.118** -0.0524*** -0.0508***
(0.0143) (0.0156) (0.0462) (0.0593) (0.0175) (0.0144)
Parent Num. of Children Squared 0.00586*** 0.00628*** 0.0154** 0.0158* 0.00545*** 0.00405**
(0.00177) (0.00202) (0.00708) (0.00935) (0.00197) (0.00182)
Age × Poor -0.00487 0.00128 -0.0140 -0.00354 0.00433 0.0168
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0206) (0.0273) (0.0178) (0.0147)
Age Squared × Poor 3.81e-05 -1.29e-05 0.000111 3.90e-05 -5.42e-05 -0.000126
(0.000109) (0.000110) (0.000168) (0.000233) (0.000149) (0.000112)
Female Parent × Poor 0.0355 0.0259 -0.0584* -0.100** -0.0793*** -0.0226
(0.0254) (0.0244) (0.0348) (0.0411) (0.0261) (0.0277)
Agri-Hukou × Poor 0.109* 0.0202 -0.0272 -0.0208 -0.0265 -0.00263
(0.0603) (0.0506) (0.0681) (0.0673) (0.0513) (0.0530)
Married × Poor 0.0222 -0.0255 -0.0685 -0.0700 -0.0176 -0.0240
(0.0324) (0.0316) (0.0442) (0.0648) (0.0387) (0.0333)
HH Income × Poor 0.0490*** 0.0216* -0.00742 -0.00900 -0.0192* 0.00861
(0.0120) (0.0111) (0.00809) (0.00793) (0.0101) (0.00773)
Schooling × Poor -0.00732** -0.00134 0.000960 -0.00548 -0.00466 0.000311
(0.00342) (0.00326) (0.00481) (0.00564) (0.00366) (0.00391)
Num. Children × Poor 0.00935 0.0221 0.0778 0.0617 -0.00730 -0.0315
(0.0196) (0.0229) (0.0478) (0.0605) (0.0226) (0.0226)
Num. Children Squared × Poor -0.00159 -0.00210 -0.0104 -0.0106 -1.28e-05 0.00398
(0.00213) (0.00281) (0.00723) (0.00945) (0.00261) (0.00256)
Admission Rate 0.218*** 0.288*** 0.280 0.235 0.361** 0.260***
(0.0782) (0.0941) (0.217) (0.282) (0.152) (0.0772)
Admission Rate × Poor -0.0374 -0.208 -0.0817 -0.0468 -0.209 -0.233
(0.140) (0.131) (0.227) (0.289) (0.169) (0.149)
Constant -0.322 -0.388 -0.784 -1.132 -0.525 -0.0860
(0.238) (0.278) (0.559) (0.697) (0.428) (0.261)
Observations 17,311 17,311 17,311 17,311 17,311 17,311
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.118 0.124 0.121 0.118
lnL -15014 -15008 -15051 -14989 -15022 -15046
Chow Test 2.267 1.647 0.951 2.974 1.396 0.849
Prob ≥ F 0.00211 0.0452 0.512 3.61e-05 0.127 0.636
Note: 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Chow tests (F statistics) and corresponding p-values are given in the last two
rows. 2. The dependent variable is the marginal returns to human capital investment and it is predicted by using the
years of college schooling as the human capital investment T1. 3. Poor indicates whether the household faced binding
liquidity constrained when the children were at college age (age of 18). 4. Six liquidity dummies are employed to
proxy for the liquidity situations, namely whether the household income was in the bottom quartile of the sample
(Column (1)), whether the family lived in a shack (Column (2)), whether the family had a private toilet (Column (3)),
whether the family had a water closet (Column (4)), whether the family had access to clean water (Column (5)), and
whether the family had electricity (Column (6)).
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Table 2.6. Estimation on T2 Equation Using Investment as T1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Tobit ME Two-part
VARIABLES ME DependOnChild Parameter Estimates P(trans f er > 0|x) E(ln(trans f er)|x, trans f er > 0)
Age -0.00194 0.518*** 0.0418*** -0.00751
(0.00820) (0.0851) (0.00704) (0.0259)
Age Squared -8.49e-06 -0.00366*** -0.000289*** -3.89e-05
(6.14e-05) (0.000625) (5.28e-05) (0.000188)
Female 0.0491*** 0.0809 0.00833 0.0171
(0.0136) (0.124) (0.0112) (0.0359)
Years of Schooling -0.00647*** -0.0436*** -0.00473*** 0.0209***
(0.00173) (0.0168) (0.00150) (0.00482)
Parent HH Net Income/Num. of Children -0.0721*** -0.204** -0.0257*** 0.00375
(0.00992) (0.0799) (0.00726) (0.00697)
HH Net Financial Wealth/Num. of Children -3.88e-05 -0.000216 -1.86e-05 9.10e-05*
(2.87e-05) (0.000228) (1.79e-05) (4.94e-05)
HH Lifetime Income/Num. of Children 2.52e-06 -0.00199 -0.000191 0.00101*
(0.000337) (0.00264) (0.000205) (0.000562)
Age -0.0125*** 0.247*** 0.0211*** -0.0167
(0.00442) (0.0499) (0.00413) (0.0139)
Age Squared 0.000111** -0.00301*** -0.000254*** 0.000142
(5.25e-05) (0.000595) (4.99e-05) (0.000160)
Female -0.189*** 1.321*** 0.134*** -0.236***
(0.00901) (0.101) (0.00875) (0.0298)
Num. of Children 0.0301*** 0.265*** 0.0306*** -0.130***
(0.00687) (0.0694) (0.00642) (0.0206)
Child Agric. Hukou 0.159*** 0.0774 0.0246* -0.262***
(0.0149) (0.147) (0.0129) (0.0442)
Income 0.00914*** 0.231*** 0.0168*** 0.0839***
(0.00154) (0.0156) (0.00176) (0.00437)
Human Capital Investment 0.00887** -0.0548 -0.00256 -0.00621
(0.00451) (0.0590) (0.00443) (0.00824)
Fixed Costs (T1 > 0) 0.0140 0.288 -0.00325 0.485***
(0.0277) (0.338) (0.0267) (0.0662)
Observations 12,700 12,700 12,700 8,056
lnL -8049.102 -28363.358 -7805.221 -12575.384
Note: 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 2. Clustered robust standard errors are at the household level in parentheses.
3. Column (1) contains the marginal effects using the dummy of “whether a household member would like to rely on
children” as dependent variable. Column (2) contains the parameter estimates of the Tobit model using log transfer
as dependent variable. Column (3-4) are the marginal effects of the participation decision and the amount decision of
transfers.
We first consider the marginal effects using the parental investment measure,
which is shown in Table 2.6. As expected, the probability of depending on children
for support during retirement decreases with parental income and increases with the
income of the children. Interestingly, parents who invested in their children’ human
capital are significantly more likely to receive financial transfers from the children
at older ages. The marginal effect for fixed costs, however, is not significant which
does not support the fixed costs argument. The Tobit estimation is shown in Column
(2), and we find that marginal effects of both the human capital investment and the
fixed costs are not significant. One possible explanation for the insignificant effect
of fixed costs on T2 is that many parents faced a binding liquidity constraint. As
equation (2.A.19) in appendix 2.A shows, T2 will only depend on child and parental
income in the second period if the parental liquidity constraint (2.1d) was binding
in the first period.
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Table 2.7. Estimation on T2 Equation Using Years of College Schooling as T1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Tobit ME Two-part
VARIABLES ME DependOnChild Parameter Estimates P(trans f er > 0|x) E(ln(trans f er)|x, trans f er > 0)
Age -0.00108 0.532*** 0.0423*** 0.00133
(0.00819) (0.0850) (0.00705) (0.0256)
Age Squared -1.46e-05 -0.00374*** -0.000292*** -0.000102
(6.14e-05) (0.000624) (5.29e-05) (0.000186)
Female 0.0480*** 0.0718 0.00787 0.0124
(0.0136) (0.123) (0.0112) (0.0354)
Years of Schooling -0.00826*** -0.0587*** -0.00542*** 0.0117**
(0.00176) (0.0171) (0.00152) (0.00487)
Parent HH Net Income/Num. of Children -0.0681*** -0.212*** -0.0262*** 0.00206
(0.0110) (0.0817) (0.00727) (0.00655)
HH Net Financial Wealth/Num. of Children -4.51e-05 -0.000228 -1.88e-05 7.05e-05
(2.96e-05) (0.000234) (1.81e-05) (4.70e-05)
HH Lifetime Income/Num. of Children -2.15e-05 -0.00212 -0.000197 0.00104*
(0.000330) (0.00267) (0.000207) (0.000557)
Age -0.0127*** 0.245*** 0.0206*** -0.0133
(0.00441) (0.0499) (0.00412) (0.0138)
Age Squared 0.000119** -0.00291*** -0.000243*** 0.000116
(5.25e-05) (0.000595) (4.98e-05) (0.000160)
Female -0.181*** 1.435*** 0.141*** -0.184***
(0.00917) (0.103) (0.00888) (0.0303)
Num. of Children 0.0330*** 0.297*** 0.0314*** -0.107***
(0.00692) (0.0693) (0.00643) (0.0206)
Child Agric. Hukou 0.178*** 0.251* 0.0315** -0.159***
(0.0151) (0.151) (0.0133) (0.0455)
Income 0.00839*** 0.220*** 0.0163*** 0.0798***
(0.00154) (0.0155) (0.00175) (0.00430)
Human Capital Investment 0.00815*** 0.0405** -0.000267 0.0566***
(0.00173) (0.0172) (0.00156) (0.00504)
Fixed Costs (T1 > 0) 0.0348 1.198*** 0.118*** -0.0869
(0.0271) (0.254) (0.0238) (0.0721)
Observations 12,700 12,700 12,700 8,056
lnL -8035.951 -28339.656 -7788.606 -12525.309
Note: 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 2. Clustered robust standard errors are at the household level in parentheses.
3. Column (1) contains the marginal effects using the dummy of “whether a household member would like to rely on
children” as dependent variable. Column (2) contains the parameter estimates of the Tobit model using log transfer
as dependent variable. Column (3-4) are the marginal effects of the participation decision and the amount decision of
transfers.
However, the Tobit specification is arguably too restrictive in explaining the dif-
ference between extensive and intensive margins. Therefore we focus on the double
hurdle model in Columns (3) and (4). The results for the probability that parents
receive financial transfers from their children in old age are broadly consistent with
those obtained using “Depend on this Child” as the dependent variable. The effect
of human capital investment, though, is not significant and fixed costs only play a
role when looking at the amount transferred. These results follow the theoretical
prediction on fixed costs only at the intensive margin.
In Table 2.7, we report the results using the number of years of college schooling
measure. The structure and specifications are the same to Table 2.6. In Column (1),
we find that, except for fixed costs, all the other marginal effects follow the theory.
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In the double hurdle model, we find that, in the participation equation, the marginal
effect of the fixed costs is positive and significant. The human capital investment
is negative and insignificant, which does not follow the theory. However, human
capital investment has a positive and significant effect on the amount of money
transferred, while fixed costs do not play a significant role. The results support the
theoretical prediction with fixed costs at the extensive margin only when using the
years of college schooling measure.
2.6 Conclusion
At both the macro and micro levels, there is evidence of substantial underinvestment
in human capital for the cohorts who are now the backbone of the labour market
in China. In this chapter, we investigate the role of parental liquidity constraints
and fixed costs of education in explaining this underinvestment. We first extend the
theoretical model by Raut & Tran (2005), and then we empirically test the model
predictions using data from the 2013 China Health and Retirement Longitudinal
Study (CHARLS).
From the benchmark theoretical models, we know that there is always human
capital underinvestment in presence of bargaining between the parent and the chil-
dren. The binding liquidity constraint would further reduce the optimal investment
amount, and it is reflected through an increase in the marginal returns on the invest-
ment. To empirically test whether liquidity constraint matter for the parents, we
employ the methods in Zeldes (1989) by testing the difference in the marginal re-
turns between the constrained and unconstrained sample. We measure the liquidity
constraints by six indicators constructed from the life history survey of CHARLS.
The results show some evidence that binding liquidity constraints can affect the
decision of the parents to invest in their children’s college education.
We further examine the role of fixed costs, such as tuition fees and children’s
foregone wages, in explaining the underinvestment in human capital. From the
theory we find that if fixed costs affect the parental investment decision in the first
period, then this is also reflected in the children’s old-age transfer decisions during
the second period. Empirically we then test the relevance of fixed costs in the old-age
transfer decision at both the extensive and intensive margins. When using actual
years of college schooling as measure for human capital investment, we find that
fixed costs only affect the extensive margin. However, if we employ the actual
30 Chapter 2
amount of money invested by the parents, then the intensive margin is significantly
affected. The sensitivity of the effects using various measures might be explained
by the fact that some parents did not face binding liquidity constraints when their
children were at schooling ages. In general, the results provide support for the
importance of fixed costs in human capital investment decisions.
Overall our findings point to the importance of policy measures aimed at redu-
cing barriers to the private investment in human capital in developing countries,
such as poverty-alleviation policies and student-loan programs.
In this chapter, we assume that all children have identical levels of altruism
toward their parents. In reality, however, this might not always hold. For example,
Bonsang (2009) finds that the share of daughters in the household could serve as an
instrument for childrens informal care to the parents. Kalwij et al. (2014) suggest
that different children have different tastes for providing care to parents. In this
thesis, we consider the number of children in the household as the measure of total
altruism to parents. We could further examine whether the share of daughters (as
used by Bonsang (2009)) in the household could affect the results. We leave this as
future research.
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2.A Model Derivations
In this appendix, we solve the models discussed in section 2.2 and derive for the
optimal human capital investment decision T1 (from parent to child) and the optimal
old-age transfer decision T2 (from child to parent). We extend the models in Raut &
Tran (2005) by incorporating the parental liquidity constraint and educational fixed
costs. The rest of this appendix is organized as follows. In section 2.A.1, we solve
the so-called “parent as dictator” model which serves only as a benchmark model in
this chapter. Section 2.A.2 solves the main model employed in this chapter, which
is called “children with bargaining power”. The major difference between these
models is who decides the amount of T2: in the “parent as dictator” model, parents
decide T2; while in the “children with bargaining power” model, children decide T2.
2.A.1 Parent as Dictator
In the first “parent as dictator” model, the parent chooses consumption cp1, cp2,
human capital investment in child T1, and the old-age transfer T2. By substituting
the constraints (2.1b), (2.1c) and (2.2b) into the parental lifetime utility function, the
optimization problem can be expressed as follows:
max
s,T1,T2
u(Ep1 − (s + nT1 + nC1(T1 > 0)))
+β[u((1 + r)s + Ep2 + nT2) + γpu(Ek2(T1, τ)− T2)] (2.A.1a)
s.t. u(Ek2(T1, τ)− T2)− u(Ek2(0, τ))
+ γk[u((1 + r)s + Ep2 + nT2)− u(cop2)] ≥ 0 (2.A.1b)
s ≥ 0 (2.A.1c)
T1 ≥ 0, (2.A.1d)
where cop2 denotes the optimal level of parental consumption if she does not make an
educational investment in her child. All variables are defined in section 2.2. Equation
(2.A.1b) describes the child’s participation compatibility constraint, and the child
obeys the arrangement by the parent if this constraint is not binding. Constraint
(2.A.1c) is the parental liquidity constraint.
If human capital investment involves fixed costs, i.e. C > 0 in equation (2.1b),
then the choice problem is not standard due to the fact that the choice set is non-
convex. As we stated in subsection 2.2.3, finding the optimal solution requires
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several steps (see, e.g., Hausman, 1980; Cogan, 1981). First, one solves the choice
problem presented above under the restriction that the parent does not invest in the
human capital of the child (T1 = 0). In that case the parent does not incur any fixed
costs and obtains a maximum intertemporal utility level of U0p. Then one solves the
same problem under the condition that the parent invests in the schooling of the
child (T1 > 0) and as a consequence faces fixed costs. Let U1p and T∗1 be the optimal
solution in case of investment. The decision to invest in the education of the children
involves a utility comparison: if U1p > U0p, the parent invests T∗1 , otherwise not.
In case that U1p > U0p, the first order conditions (F.O.Cs) imply the following
equalities:
u′(cp1)− µ = (1 + r)(β + θγk)u′(cp2) (2.A.2)
∂Ek2(T1, τ)
∂T1
= (1 + r) +
µ
(u′(cp1)− µ)
≥ (1 + r) (2.A.3)




where the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers θ and µ are associated with the participation
constraint of the children and the parental liquidity constraint, respectively.




= (1 + r). (2.A.5)
This is the result reported by Raut & Tran (2005): the parent’s education decision for
each child is market efficient as the marginal rate of return of investment in child’s
education equals the market rate of return on other assets (1 + r). Notice the level
of investment in each child’s education does not depend on other variables, like
the degree of parental altruism and the total number of children. This result does
not hold if the child has bargaining power. To discriminate between the dictator
model and the bargaining model, the identification strategy of Raut & Tran (2005)
relies on the sensitivity of T1 to the number of children n. Equation (2.A.3) says that
the marginal rate of return is higher than (1+r) and the human capital investment
level is lower if liquidity constraint (2.A.1c) is binding. Notice that in that case T1
might be negatively related with n. Please also note that equation (2.A.3) holds
irrespective of whether the participation constraint (2.A.1b) is binding or not. But
from now onwards, we assume like Raut & Tran (2005) that the child obeys the
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parental arrangement and his(her) participation constraint is not binding (θ = 0). In
that case, the first order conditions (2.A.2) and (2.A.4) simplify to:





One can show that these first order conditions also hold if we impose that the
parent doesn’t invest in the education of their children (T1 = 0). To have a explicit
consumption path, we follow Raut & Tran (2005) and assume that the utility function
is of logarithm form (u(x) = α ln(x)) and that α + αβ = 1. Then one can show that
cp2 =
 (1 + r)
β
1+β Υ(T1, T2) = αβ(1 + r)Υ(T1, T2) if µ = 0 (s > 0)
Ep2 + nT2 if µ > 0 (s = 0),
(2.A.8)
where Υ(T1, T2) = Ep1 +
Ep2
1+r − nT1 +
nT2
1+r − nC · 1(T1 > 0). Combining (2.A.7-2.A.8)
















n + C · 1(T1 > 0)
]






n if µ > 0 (s = 0),
(2.A.9)
where the coefficients are functions of parental altruism γp.
2.A.2 Children with Bargaining Power
In the second model “children with bargaining power”, the parent first makes
investment T1 in the first period, then the child reacts by making T2 in the second
period. The parent first solves the following optimization problem:
max
s,T1
u(Ep1 − (s + nT1 + nC1(T1 > 0)))
+β[u((1 + r)s + Ep2 + nT2) + γpνp(Ek2(T1, τ)− T2)] (2.A.10a)
s.t. s ≥ 0 (2.A.10b)
T1 ≥ 0, (2.A.10c)
34 Chapter 2
then the child solves the following problem in the second period:
max
T2
ν(ck2) + γku(cp2) (2.A.11)
s.t. ck2 = Ek2(T1, τ)− T2 (2.A.12)
cp2 = (1 + r)s + Ep2 + nT2. (2.A.13)
Using backward induction, we first solve the optimization problem for the child.
We can derive the optimal consumption allocation between the parent and the child





Equation (2.A.14) is similar to equation (2.A.7), but the difference here is that equa-
tion (2.A.7) is obtained from the child’s problem rather than the parent’s. The parent
foresees this result when (s)he solves his(her) optimization problem (2.A.10). Like in
the dictator model, the parent faces a non-convex choice set because investment in
children’s human capital involves fixed costs. Again, the parental decision whether
or not to invest in human capital is made on basis of a comparison of lifetime utilities
U1p and U0p.
In the case that the parents decide to invest in their children’s human capital, the
first order conditions (F.O.Cs) imply the following equalities:









≥ (1 + r)
γpγk
. (2.A.16)
The Euler equation (2.A.15) is exactly the same as in the dictator model if the
participation constraint is not binding (cf. equation 2.A.6). If the liquidity constraint







According to the bargaining model, parents invest less in their children’s human
capital than according to the dictator model because parents and children are typic-
ally imperfectly altruistic (0 < γp < 1, 0 < γk < 1). Similar to equation (2.A.3) in
the dictator model, we observe that a binding liquidity constraint causes parents to
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invest even less in their children.
Then we need to derive an explicit solution for T2. Notice that equations (2.A.15)
and (2.A.14) also hold if T1=0. Again we assume logarithmic utility and α + αβ = 1.
Under those assumptions, the closed form solution for cp2 can still be described by





After combining this result with equation (2.A.8) and by rearranging, we obtain the













n + C · 1(T1 > 0)
]





n if µ > 0 (s = 0).
(2.A.19)
Different from equation (2.A.9) whose coefficients are only determined by the par-
ent’s altruism, the coefficients in equation (2.A.19) are only determined by the
children’s altruism.
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2.B Detailed Sample Selection
We first construct a child-level data set from CHARLS 2013 where each observation
is a child.14 After deleting the dead children and those observations with missing
values on the gender (174 missing), date of birth (3,030 missing), education (2,551
missing), Hukou status15(1,132 missing), marriage (1,506 missing), coresiding with
family (1,584 missing), income (9,003 missing16) and the number of alive children
(6,141 missing), in total 19540 observations are left (Originally 30,051 alive children
with missing values in covariates are available).
Then we merge the child-level data with the household information. We choose
the family respondent as the representative of the household and consider also
the information on his(her) spouse if married. For instance, the gender and age
information of the household is from the family respondent while the education level
of the household is taken from the highest one of the couple,17 and the household
wealth is the total wealth of the couple. At this stage, 10,787 out of 10,803 households
are retained. After merging, we further conduct a sample selection as follows. First,
the children from those household members who are not family respondent or
spouse are dropped,18 retaining 19,540 observations in total. Second, we drop those
observations with missing values on some important variables of the households
and drop those children who are still at school. At this stage, 18,995 observations
are left. We do not drop those children who are still coresiding with the family even
though the directions of the transfers could be ambiguous.19
14 We choose the second wave because it is more updated. Nevertheless, we also conduct robustness
check using the first wave and the third wave. We do not choose the third wave namely CHARLS 2015
as our main data set because we also need information in the life history survey in 2014 therefore the
retrospective information on the new households in the third wave are not available.
15 Hukou is a special institutional arrangement to identify the origins of households. In general, two
kinds of Hukou are frequently discussed: the agricultural one and the non-agricultural one. It is a very
important institution for Chinese households, since non-agricultural Hukou brings about more social
advantages than the agricultural one, and the costs of altering the Hukou are substantial.
16 The size of the missing values in income is huge, and it deserves more investigation. Actually, no
information on the reasons of the missing is given in CHARLS 2013 or 2015. However, in CHARLS
2011, the number of missing values is 4,212, among which 4,032 are due to “don’t know” and 69 due to
“refuse to answer. Therefore, the majority of the missing values here are also from the “don’t know” type
non-response.
17 We just consider the main respondent and spouse in the households and delete the other household
members.
18 In CHARLS, it is possible to have children from multiple couples in a household. The sampling
strategy employs a screening method at the household level, namely asking all the age eligible household
members aged 45 above and their spouses.
19 No consensus has been reached on this issue. Raut & Tran (2005) only have data from non-coresiding
parents and children, so they don’t consider coresiding children (page 397, the last sentence is section
2.1). Oliveira (2016), however, assumes coresiding is the transfer from children to parents, therefore he
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Finally, in order to obtain information on liquidity constraints and alternative
measures of permanent income, we merge the data with the life history data set20
based on household ID and the year when each child reached the college age of 18.
At last we reach a sample size of 17,311.
includes coresiding children in the sample (page 5, footnote 25). Ham & Song (2014) drop the coresiding
children, since they argue that the directions of transfers in coresiding families are not clear (page 81, line
3 of paragraph 2 in Data section).
20 We first transform the life history data into an informative unbalanced panel data, then construct the
liquidity variables and calculate lifetime income.

Chapter 3
The Impact of the Cultural
Revolution on Lifetime Income*
3.1 Introduction
The long-term effect of exposure to adverse events early in life on individual income
has important implications for policy makers. A precise evaluation of the total costs
throughout one’s lifetime caused by these adverse events enables governments to
propose more effective remedies. The extant literature employs various events (e.g.
wars, regional violence, and earthquakes) to estimate the long-term effects of those
events on individual income (see, e.g., Almond et al., 2018). The Chinese Cultural
Revolution (CR hereinafter), an adverse political event, is often treated as a targeted
event of interest in studies of Chinese populations. The literature using the CR,
however, reports mixed results. For example, Zhang et al. (2007), Zhou (2013) and
Li et al. (2010) find that the CR had positive effects on individuals’ current income.
They argue that individuals who lived through the CR may have developed a mental
fortitude that has led to the observation of this positive effect. Alternatively, it might
be the result of a selection effect–that is, those who were affected were originally
from elite social classes. In contrast, another stream of research (see, e.g., Xie et al.,
2008) shows that the CR had no significant effects on earnings. A third stream of
*This chapter is based on Wang (2019).
40 Chapter 3
research such as Meng & Gregory (2007) reports negative effects. Negative effects
are explained by interrupted human capital accumulation due to the CR. The mixed
findings are the result of different research streams focusing on different specific
contexts, such as the “sent-down movement” or interrupted education during the
CR. However, the most important feature of the CR has not been well studied,
namely, the violence. Violence can affect individuals significantly over their life
cycles. In addition, due to data limitations, many well-established studies, such as
Xie et al. (2008), employ the data sets that cover only certain cities rather than the
entire country. Assessing the general impact of the CR on income using a nationally
representative sample is worthwhile because it is important to evaluate the cost of
this event on the population in this cohort.
In this chapter, we estimate the general impact of the CR on individual lifetime
income, giving special attention to two critical aspects. The first is the measure of
income. Most traditional literature employs individual income from a single year
as the measure (see, e.g., Li et al., 2010). This measure is also often observed in
research using population census data. Using only one year of observation fails
to capture the general life-cycle effect of the adverse event (see, e.g., Haider &
Solon, 2006) and suffers from temporary fluctuations. To overcome this issue, we
consider two measures for a lifetime earnings profile as the dependent variables.
To capture both the levels and curvature of the profile, we consider the average
lifetime income per worked year and the difference of a person’s first and last wages
before retirement. By using average lifetime income, we smooth the temporary
fluctuations. By using the first-last wage differentials, we capture the steepness
of the age-earnings profile and thus the effect of on-the-job training. The second
problem arises with respect to measures of exposure to the CR. Existing literature
characterizes the CR by considering certain isolated events or phenomena that
occurred during the CR, such as the sent-down movement or interrupted education
(see, e.g., Li et al., 2010; Xie et al., 2008; Zhou & Hou, 1999). In this chapter, we
consider two types of exposure to the CR. The first exposure measure is regional
violence during the first five years of the CR (1966-1971), which is a prefecture-level
measure, and the second exposure measure is whether an individual joined the Red
Guard army, which is an individual-level measure.
The China Health and Longitudinal Retirement Study (CHARLS hereinafter)
life history survey data set is ideal for this research. The CHARLS is nationally
representative and provides complete records of work history and corresponding
wage information. From this data set, we are able to construct lifetime panel data to
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use in our subsequent analysis. The general results show that, within the CR cohort,
the prefectures with more violence during the CR produced lower average lifetime
income among males, while having joined the Red Guards increased the average
lifetime income for males. The average lifetime income of females within the CR
cohort was not significantly affected by either measure. In addition, the first-last
wage differential was not affected by violence levels or having been a member of
the Red Guards.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 briefly introduces
the background of the CR. Section 3.3 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3.4
introduces the data set and variables. Section 3.5 analyses the impact of the CR on
lifetime income. Section 3.6 offers some concluding remarks and discussion.
3.2 The CR
The general historical and political explanations of the CR have been documented
in several papers (see, e.g., Bonnin, 2006). The CR has affected many aspects of the
country and its residents, such as cultural traditions, education system, personal
beliefs, and long-term household welfare. In general, the CR can be divided into
two subperiods: The first half of the CR consists of the Red Guard army movement
and the massive chaos created by the Red Guard army members, and the second
half consists of the “rustication program” or the sent-down movement.1 Figure 3.1
depicts the overall timing of the event. We begin by introducing the second half (i.e.
rustication) and then explain the core elements of the first half, which is the primary
period we focus on in this chapter.
1966 1969 1971 1976 1978
Red Guard Movements Rustication (Sent-Down) Movements
CR Violence
Ten Years of CR
Figure 3.1. Major Events in the CR
1 The rustication movement forced Chinese youths to the countryside to be reeducated by farmers.
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3.2.1 Rustication and College Education during the CR
Most of the extant literature (see, e.g., Xie et al., 2008) studies the effect of the
rustication program (or the sent-down movement) during the CR on individuals’
current income. Identified as second half of the ten years of the CR, from 1969 to
1976, this period marks a revolution in education for the school-aged youth. Due to
the massive interruption of schooling and the chaotic uprising among the young
Red Guard members in the first half of the CR, a serious mismatch occurred between
an increasingly limited labour force and the number of Red Guard members who
experienced interrupted schooling in the second half of the CR. To address the
potential massive unemployment, the youth were rusticated to the countryside or
to factories. This rustication policy was formally terminated in 1978 even though
the CR ended in 1976,2 so 1977 is also an important year for significant rustication.
During the period between 1978 and 1980, the majority of youths sent to work in
the countrysides returned to urban areas when the policy ended. Some stayed in the
countryside, however, for the rest of their lives.
Another stream of literature (see, e.g., Meng & Gregory, 2007) studies the poten-
tial income loss due to missed schooling years (especially for college-level schooling)
during the CR. Before the CR, schools were open, and a college education was avail-
able for high school graduates who could pass the college entrance examinations.
Throughout the CR, however, the college entrance examinations were suspended.
Moreover, colleges did not admit new students between 1966 and 1970. Beginning
in 1970, recruitment only took place via recommendations by local administrators
based on the backgrounds of the candidates, such as whether candidate’s family
members were poor farmers (politically good) or landlords (politically bad). In total,
approximately 940,000 candidates were recruited through this unique channel, and
it is now widely believed that candidates in this small cohort were of the lowest
quality in terms of their education. At the end of 1977, recruitment via recommenda-
tions was terminated, and the college entrance examinations were restored along
with a minimum grade requirement and a relaxed age limit. Eligible individuals
who could apply for colleges included high school graduates, returning rusticated
youths, workers, farmers, demobilized soldiers, and cadres (those who have decent
jobs) with at least primary diplomas. Age requirements differed across different
groups. Individuals who were in middle or high school in 1966, 1967, and 1968
(called laosanjie), and who suffered the most severe interruptions of their schooling,
2 Nevertheless, a small number of educated youths were still rusticated between 1978 and 1980.
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were all eligible to apply. Individuals younger than 25 years of age were also eligible.
In 1977, approximately 5,700,000 people applied to take the college entrance exam
and fewer than 300,000 were recruited. In 1978, the numbers were 6,100,000 and
402,000, respectively.
3.2.2 The Red Guard Movement and Violence in the CR
In this chapter, we focus on the first half of the CR, and a similar strategy is employed
by Bai (2014). While the most commonly recognized ten years of the CR occurred
between 1966 and 1976, the CR stricto sensu, is defined with historical objectivity
as the period from May 1966 to April 1969 (Bonnin, 2006). During this period, the
youth, mostly from urban areas, were incited to “rebel” against the country’s current
leadership and join the Red Guard army. The majority of Red Guards came from
the student population at that time. Nonetheless, some young factory workers were
also involved. Many schools and factories were therefore closed. Consequently,
students faced interrupted education in this period. Even for those students who
remained in school, the curricula changed to emphasize the study of the “Little Red
Book”, a collection of famous quotations from Chairman Mao. At the end of 1968,
all the students who were in middle or high school in 1966, 1967, and 1968 (laosanjie)
were simply graduated, regardless of their grade. After the intense conflicts initiated
by the Red Guard, several campaigns began to play a role, most of which were
conducted by the military and newly established local governments. Figure 3.2
offers a detailed timeline of this period.
In Figure 3.2, the earliest events, such as “Wudou” (armed battles), “attack
military/government”, and “suppression”, are often classified as collective conflicts
and did not involve the military. Most of these events lasted throughout the first
half of the CR. Beginning around 1969, events such as “Qingdui” (cleansing of class
ranks), the “One Strike-Three Anti” campaign, and the “Anti-May 16” campaign3
were initiated either by the military or the newly established local government
(geweihui). In the literature, the first group of events are defined as “collective conflicts”
and the second group of events are defined as “campaigns”. In the empirical research,
collective conflicts are often used as the measure of severity of the CR because they
occurred before various campaigns. The spatial distributions of conflicts, campaigns,
and their associated number of deaths and injuries appear in Figures 3.3 and 3.4,
3 The Anti-May 16 event was created by a group of left-wing Red Guards in 1967, and the Anti-May 16
campaign was initiated to punish these Red Guard members.
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respectively.
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Conflicts without Involving Military (Wudou)
Attack Military/Government
Suppression by Military/Security Forces
Cleansing of Class Ranks (Qingdui)
One Strke-Three Anti (Yidasanfan)
Campaign against May 16 Elements
Figure 3.2. Six Named Collective Conflicts/Campaigns
According to Walder (2014), approximately 1.1-1.6 million unnatural deaths oc-
curred, and 20 to 30 million people were the victims of some of political persecution
produced by the discord between the insurgents and the authorities during the CR.
Human capital is not the only aspect that has been devastated; other critical aspects
such as social capital and city infrastructures have also been damaged. Traditional
wisdom argues that the rural areas were free from being affected, but this is perhaps
not true. Walder & Su (2003) recently demonstrated that the rural areas were also
extensively affected, though the effects were delayed compared with the urban areas.
In the current empirical analysis, we only use the number of events and deaths from
collective conflicts.
3.3 Relevant Literature
Several studies estimate the impacts of adverse political events on individuals’ late-
life well-being. For the purpose of this chapter, we examine literature that employs
the CR as a natural experiment, with special attention given to research that uses
income as the dependent variable. We summarize information on journals, data
sets, methodologies, measures of exposure to the CR, and income measures in
Table 3.1. Because income is closely related to educational choices, we also include
the literature that uses education as the dependent variable into the table.
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(a) Number of Conflicts* 1000 per Capita
(b) Number of Deaths* 1000 per Capita
(c) Number of Injuries* 1000 per Capita
Figure 3.3. Collective Conflicts Violence during the CR 1966-1971
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(a) Number of Campaigns* 1000 per Capita
(b) Number of Deaths* 1000 per Capita
(c) Number of Injuries* 1000 per Capita
Figure 3.4. Campaign Violence during the CR 1966-1971
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Table 3.1. Literature Review of the CR Effects on Income and Education
Authors (Journals) Data Methods Measures of CR Exposure Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable: Income
Li et al., 2010 (JPE) Twins Survey1 Twin FE Sent-down to rural Monthly earnings 2002
Zhou & Hou, 1999 (ASR) Urban Residence2 OLS Sent-down to rural Annual income 1978, 1987, 1993
Zhou, 2013 (WP) CGSS32003 IV Sent-down to rural Monthly income 2003
Meng & Gregory, 2007 (IZA-WP) UHIES4 Years of missed schooling Monthly earnings 1992-2000
HIDS5 LATE CR Cohort 1947-1961 Years of schooling




Deng & Treiman, 1997 (AJS) 1% Census7 Trends FE Year-of-birth in CR Educational attainment
Meng & Zhao, 2016 (IZA-WP) CHIPS8 IV Years of missed schooling Years of schooling
CULS9 Unnatural deaths and victims
UREES10 Regional growth compared to pre-CR
Meng & Gregory, 2002 (EDCC) UIDS11 Probit Years of Missed Schooling Educational attainment
RFPS12
Bai (2014) (WP) Gazetteers13 IV Unnatural Deaths and Victims Regional development
Census 1982, 1990, 2000 Education
Han et al., 2019 (JHC) CHNS14 OLS,RD CR cohorts 1947, 1948-50, Re-schooling
UHS15 1951-55, 1956-57, 1958-61
Fan, 2017 (ALCR) CGSS31990/2000 Semi-Para. Cox CR cohorts 1947-1957 School returning timing
Note: 1. The Chinese Twin Survey was conducted by the Urban Survey Unit of the National Bureau of Statistics of
China in five cities in 2002. 2. The sample of urban residents was collected in 1993 and 1994 in 20 cities from six
provinces: Hebei, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Sichuan. 3. The China General Social Survey (CGSS)
is the earliest nationally representative continuous survey project, launched by the Department of Sociology of the
Renmin University of China and the Survey Research Center of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
in 2003. The first phase consists of 2003-2006 and 2008, and the second phase consists of 2010-2019. 4. The Urban
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (UHIES) is conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China on an
annual basis. The sample includes 15 provinces and lasts from 1992 to 2000. 5. The Household Income Distribution
Surveys (HIDS) is conducted by the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The surveys
were conducted in 1995, 1999, and 2002 and cover ten, six and ten provinces, respectively. 6. The Study of Family Life
in Urban China (SFLUC) was conducted in 1999 in three cities: Shanghai, Wuhan, and Xi’an. The authors collected
the data by themselves. 7. The 1% sample of census is drawn from the 1982 population census of China. 8. The
Chinese Household Income Project Survey (CHIPS) was conducted by China Institute for Income Distribution with
the help of National Bureau of Statistics and now has five waves: 1988, 1995, 2002, 2007, and 2013. It covers all the
provinces and both rural and urban households in China. 9. The China Urban labor Survey (CULS) was conducted
by the Institute for Population and labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences with provincial and
municipal branches of National Bureau of Statistics of China, which was conducted from November 2001 to January
2002. It covers five large cities: Fuzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan and Xi’an. 10. The Urban Residents Education
and Employment Survey (UREES) was fielded in 2005 and consists of urban households in the following provinces:
Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Gansu. 11. The Urban
Income Distribution Survey (UIDS) was conducted nationwide by Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences in 1989. 12. The Residents and Floating Population Survey (RFPS) was fielded in Shanghai in 1995
by the Institute of Population Studies at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. 13. The gazetteers recorded local
histories, ranging broadly from geography, economics to politics in China; this data was collected by Walder (2014).
14. The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) was collected by the Carolina Population Center at University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for
Disease Control and Prevention; the first round was fielded in nine provinces in 1989, and six additional panels were
collected in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006. 15. The Urban Household Survey (UHS), which was designed to be
nationally representative, was collected by National Bureau of Statistics of China from 1986 to 2006. It is time series of
cross-sections.
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The extant literature commonly employs cross-sectional income or wages as the
dependent variable, but different research employs different measures of exposure
to the CR. Therefore, the identification strategies and the targeted populations vary
across studies. A typical example is given by Li et al. (2010), who employ a twins
data set. They consider whether one of the identical (monozygotic) twins who was
sent down to the rural area had a lower income than the other who was not sent
down. Using within-twins variation, they find that one year spent in the countryside
was associated with a 3.4% higher monthly wage in 2002. A similar data set is
employed by Zhang et al. (2007). They study the effect of the CR on income by
comparing returns to schooling between a CR cohort (born between 1947 and 1969)
non-CR cohorts. Employing hourly wages as the measure of income, they find that
the CR cohort does not have lower returns to schooling. Instead of using twins data,
Zhou & Hou (1999) conduct a survey in urban areas of six provinces in China. They
consider annual income across three years (1978, 1987, and 1993) as the dependent
variable. They also restrict the sample to individuals who entered into the labour
market between 1967 and 1968. They identify the impact of the CR by comparing
those who were sent down to the rural areas with those stayed in urban areas. The
results show that the CR negatively affected income, but the effects are insignificant.
Zhou & Hou (1999) attribute the insignificant results to a policy issued in 1980s to
facilitate the sent-down youth to labour market (e.g., government helps the sent-
down to find jobs). Instead of using an urban survey, Zhou (2013) employs nationally
representative survey data. Similar to Zhou & Hou (1999), Zhou (2013) compares the
monthly income of the sent-down and the stayed-in-urban groups. The difference
is that Zhou (2013) identifies the 1948-1963 cohort as the CR cohort and employs a
nationally representative sample. The evidence shows that the income of males was
positively affected by the sent-down experience while the income of females was not.
Xie et al. (2008) disaggregate the effect of the sent-down experience into groups with
different durations of stay. By investigating within-sibling variations in the sent-
down experience, they find that the sent-down experience actually increased annual
income if the sent-down duration was less than six months. If the duration of stay
was longer than six months, the sent-down experience decreased income. Meng &
Gregory (2007) calculate years of missed education for each cohort and estimate the
earnings loss by multiplying the years of missed schooling and returns to schooling.
They find that the CR cohort indeed has more years of missed schooling, but the
calculated earnings loss based on estimated returns to schooling is not significantly
different between the CR and the non-CR groups.
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In summary, the existing research has investigated the impact of the CR on in-
come through specific events that occurred during the CR. In addition, the measures
of income are mainly from cross-sectional data sets. In this chapter, we estimate
the general effect of the CR on lifetime income. Then we compare our results to the
estimates in the literature.
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.4.1 Data Source
Our primary data set is the life history survey of the CHARLS, conducted in 2014.
The CHARLS is a HRS (Health and Retirement Study)-type ageing survey that has a
common base with SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe)
and ELSA (English Longitudinal Study of Ageing). It aims to collect a nationally
representative sample of Chinese residents aged 45 years and more on a biannual
basis. The baseline survey was conducted in 2011, and now it has three regular
waves and one special survey on the life history of the respondents. The respondents
in the previous two waves (i.e., 2011 and 2013) were asked to provide retrospective
information on their family background, education, health, health care, wealth, and
work from the childhood until the interview year. One advantage of this survey
is the minimized error caused by recall problems of the elderly because it uses
calendars that are anchored to some important events in history, such as the CR or
certain major floods in local areas (Chen et al., 2017). In addition to the life history
survey data, wage information in Wave 1 (2011), Wave 2 (2013), and wave 4 (2015)
are also used for the sake of complete information and to double-check whether the
wage information is correct.
We also employ another historical data source on the regional violence associated
with the CR–namely, the China Political Events Dataset, 1966-1971, provided by
Walder (2014). Walder (2014) constructs county-level CR violence data by collecting
information in local annals (county or city gazetteers), including conflicts, injuries,
and deaths. The data also provide information on the extent of potential levels of
underreporting violence, such as the number of words used in the description of
the CR history. We use the information about the number of conflicts, injuries, and
victims from 1966 to 1971, the prominent period in the CR for the purposes of our
research. Because the data set is collected from county-level gazetteers, the variables
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are valid at the county-level. The life history survey of the CHARLS, however,
provides only the prefecture-level of individuals’ residence history. Therefore, we
link the individuals to the prefecture-level cities.4 This data set is also used by Meng
& Zhao (2016) and Bai (2014).
3.4.2 Variable Construction
Lifetime Income
The core dependent variable in our analysis is lifetime income, which we calculate
using self-reported annual income or monthly wages.5 To capture both the levels
and the curvature of lifetime income profiles, we construct two measures for lifetime
income. The first is the average lifetime earnings per worked year; we describe the
calculation procedures below, and they are similar to those used in Alessie et al.
(2013). The respondents are asked to provide all the jobs they had that lasted at least
six months, and each job is anchored by start and end dates. For each job episode,
there are some missing values for either start or end dates, so we impute those
missing values. Each job, depending on its duration, has different wage information.
For the first job as well as other jobs that lasted more than five years but fewer than
20 years, the wages in the first and the last years are recorded. For the jobs that lasted
more than 20 years, the wages in the first, the middle, and the last years are recorded.
Together with the current wage information from waves 2011, 2013, and 2014, wage
paths are obtained using linear interpolation by assuming constant wage growth
rates. In the original data set, there are some missing values, which we impute using
the strategy explained in appendix 3.A. We adjust the price levels to 2010 Chinese
yuan using the urban-rural-specific province-level annual Consumer Price Index
from 1960 to 2015, obtained from the National Bureau of Statistic in China. The
constructed annual income is shown in Table 3.2. Table 3.2 reports four types of
information: age, overall average annual income for all individuals, average annual
income for males, and average annual income for females. The first row of the
three-row block of each year for each variable provides the sample size, the second
row provides the mean, and the third row provides the standard deviation. In
4 Because the administrative divisions now are different from the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in some
counties not belonging to certain prefectures consistently, we match the current prefectures (the division
codes in CHARLS) to the multiple counties in the 1960s and 1970s (the division codes in Walder (2014)).
5 In the data set, respondents are asked information about their lifetime job tenures lasting at least six
months, such as the job category (e.g., own agricultural production and business activities, agricultural
employment, nonagricultural employment, nonagricultural self-employment, unpaid household business
help, and army), job start and end dates, hourly labour and wages.
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general, the income paths follow the statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics
of China closely.
Lifetime income should also include current pension benefits if the individuals
are retired or future pension benefits if they are yet to retire. In China, however, the
problem of calculating pension benefits arises because the majority of the population,
who are from rural areas, are not covered by any work-related pension schemes.
Even for those who began to participate the New Rural Pension Scheme initiated
in 2009, the age of retirement is rather unclear. Thus, the calculation of lifetime
income presents a challenge. To address this problem, we ignore the future pension
plans and use the lifetime income individuals have already earned. Because some
individuals in the sample are still working, we calculate the average lifetime income
per worked year. Therefore, individuals who have retired are comparable with
those who have not. The second measure–namely, first-last wage differentials,
which is calculated by subtracting the log of first wage from the log of last wage of
individuals–represents the proportional changes in the wages between a person’s
first and current jobs. This measure is constructed to capture the curvature of the
lifetime earnings profiles. A higher wage differential demonstrates a relatively lower
first wage compared with a higher last wage, indicating the potential high level
of reinvestment of human capital during work after the CR. This reinvestment is
mainly through on-the-job training.
Exposure to the CR
Ideally, the main explanatory variable should be the treatment that individuals
who have experienced the CR and the corresponding controls are naturally the
individuals who have not experienced the event. Because the CR affected almost
the whole country, it is difficult to find the counterfactual groups who were not
affected at all. Nevertheless, we can still employ three identification strategies by
using three measures of exposure to the CR. The first identification strategy employs
the measure of the CR cohort dummy. We can identify the impact of the CR by
comparing the conditional income difference between the CR cohorts and the non-
CR cohorts. Similar to traditional literature such as Meng & Gregory (2007), the
dummy is constructed based on whether the individual was born between 1946
and 1961.6 Because this cohort was most likely to experience the shutdown of
6 Meng & Gregory (2007) define the CR cohort as the collection of 15 cohorts between 1947 and 1961.
These 15 cohorts suffer from potential interrupted education. We consider one extra year ahead to capture
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Table 3.2. Annual Income, 1981-2010: Full Sample and by Gender
Year Age All Male Female
1981 Obs. 14,478 14,303 7,211 7,092
Mean 27.72103 7,159.376 8,841.826 5,448.696
S.D. 8.48599 22,558.05 28,543.57 13,861.07
1982 15,092 14,920 7,507 7,413
28.22316 7,899.564 9,788.934 5,986.237
8.68471 22,628.16 28,983.87 13,139.07
1983 15,578 15,391 7,727 7,664
28.82411 8,783.144 11,055.31 6,492.299
8.834886 24,238.38 31,140.65 13,846.95
1984 15,984 15,788 7,936 7,852
29.49468 9,668.497 12,230.24 7,079.348
8.955553 27,527.81 34,459.89 17,613.56
1985 16,370 16,170 8,120 8,050
30.1796 9,703.309 12,377.51 7,005.853
9.076376 27,935.4 35,500.18 16,791.14
1986 16,703 16,498 8,260 8,238
30.90056 10,029.09 12,909.4 7,141.084
9.189459 27,830.15 35,450.66 16,565.94
1987 16,967 16,747 8,392 8,355
31.63547 10,215.61 13,312.87 7,104.639
9.266397 35,073.3 46,625.87 16,215.82
1988 17,196 16,974 8,482 8,492
32.41382 9,097.036 11,933.41 6,264.001
9.342662 28,321.08 37,824.17 12,580.57
1989 17,370 17,118 8,548 8,570
33.22861 8,311.83 10,951.18 5,679.258
9.387296 24,073.18 31,886.18 11,384.95
1990 17,499 17,259 8,612 8,647
34.09618 8,778.265 11,611.97 5,956.029
9.429264 24,238.64 31,357.42 13,320.73
1991 17,580 17,301 8,623 8,678
34.98999 9,043.582 11,954.6 6,151.016
9.453399 23,787.73 30,079.42 14,572.74
1992 17,629 17,345 8,634 8,711
35.91355 9,071.547 12,035.14 6,134.155
9.462351 23,783.31 30,200.48 14,318.32
1993 17,654 17,346 8,637 8,709
36.81511 8,435.555 11,246.16 5,648.185
9.466224 21,731.4 27,589.89 13,043.89
1994 17,665 17,347 8,627 8,720
37.73122 7,315.056 9,780.657 4,875.75
9.461006 19,524.77 25,052.49 11,203.21
1995 17,643 17,316 8,596 8,720
38.65063 6,701.698 8,993.371 4,442.613
9.446832 19,358.27 25,179.4 10,437.04
Year Age All Male Female
1996 Obs. 17,628 17,293 8,580 8,713
Mean 39.56422 6,586.335 8,856.648 4,350.677
S.D. 9.441301 19,703.2 25,820.58 10,195.64
1997 17,583 17,262 8,549 8,713
40.49736 6,814.184 9,140.23 4,531.92
9.430995 21,921.41 28,930.58 10,971.06
1998 17,521 17,199 8,516 8,683
41.43337 7,297.487 9,797.97 4,845.095
9.417657 24,954.45 33,073.55 12,189.17
1999 17,451 17,125 8,474 8,651
42.37872 7,959.699 10,715.94 5,259.849
9.406149 28,773.22 38,348.52 13,553.65
2000 17,402 17,077 8,441 8,636
43.33416 8,465.887 11,412.42 5,585.888
9.391411 31,430.95 42,132.19 14,205.51
2001 17,307 16,954 8,372 8,582
44.26336 8,980.588 12,168.75 5,870.439
9.376955 34,884.57 47,096.13 14,861.75
2002 17,248 16,907 8,346 8,561
45.22756 9,643.165 13,140.56 6,233.606
9.374357 38,741.2 52,544.78 15,782.26
2003 17,173 16,831 8,298 8,533
46.179 10,064.98 13,750.65 6,480.809
9.369128 41,696.79 56,906.95 15,946.72
2004 17,078 16,761 8,250 8,511
47.12993 10,374.7 14,278.45 6,590.662
9.372928 44,773.13 61,529.44 15,784.97
2005 16,960 16,650 8,200 8,450
48.08296 10,727.54 14,833.1 6,743.444
9.37589 46,820.19 64,632.03 15,288.1
2006 16,835 16,546 8,133 8,413
49.02709 10,914.78 14,851.18 7,109.4
9.387844 25,024.05 27,683.21 21,478.39
2007 16,724 16,464 8,072 8,392
49.98344 10,968.52 15,099.59 6,994.973
9.398785 22,851.17 28,018.82 15,400.57
2008 16,632 16,388 8,023 8,365
50.94835 11,000.91 15,248.77 6,926.721
9.410438 24,244.13 30,389.82 15,228.4
2009 16,523 16,290 7,969 8,321
51.92592 11,552.73 16,018.49 7,275.878
9.428646 27,794.27 35,639.95 16,080.74
2010 16,423 16,236 7,930 8,306
52.89728 11,644.8 16,204.2 7,291.799
9.444695 31,047.61 40,702.23 16,245.45
Note: In this table, we show some descriptive statistics of annual income between 1981 and 2010 from the
life history survey of the CHARLS. In each three-row cube, we exhibit the number of observations, sample
means, and standard deviation of each variable. By comparing the table with the statistics released by the
National Bureau of Statistics of China, we find that the data are externally valid. The table also exhibits a
substantial gender gap in income.
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schools, the altering of curriculum, joining of the Red Guard army, and the sent-
down movements, this assignment of the treatment is the simplest and, of course,
the most imprecise one. The second peril is that it depends highly on the functional
approximations of the cohort trends. Therefore, the results might be sensitive to the
specifications with different polynomial orders of the year-of-birth term. Third, we
cannot evaluate the impact of the CR on individuals within the CR cohort, because
there are a lot of heterogeneities within the CR cohort. So we will not show this
result in the main text, but it is available on request.
Therefore, we mainly focus on the second and the third groups of measures of
exposure. The second group of measures is the regional violence during the CR.
Not every region was affected by the CR in the same way (see, Figure 3.3), so the
cross-regional variation can be employed to identify the impact of the CR. Thus, we
introduce the prefecture-level violence caused by the CR as another treatment to
help explain the variations in lifetime income. Specifically, we employ the number
of collective conflicts per thousand population and the number of unnatural deaths
due to the CR per thousand population. We make use of the conflicts and deaths
from the following types: (1) armed battles between insurgents factions (Wudou),
(2) attacks on military forces by insurgents, (3) attacks on government offices by
insurgents, (4) suppression of insurgents by military/security forces, and (5) other
conflicts involving insurgents. Because the violence counts account for all the events
between 1966 and 1971, they are time invariant. Descriptive statistics related to the
number of conflicts and deaths appear in Table 3.3. In addition to the collective
conflict variables, we provide the variables from campaign events for comparison.
Finally, we summarize the regional control variables in the data: the population
sizes of the “cadre”7 and urban residents in each prefecture at the start of the CR.8
We merge the violence data with the respondents in CHARLS through the
residence information between 1966 and 1971. The final measure of exposure to
the CR, especially the CR cohort, is the Red Guard army dummy. This represents
an individual who had (or had not) joined the Red Guard army. It is a dummy for
the “injurer” group during the CR because the Red Guard army was one the most
important instigators of chaos during the CR.
potential early schooling. The results are robust with respect to these minor changes in the time window.
7 ”Cadre” refers to those who have management positions or political power.
8 In the original data set, there are 354 prefectures.
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics of Prefectures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables N Mean S.D. Min Max Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3
Cadre population 345 15,797 17,809 0 150,551 5,759 11,899 19,317
Urban population 345 331,617 527,448 0 5.270e+06 90,958 192,492 360,330
Conflicts 345 9.441 7.700 0 44 4 8 13
Campaigns 345 17.88 11.90 0 57 9 16 24
Deaths (per thousand) 345 2.061 4.455 0 39.47 0.0754 0.532 1.984
Deaths due to conflicts (per thousand) 345 0.404 1.119 0 12.06 0.0102 0.0645 0.294
Deaths due to campaign (per thousand) 345 1.657 4.152 0 38.12 0.00936 0.222 1.446
Note: 1. Variables cadre population and urban population are the counts of people in positions with
power and with urban hukou status, respectively. 2. Conflicts measure how many collective battles or
confrontations occurred without involving the military or social security forces. 3. Campagins measure
the number of conflicts that were driven by the government or military forces.
Control Variables
We also construct some demographic controls, such as age (or year of birth), gender,
first Hukou status, and whether the respondents have ever married. Moreover, we
employ several control variables related to family backgrounds. First, we construct
the parental education background. Intergenerational mobility has been revealed
to have a significant impact on the offspring’s income through both education
and innate ability. Therefore, controlling for parental education can mitigate the
potential bias due to omitted innate ability. Second, we consider the family’s relative
financial situations compared with the average community/village and whether
the food supply was insufficient when the respondents were 17 years of age. This
information serves as a proxy for childhood conditions. Third, we employ three
variables related to family economic situations during the Great Chinese Famine
(1958-1961): whether family members were starving, whether any members starved
to death, and whether the family fled during the famine when the individual was
between 0 and 5 years of age. These dummies are important because among the CR
cohort members, some could have experienced the Great Chinese Famine between
1959 and 1961 when they were between 0 and 5 years of age. As a result, their
abilities could have been adversely affected. Fourth, as an important background
control, we consider whether the respondents received monetary or suggestive
help from family members when they were young adults. Receiving help, either
monetary or nonmonetary, can enhance the earnings capabilities of those who were
self-employed.
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3.4.3 Sample Selection
In total, 20,654 respondents have reported their information, but the valid sample
size drops to 20,622 after we exclude missing values in the variables of year of
birth (20,623 were not missing) and gender (20,652 non-missing). In addition, we
drop two individuals due to wrong values in year of birth (143- and 146-year-old
individuals). Next, we drop 696 individuals who never worked. Among this group,
197 individuals report no work history, and 499 individuals report that they had
worked but the data reveals no job tenures. We also drop individuals with missing
values for current Hukou and marriage status.9 At this stage, we have 19,384 total
respondents. We then construct a lifetime panel data and fill in the eduction and
work histories of each individual from their year of birth to the year of the interview.
The total number of individual-year observations is 1,158,838. Among the whole
sample, 349,762 individual-year observations do not have any work information,
and of these, 10,833 observations are gap years for all the individuals and the rest
are the individual-year observations during nonworking ages (either before or after
the working years). Among the 10,833 gap-year observations, 8,923 observations
represent unemployment status, and 1,910 observations have no information but we
also treat these observations as unemployed.10 The total number of observations
in working years is 819,909, and the number in working years with actual working
information is 809,076. Furthermore we find that not all individuals who report
working years also report complete wage information. We exclude all individuals
who reported no wage information. Finally, we are left with 739,298 individual-year
observations during working years without unemployment or breaks in careers,
and the overall sample size is 1,069,884. This amounts to 18,198 individuals. After
dropping the observations with missing administrative division codes, we finally
obtain 17,614 individuals. Within the CR cohort, the sample size is 8,808.
3.4.4 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of all the variables with final a sample size 17,614 appear
in the Table 3.4. In our subsequent analysis, we focus more on the CR cohort sample;
9 The majority of individuals who reported no work experience also have missing values in these
important variables. After we exclude the observations with missing values, 49 individuals reported no
work experience.
10 We do not impute the earnings of those with an unemployment status with 80% of the adjacent wages
as Alessie et al. (2013) do, because unlike developed economies, which pay approximately 80% of the
wages of the previous job if individuals become unemployed, individuals in developing economies, such
as China, receive nearly no public transfers when they are unemployed.
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these descriptive statistics appear in Table 3.5.
To generate an impression of the overall wage patterns in the final sample, we
estimate and plot the age-earnings profiles by gender, education, and CR/non-CR
groups. We obtain age-earnings profiles by regressing the log-annual income on the
fourth order polynomial in age for different groups with individual fixed effects.
Panel A of Figure 3.5 shows the age-earnings of males by education levels. Panel B
shows the equivalent for females. In general, the patterns follow the intuition that
less educated individuals have a flatter age-earnings profile (see, e.g., Alessie et al.,
2013). In Panel C, we estimate the profiles by gender and CR/overall cohorts, and
we find that males dominate females in terms of income and that the CR cohorts are
also inferior to the overall cohorts.
3.5 Empirical Models
We want to estimate the impact of the CR on individuals’ lifetime income profiles.
Specifically, we consider two variables to describe the lifetime earnings profiles:
average lifetime income per worked year and the first-last wage differential (log
last-log first). Typically it is common to use two types of variations to identify the
effects of exposure to CR: the cross-cohort variations and the regional variations
within the CR cohort. In the current context, however, the variations across CR and
non-CR cohorts are not plausible. Because the pre-CR cohort (born before 1946)
was also exposed to the CR (post-schooling period) and the great famine (in utero
or childhood period), and the post-CR cohorts (born after 1962) experienced the
opening and reform policy and other influential policies during the critical periods
of their lifetime.
To avoid these potential confounding factors, we only use the sample of the CR
cohort members (1946-1961). That said, we only use the cross-prefecture variations
to identify the effects. As a robustness check, in the online appendix (available on
request), we also make use of the cross-cohort variations only. The results show that
the CR members have a lower lifetime income than the non-CR cohort members.
Although we do not incorporate this variation in our model, the results from the
robustness check reveal that the effect we obtain is actually a lower bound. If we
found nontrivial negative effects, the true effects would be larger by including other
non-CR cohort members.
In the following models, we consider two measures of exposure to the CR as our
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Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics of All Respondents (Cross-Sectional)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables N Mean S.D. Min Max Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3
Core Variable
Lifetime income1 17,614 335,620 754,169 147.6 5.068e+07 77,366 175,015 373,442
Average lifetime income 17,614 8,968 21,683 3.433 1.810e+06 1,840 4,303 9,979
(per worked year)
Current (last) income 17,614 13,027 55,582 1.234 4.767e+06 1,324 4,406 14,904
First income 17,614 5,869 30,433 0.576 1.837e+06 427.7 1,322 3,722
First-last differential 17,614 7,160 56,021 -1.829e+06 4.766e+06 -377.3 1,840 9,966
log last-log first 17,614 1.148 1.964 -7.160 9.352 -0.327 1.133 2.519
Red Guard 17,614 0.193 0.395 0 1 0 0 0
Demographic Variables
Age 17,614 58.33 9.449 43 94 50 58 65
Female 17,614 0.501 0.500 0 1 0 1 1
First Hukou is agricultural 17,614 0.897 0.304 0 1 1 1 1
Have ever married 17,614 0.990 0.0981 0 1 1 1 1
Childhood and Family Background
Illiterate parent 17,614 0.818 0.385 0 1 1 1 1
Better financial situations2 17,614 0.605 0.489 0 1 0 1 1
Family starving to death3 17,614 0.102 0.303 0 1 0 0 0
Family starving during famine4 17,614 0.763 0.426 0 1 1 1 1
Family fleeing during famine 17,614 0.0807 0.272 0 1 0 0 0
Insufficient food before age 17 17,614 0.673 0.469 0 1 0 1 1
Have received monetary help5 17,614 0.0773 0.267 0 1 0 0 0
Have received idea help 17,614 0.137 0.344 0 1 0 0 0
Note: 1. The lifetime income is constructed based on each job tenure throughout the person’s history,
and the current income is the latest annual income if not yet retired or the last annual income before
retirement if already retired. 2. The respondent is asked how, before age 17, his/her family background
was compared with the average family in the same community/village. 3. The variable is obtained by
asking respondents who were between the ages of 0 and 5 years, between 1958 and 1961 (The Great
Chinese Famine), if any family member starved to death. 4. The respondent was asked that if any family
experienced starvation. 5. This variable is obtained by asking whether the respondent received financial
support for business when (s)he was young.
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Table 3.5. Descriptive Statistics of the CR Cohort Members (Cross-Sectional)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables N Mean S.D. Min Max Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3
Core Variable
Lifetime income1 8,808 320,951 695,493 147.6 2.254e+07 78,107 166,914 346,934
Average lifetime income 8,808 7,510 16,288 3.433 505,290 1,725 3,790 8,115
(per worked year)
Current (last) income 8,808 11,577 58,551 1.748 4.767e+06 1,322 4,171 11,908
First income 8,808 3,744 20,598 0.576 1.314e+06 327.6 890.4 2,451
First-last differential 8,808 7,833 59,663 -678,473 4.766e+06 -5.164 2,259 9,217
log last-log first 8,808 1.417 1.963 -7.160 9.352 -0.00563 1.465 2.760
Red Guard 8,808 0.299 0.458 0 1 0 0 1
Demographic Variables
Age 8,808 60.55 4.241 53 68 57 60 64
Female 8,808 0.497 0.500 0 1 0 0 1
First Hukou is agricultural 8,808 0.889 0.314 0 1 1 1 1
Have ever married 8,808 0.989 0.103 0 1 1 1 1
Childhood and Family Background
Illiterate parent 8,808 0.869 0.338 0 1 1 1 1
Better financial situations2 8,808 0.594 0.491 0 1 0 1 1
Family starving to death3 8,808 0.00840 0.0913 0 1 0 0 0
Family starving during famine4 8,808 0.101 0.301 0 1 0 0 0
Family fleeing during famine 8,808 0.0110 0.104 0 1 0 0 0
Insufficient food before age 17 8,808 0.0903 0.287 0 1 0 0 0
Have received monetary help5 8,808 0.0662 0.249 0 1 0 0 0
Have received idea help 8,808 0.119 0.323 0 1 0 0 0
Note: 1. The lifetime income is constructed based on each job tenure throughout the person’s history,
and the current income is the latest annual income if not yet retired or the last annual income before
retirement if already retired. 2. The respondent is asked how, before age 17, his/her family background
was compared with the average family in the same community/village. 3. The variable is obtained by
asking respondents who were between the ages of 0 and 5 years, between 1958 and 1961 (The Great
Chinese Famine), if any family member starved to death. 4. The respondent was asked that if any family
experienced starvation. 5. This variable is obtained by asking whether the respondent received financial
support for business when (s)he was young.




































40 50 60 70
Age
Primary and Less Middle School
High School More Than High School
Age−Earnings Profile






































40 50 60 70
Age
Primary and Less Middle School
High School More Than High School
Age−Earnings Profile




































40 50 60 70
Age
Male, All Cohorts Female, All Cohorts
Male, CR Cohorts Female, CR Cohorts
Age−Earnings Profile
(c) Age-Earnings Profile by Gender and Cohort
Figure 3.5. Age-Earnings Profile by Characteristics
60 Chapter 3
main explanatory variables: (1) the prefecture-level violence between 1966 and 1971
that an individual experienced and (2) whether the individual joined the Red Guard
army. The first measure is a proxy for the general effects of the CR on the population
at large, while the second assesses a specific group of people who actively joined the
CR. In the next subsection, we provide more detailed specifications.
3.5.1 Regional Violence
We first use prefecture-level violence to identify the impact of the CR. Each indi-
vidual is merged to a prefecture in which he or she lived between 1966 and 1971.
The estimated model is as follows:
yigc = α + β1Violenceg + Xiγ + Zgη + λc + εigc, (3.1)
where the violence variable, Violenceg, includes collective conflicts and the associ-
ated deaths between 1966 and 1971; thus, it is time-invariant. The collective conflicts
are defined in section 2. All the violence measures are transformed into logarithm
forms.11 The parameter β1 is the targeted parameter. Covariates Xi contain the
important family background and childhood conditions. The regional controls, Zg,
include the population sizes of urban and cadre people in the prefecture at the
start of the CR. In addition, to control for common trends, we also consider the
year-of-birth fixed effects λc. It is possible that individuals within each prefecture
correlate with each other. Therefore, we cluster the idiosyncratic errors, εigc, at
both the prefecture and the year-of-birth levels. The detailed estimation of two-way
clustering of standard errors is from Cameron & Miller (2015).
Notably, a threat on using historical archives deserves more discussion. Because
the CR is a political event, there is a possibility of underreporting of the counts
of victims or other adverse outcomes. Walder (2014) argues, however, that the
administration rules of local annals mitigate this problem because administrators
of annals are required to write down the number zero if no violence is observed
to have occurred. In addition, they must also record a reason for reporting a zero.
Nevertheless, the underreporting problem is still possible. That is, if the levels
of resources and attention allocated to writing the annals are low in some areas
(e.g., in many rural areas), then the underreporting problem is more likely to occur.
To examine whether the estimated effects are subject to potential underreporting
11 The transformation is log(1+violence) to avoid infinite negative values.
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bias, we also conduct a robustness check by including a proxy for underreporting
behaviour in our regression model.
The proxy for the measure of potential underreporting is the lengths of the annals
from which the measure of CR violence is constructed. Specifically, the proxy is the
word counts in dashiji, the general chronology of events for the period from June
1966 to December 1971. The rationale to use the word counts is that if a county
gave limited attention to writing the annals, then the underreporting behaviours
can be simultaneously reflected in the lengths of the annals. All the violence counts
are rescaled to 1,000,000 words. The robustness check results appear in the online
appendix which is available on request.
3.5.2 Red Guard Army
The last identification strategy is also employed to find the within-CR cohort effects
of the CR. The corresponding measure is the dummy indicating whether an indi-
vidual joined the Red Guard army or not. The model to be estimated is as follows:
yigc = α + β1RedGuardi + Xiγ + Zgη + λc + θg + εigc, (3.2)
where, ceteris parabus, RedGuardi is the Red Guard dummy, which is measured at
the individual level. The existing literature (see, e.g., Li et al., 2010) that employs the
sent-down movement reveals a positive value of β1. According to the history files
(e.g., Bonnin, 2006), those who were sent down between 1969 and 1978 were also
more likely to have joined the Red Guard army, and not vice versa.12
3.6 Results
In this section, we provide the estimation results for the models described in sec-
tion 3.5. We first demonstrate the results using regional violence as the measure of
exposure, and then we show the gender-specific estimates. Finally, we show the
results with the Red Guard army dummy.
12 In CHARLS, we identify individuals who were sent-down to the countryside; fewer than 300 respond-




The main results for model (1) appear in Table 3.6. Columns (1-4) show the estimates
using the average lifetime income per worked year as the dependent variable, and
Columns (5) and (6) show the results using the differential of the logarithm of first-
last wages. We consider two measures for the severity of the CR violence. The first
measure is the number of deaths that occurred during collective conflicts, and the
second measure is the number of collective conflicts. Columns (1-2) and (5-6) are the
estimates using the log of number of deaths, and Columns (3-4) and (7-8) are the
estimates with the log of the number of conflicts.
For each pair of dependent variable measure and core explanatory variable
measure, we first conduct the univariate regression (columns with odd numbers)
and then include the full set of control variables and fixed effects (columns with
even numbers). By comparing the two estimates in each pair, we can observe how
sensitive the results are and whether selection effects dominate the true effects or
not.
According to Columns (1-4), exposure to more severe violence decreases the
average lifetime income by more than 10 percentage points without control variables
and fixed effects. The effect is reduced to around 7 percentage points if we include
the full set of controls and fixed effects. The estimate for the log of deaths in Column
(2) also becomes insignificant, but the magnitude is very close to the log of number
of conflicts in Column (4).
In terms of wage differentials, as shown in Columns (5-8), exposure to violence
seems not to play a role. In addition to the insignificance of all estimates, the signs
of the estimates between two measures of exposure are also divergent.
3.6.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Gender
Currently, Chinese households exhibit a large gender gap in income (see Table 3.2).
Before the CR, the monetary system was run by the central state, and the gender
gap problem was not yet reflected in terms of real income. It is therefore important
to know whether the CR was the starting point of the gender gap. In other words,
it is important to know whether males and females were affected by the CR to the
same extent. In this subsection, we discuss the gender-specific effects by interacting
the gender dummy with the violence terms, as shown in Table 3.7. The upper panel
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contains the results using average lifetime income as the dependent variable, and
the lower panel uses the wage differential. For each panel, Columns (1-2) and (5-6)
show the estimates with the male sample, while other columns show the female
counterpart.
Table 3.6. Lifetime Income on Regional Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Ln Avg. Lifetime Income First-Last Wage Diff.
log deaths -0.102** -0.0735 -0.0638 -0.0575
(0.0482) (0.0450) (0.102) (0.0988)
Log conflicts -0.111*** -0.0720** 0.0879 0.0989
(0.0384) (0.0359) (0.0603) (0.0618)
Female -0.696*** -0.695*** -0.847*** -0.849***
(0.0461) (0.0459) (0.0583) (0.0591)
Agricultural Hukou at birth -0.466*** -0.457*** -0.00466 -0.0292
(0.0722) (0.0722) (0.0904) (0.0863)
Illiterate parent -0.112** -0.111** 0.0599 0.0628
(0.0557) (0.0558) (0.0647) (0.0642)
Constant 8.235*** 8.531*** 8.472*** 8.672*** 1.436*** 1.288*** 1.204*** 1.048***
(0.0618) (0.0849) (0.0956) (0.115) (0.0572) (0.146) (0.141) (0.200)
Observations 8,808 8,808 8,808 8,808 8,808 8,808 8,808 8,808
Adjusted R-square 0.002 0.159 0.004 0.160 0.000 0.055 0.001 0.056
Year-of-birth FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Regional controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Childhood controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Background controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Note: 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 2. Columns (1-4) show the results using the log of lifetime income
per worked year as the dependent variable, and Columns (5-8) show the ones with first-last differential
of log wage. 3. All standard errors are clustered at both the year-of-birth and prefecture levels. 4. The
childhood control variables include whether the respondents’ family experienced starvation or fled
during the great famine when they were young. Background controls include the family financial
situation and whether the respondents have received help when they were young.
In general, we find that the males are affected negatively in terms of average
lifetime income while females are not. With regard to the wage differential, neither
group seems to be affected. Similar to the results with the pooled sample, a one
percentage point increase in deaths due to the CR reduces the males’ lifetime income
by 8.9 percentage points (see Column (2)). The effect is 7.77 percentage points
(see Column (6)) when using the number of conflicts as the measure of severity.
The results for the females become insignificant when we include the controls and
year-of-birth fixed effects.
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Table 3.7. Lifetime Income on Regional Violence: by Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Male Male Female Female Male Male Female Female
Avg. Lifetime Income
log deaths -0.110** -0.0891** -0.0911 -0.0546
(0.0437) (0.0404) (0.0586) (0.0559)
log conflicts -0.100** -0.0777* -0.116*** -0.0607
(0.0443) (0.0441) (0.0426) (0.0409)
Agricultural Hukou at birth -0.364*** -0.580*** -0.358*** -0.570***
(0.0849) (0.0745) (0.0853) (0.0742)
Illiterate parent -0.139* -0.0867 -0.138* -0.0876
(0.0760) (0.0663) (0.0765) (0.0666)
Constant 8.589*** 8.444*** 7.877*** 7.936*** 8.797*** 8.595*** 8.129*** 8.055***
(0.0745) (0.106) (0.0592) (0.112) (0.115) (0.144) (0.109) (0.134)
Observations 4,432 4,432 4,376 4,376 4,432 4,432 4,376 4,376
Adjusted R-squared 0.002 0.100 0.001 0.075 0.003 0.100 0.004 0.076
First-Last Wage Diff.
log deaths -0.0893 -0.0865 -0.0358 -0.0247
(0.110) (0.106) (0.102) (0.103)
log conflicts 0.114 0.117 0.0681 0.0867
(0.0748) (0.0731) (0.0711) (0.0737)
Agricultural Hukou at birth 0.0471 -0.0702 0.0254 -0.0959
(0.113) (0.113) (0.110) (0.109)
Illiterate parent 0.0487 0.0572 0.0482 0.0619
(0.0918) (0.0976) (0.0908) (0.0972)
Constant 1.863*** 1.168*** 1.002*** 0.600*** 1.561*** 0.874*** 0.826*** 0.400*
(0.0679) (0.187) (0.0707) (0.181) (0.165) (0.244) (0.174) (0.237)
Observations 4,432 4,432 4,376 4,376 4,432 4,432 4,376 4,376
Adjusted R-squared 0.000 0.015 -0.000 0.009 0.001 0.016 0.000 0.010
Year of Birth FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Childhood Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 2. All standard errors are clustered at both the year-of-birth and
prefecture levels. 3. The upper panel shows the results using log of lifetime income per worked year as
the dependent variable, and the lower panel shows the results with first-last differential of log wage.
4. The childhood control variables include whether the respondents’ family experienced starvation or
fled during the great famine when they were young. Background controls include the family financial
situation and whether the respondents received help when they were young.
3.6.3 Red Guard Army
Finally, we show the estimates of equation (2) in Table 3.8–namely, the estimates
using the Red Guard army dummy as the core explanatory variable. Columns (1-4)
are the estimates taking the log of average lifetime income per worked year as the
dependent variable on the male and female samples, respectively. Columns (5-8)
are the counterpart estimates using the first-last wage differential as the dependent
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variable. Columns (1-2) and (5-6) show the results for the male sample, while the rest
show the results for the female sample. After we add controls and fixed effects, the
Table 3.8. Lifetime Income on Red Guard Army
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Ln Avg Lifetime Income First-Last Wage Diff.
Male Male Female Female Male Male Female Female
Red Guard 0.0734 0.166*** 0.114** 0.0818* -0.0366 0.0349 0.0378 0.0305
(0.0517) (0.0366) (0.0483) (0.0468) (0.0629) (0.0651) (0.0666) (0.0753)
Agricultural Hukou at birth -0.226*** -0.483*** 0.0703 -0.202*
(0.0737) (0.0909) (0.116) (0.118)
Illiterate parent -0.126* -0.0768 -0.0352 0.0384
(0.0706) (0.0580) (0.102) (0.0927)
Constant 8.528*** 8.672*** 7.822*** 8.532*** 1.850*** 1.893*** 0.982*** 0.973
(0.0844) (0.305) (0.0641) (0.377) (0.0777) (0.553) (0.0672) (0.619)
Observations 4,437 4,432 4,376 4,376 4,437 4,432 4,376 4,376
Adjusted R-square 0.001 0.207 0.001 0.174 -0.000 0.113 -0.000 0.121
Year-of-birth FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Prefecture FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Childhood controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Background controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 2. Columns (1-2) and (5-6) report on the male sample only, and
Columns (3-4) and (7-8) report on the female sample only. 3. All standard errors are clustered at both the
year-of-birth and prefecture levels. 4. The childhood control variables include whether the respondents’
family experienced starvation or fled during the great famine when they were young. Background
controls include the family financial situation and whether the respondents received help when they
were young.
effect of having been a Red Guard army member becomes higher and significant for
the males (see Columns (1) and (2)), while the opposite is for females (see Columns
(3) and (4)). On average, the experience of being a Red Guard army member for
males increases average lifetime income by about 16.6 percentage points, which is
substantial. The effect is approximately 8.18 percentage points for females. The
comparison between the univariate model and the full model also implies potential
selection effects. Because the control variables we include are mainly related to
family background during childhood (e.g., whether family members experienced
starvation, whether the family’s financial situation is better than that of neighbours),
it might suggest that those with a good family background were more likely to
join the Red Guard army. From the measures of the CR, we find that the regional
violence measure is more representative for victims during the CR. On the contrary,
members of the Red Guard army members were mostly the ”suppliers” of the
violence during the CR. Therefore, we assume that the Red Guard army represents a
self-selected, more active, and younger population with better family backgrounds.
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These individuals were more likely to self-motivate and seize (political/leadership)
opportunities. Another possible explanation is that they have built connections with
each other and that those connections helped them gain political power after the CR,
which subsequently helped them earn more because being a public servant is often
a well-paid occupation compared with others.
We have also estimated a separate specification, which allows for interaction
between the CR violence measures and the Red Guard Army dummy. The interac-
tion term is insignificant, regardless of whichever CR measure we use.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the long-term effects of the CR on individual lifetime
income using the life history survey of the CHARLS data set. The extant literature
reveals mixed evidence on the impact of the CR on income because different research
sheds light on different aspects of the CR. Yet the effects of the violence during
the CR on lifetime income need further investigation using alternative measures
of exposure to the CR. For the measure of income, most research employs cross-
sectional wages as the dependent variable, which has two potential drawbacks. First,
cross-sectional data cannot smooth out the temporary fluctuations. To overcome
this problem, we construct the average lifetime earnings per worked year as the first
dependent variable. Second, cross-sectional data sets cannot capture the curvature
of the individuals’ lifetime income profile. The curvature is important because for
those who have similar average lifetime income, it could distinguish those who
have always earned a lot from those who started with low income but ended with
high income. To account for this, we introduce the first-last wage differential, that is,
the difference between an individual’s first and last wages before retirement (or the
latest wage for those who are still working).
We employ two identification strategies through two measures of exposure to
the CR. First, we use regional violence during the CR between 1966 and 1971, and
second we use whether individuals joined the Red Guard army as the measure of
exposure. With the regional violence measure, we use the number of conflicts and
the number of deaths at the prefecture level as a proxy for CR-induced violence. The
results show that having been exposed to more violence decreases males’ lifetime
income by approximately 7%. Finally, we estimate the impact of having joined the
Red Guard army on lifetime income. The results show that males in the CR cohort
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who joined the Red Guard army have higher average lifetime income than those
who did not join, and the effect is around 16.6 percentage points. The estimates with
the first-last wage differential are insignificant for all gender groups. In future work,
it will also be important to identify potential mechanisms of the long term effects
and shed more light on the selection of being a Red Guard army member.
In the literature, several potential mechanisms can explain the results in this
chapter. The first mechanism is an interrupted education (see, e.g., Meng & Gregory,
2002). During the CR, many students were not able to receive regular training, which
translated to lower lifetime income after the CR. The second is social trust (see, e.g.,
Bai & Wu, 2020). The CR undermined mutual trust among individuals, which
harmed various economic cooperation after the CR. The third is the disadvantaged
local economies and governance. Red Guard Army members were more likely to
become regional governors because of their active involvement. Compared with
governors from other cohorts, those Red Guards are mostly inferior in terms of their
governing abilities.
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3.A Missing (Wrong) Values and Imputation Strategies
In the original data set, there are nontrivial number of missing values in either start
or end dates of each job tenure; thus, we impute them using the following strategy.
If the start dates are missing, we impute them using the end date of the previous
job tenure. If the end dates are the missing dates, we impute them using the start
date of the following job tenure. For those who were retired, we impute the missing
end dates of the final job using the retirement date; otherwise, we impute them
using the current date for the latest job. The detailed imputation numbers appear in
Table 3.A.1.
We construct the wage paths as follows: first, we assign the individuals’ wage of
the start year, the end year, and the middle year (if the job lasted at least 20 years)
to corresponding years of each individual-year observation. Second, we add or
update the wage information from the other three waves at the years of interviews
if available.13 Then, we interpolate the wage paths using linear interpolation except
during the unemployment and other career breaks.
Because there are still missing values, we further impute these by using the age-
max-min imputation. Specifically, we record the minimum, mean, and maximum of
the wages, and then we impute the missing values using minimum if the age was
under 30 years of age, using the mean if the age was between 31 and 50 years of
age, and using the maximum if the age was above 50 years of age. By using this
method, we assume that during each employment tenure, except the linear wage
growths, wages increase as work experience increases. Using this procedure, we
further imputes 127,292 observations for the wage paths with all job categories.
13 In wave 1, we drop those observations with extreme values in annual/monthly wages which is for
example larger than 1,000,000.
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Table 3.A.1. Missing Patterns on Job Variables
Job Tenures Job Category
i-th Job Starting Date Ending Date Difference
1 831 3901 (932) [2138] 30704{0} 280
2 4269 (1462)1 11506 (1358)2 [7343]3 7237{-2} 3917
3 12951 (2843) 15819 (303) [5410] 2868{-2}5 12892
4 17372 (1861) 18556 (118) [2928] 1184{-1} 17360
5 19177 (741) 19677 (46) [1195] 500{0} 19183
6 19939 (309) 20190 (27) [533] 251{0} 19938
7 20285 (122) 20401 (8) [230] 116{0} 20286
8 20447 (54) 20515 (4) [118] 68{0} 20448
9 20540 (29) 20569 (5) [53] 29{0} 20540
10 20576 (12) 20589 (0) [25] 13{0} 20577
11 20598 (9) 20605 (0) [16] 7{0} 20599
12 20609 (4) 20611 (0) [6] 2{0} 20609
13 20611 (0) 20616 (1) [4] 5{0} 20611
14 20616 (1) 20620 (0) [5] 4{0} 20616
15 20621 (1) 20621 (0) [1] 0{0} 20621
16 20621 (0) 20621 (0) [0] 0{0} 20621
17 20621 (0) 20621 (0) [0] 0{0} 20621
18 20621 (0) 20621 (0) [0] 0{0} 20621
Note: 1. The table shows the numbers of missing values in the starting and ending dates of each job tenure and the
job category variable. The total number of observations is 20,622, and numbers without any parentheses represent the
number of missing values in each variable. In the brackets () of the start dates are the missing start dates imputed
using the end date of the previous job tenure. 2. In the parentheses () of the end dates are the missing end dates
imputed using the start date of the following job tenure. 3. In the square brackets [] are the missing end dates imputed
using retirement date or the current date for the latest job, depending on retirement status. 4. The column “Difference”
represents the difference of the missing values between the start and the end dates (positive number means the number
of missing ending dates is larger, and vice versa). 5. The numbers in braces {} represent the difference between the
missing start and end dates after imputation (a negative number indicates that the number of missing start dates is
larger, and vice versa). After imputation, the job tenure information is of good quality.

Chapter 4
Exposure in utero to Adverse
Events and Health Late-in-life*
4.1 Introduction
A growing body of literature has shown that exposure to adverse conditions around
birth can have long-term negative consequences on health. The long shadow of
early-life circumstances can be explained by both biological and social mechanisms.
According to the “Fetal Origin Hypothesis” by Barker (see, e.g., Barker et al., 1993;
Barker, 1995; Almond & Currie, 2011), malnutrition during pregnancy might cause
disproportional fetal growth and program later coronary heart disease and type 2
diabetes (see, e.g., Lumey, Stein & Susser, 2011; Portrait et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2017;
Kim et al., 2017; Hu et al., 2017; Dinkelman, 2017; Doblhammer, van den Berg &
Lumey, 2013; Van den Berg et al., 2015). Moreover, prenatal stress might also be
responsible for developing diseases such as depression and cognitive deficiency in
the longer run (see, e.g., Akbulut-Yuksel, 2017; Gade & Wenger, 2011; Strauss et al.,
2011; Bramsen et al., 2007; Grimard & Laszlo, 2014; Teerawichitchainan & Korinek,
2012; Islam et al., 2017). The pathway framework (Kuh & Shlomo, 2004), on the
other hand, rests less on the biological imprinting and states that the impact of early
life conditions on health later in life depends also on the interaction of the individual
with the environment. The idea is that adverse conditions around birth might set in
motion lifetime trajectories of health related disadvantages. For example, children
*This chapter is based on Wang et al. (2020).
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born under adverse circumstances might be exposed to poor diets, smoking, worse
educational and job opportunities, and all these factors in turn will have a negative
impact on health.
In this chapter we estimate the effect of in utero exposure to the Chinese Great
Famine (1959-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (mainly the Red Guard Army
movement 1966-1971) on a range of physical and mental health outcomes in later
life. While the famine was responsible for severe malnutrition for pregnant mothers
living in rural areas, the Cultural Revolution caused a sharp increase in violence and
stress in urban areas. Therefore, it is interesting to look at both events.
We draw data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS)
survey, a nationally representative survey of the Chinese population aged 45 or
more. The 2011 and 2015 waves of the survey include data from blood biomarkers,
which allow us to construct an 8-year risk score for diabetes and a 10-year risk score
for cardiovascular disease (CVD). Indeed some in utero effects might only manifest
themselves later in life but early signals of disease might be detected at younger
ages using blood-based biomarkers. For mental health, the data include standard
survey scales to measure the presence of depressive symptoms and assess cognitive
abilities.
Our results support the idea that adverse events around birth potentially have a
long-lasting negative effect on both physical and mental health. We also find that
there are gender differences in this effect: exposure in utero to the famine heightens
the risk of type 2 diabetes for women, while it increases depressive symptoms for
men. On the other hand, the Cultural Revolution mainly harmed cognitive abilities
of men.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 summarizes the epi-
demiological and biomedical evidence. Section 4.3 briefly explains the background
of the Chinese Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution. Section 4.4 introduces
the data the construction details of the main variables. Section 4.5 describes the
empirical model and section 4.6 presents the results. Finally, section 4.7 concludes
the chapter.
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4.2 Biological Mechanisms
In this section we summarize several commonly accepted biological mechanisms
through which the in utero exposure to adverse events can be translated into late life
diseases. Based on the literature, there are two important mechanisms: malnutrition
and prenatal stress. Biomedical studies show that exposure to prenatal stress harms
individuals’ cortex development and it further induces depression and cognition
deficiency, whereas exposure to malnutrition is mostly associated with later life
cardiovascular disease or diabetes.
4.2.1 Stress and Cognitive Deficiency
In recent studies, prenatal stress is found to have a significant impact on the babies
in utero. The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis plays a crucial role in
understanding the mechanism,1 especially during early fetal development because
plasticity is very high (see, Braithwaite et al., 2014). Basically, the HPA axis is
a neuroendocrine system which regulates the body’s response to stress. Higher
prenatal stress implies more responses or reactions from the HPA axis, which in turn
affects the brain formation of babies.2
The detailed processes are as follows (see, e.g., Molenaar et al., 2019; Bock et
al., 2015). When pregnant mothers experience unexpected adverse events or a
stressful environment, the hypothalamus (the H of HPA) in the brain area release
excessively a type of hormone called corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH). The
CRH then travels to the pituitary gland (the P of HPA) which responds by releasing
more adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH). The ACTH then travels across human
bodies and reaches the adrenal glands (the A of HPA) on the top of kidneys. The
adrenal glands are stimulated by the increase of ACTH and release more cortisol
into the bloodstream. Normally the HPA axis has a feedback system that balance
the hormone levels. When the stress level becomes too high, however, the “negative
feedback” hits the HPA axis and the sense receptor in hippocampus will shut down
the stress response mechanism. Finally, the cortisol level becomes out of control.
The elevated cortisol level then affects the foetus. Normally the placenta acts as
1 There are also other mediation pathways to explain the association, but the one with HPA axis is
commonly accepted.
2 Various biological literature tries to find biomarkers to quantify the activity of the HPA axis and the
prenatal stress, such as hair cortisone levels (see, e.g., Molenaar et al., 2019) and dehydroepiandrosterone
(DHEA) and dehydroepiandrosteronesulfate (DHEAS) (see, e.g., Schmelter et al., 2019).
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a barrier between the concentrated cortisol level and the foetus. However, when the
cortisol density around the placenta becomes too high, it will penetrate the placenta
and the foetus becomes exposed to this excessive cortisol. Recent epigenetic literat-
ure offers the mechanisms after the foetus exposing to the excessive cortisol. It has
been shown that the gene expression and the DNA-methylation processes of babies
are altered to adapt to the changing intrauterine environment. The methylation pro-
cess of the genes such as Nr3c1, CRH, CRHBP, Crb,and Nr3c1 F1 promoter (see, e.g.,
Welberg & Seckl, 2001; Hamada & Matthews, 2019; McGowan & Matthews, 2017)
would be altered. For instance, the Nr3c1 gene which controls the glucocorticoids
receptor production and controls the HPA axis reactivity of babies. The altered HPA
axis activities then affects the shaping of cortex and hippo-campus which reflects
cognitive abilities late-in-life.
4.2.2 Malnutrition and Type-2 Diabetes and CVD Risks
Babies who experience malnutrition in utero are shown to have higher risks of type-2
diabetes (see, e.g., Vaiserman & Lushchak, 2019) and higher risks of CVD (see, e.g.,
Alessie et al., 2019). The literature finds that maternal malnutrition creates intrauter-
ine growth restriction, which then produces foetal adipose tissue and pancreatic
β-cell dysfunction for the foetuses. To be more specific, the β-cell dysfunction is
essential to explain the mechanisms behind the association. The β-cell is made from
the stem cells when the pancreas of the embryo is developing, and it is the basis for
the islets of Langerhans (the home of hormone). The decreased β-cell in reaction to
the environmental cues will lead to irreversibly reduced insulin secretion. That is
why the babies exposed to malnutrition will develop higher diabetes and CVD risks.
The detailed processes are as follows: when pregnant mothers and their embryos
experience malnutrition, the “thrifty genotype” starts to play a role (see, Hales &
Barker, 1992). Epigenetic evidence (mostly from animal models) shows that, with
reduced nutrition supply especially amino acids, the DNA-methylation processes
for genes such as IGF2, GNASAS, IL10, LEP, ABCA1, INSIGF and MEG3 will be
altered (see, e.g., Lumey, Terry et al., 2011; Heijmans et al., 2008; Tobi et al., 2009).
For example, one of the most famous epigenetic evidence by Heijmans et al. (2008)
shows that, when the expression of the gene insulin-like growth factor-2 (IGF2)
is reduced, the β-cell transformation from the stem cells is suppressed. Then the
body becomes thriftier in keeping glucose and releasing less insulin, and the risk of
having type 2 diabetes increase once the nutrition supply after birth is improved.
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The babies finally have lower insulin secretion and a higher ability to store fat (see,
e.g., Gluckman & Hanson, 2004).
The risks of having CVD also increase because of two reasons: first, since type 2
diabetes can also cause (or caused by) CVD, the risks for having CVD also increase.
Second, the lack of amino acids lead to the decrease of β-cells, while the lack of
glucose and oxygen will directly lead to a reprogramming of the neuro-endocrine
system (see, e.g., Almond & Mazumder, 2011), similar to the HPA axis reaction due
to stress. Then the CVD risks will be developed along with the type-2 diabetes risk.
The mechanisms summarized above are the most commonly accepted results.
Some other research also finds that malnutrition could affect cognition (see, e.g.,
De Groot et al., 2011; Doblhammer, Van den Berg & Fritze, 2013), vice versa for the
literature studying prenatal stress (see, e.g., Akbulut-Yuksel, 2017). These studies
are mostly from the epidemiology literature and the findings might suggest that
cognition deficiency is the complication of diabetes and CVD, vice versa.
4.2.3 Role of Gender
In the literature, the evidence on the sex-specific health effects of prenatal exposure
to adverse events is mixed (Alessie et al., 2019). For example, in terms of exposure
to prenatal stress, some studies reveal that it is mostly male offspring’s emotionality
to be negatively affected, while others find the opposite effect, i.e. that female
offspring’s anxiety and depressive symptoms respond significantly to the adverse
environment (see, e.g., Bock et al., 2015, for a review of both animal and human
studies). A strand of research finds that the gender-specific effects in response to
stress can be explained by the timing of stress exposure (see, e.g., Mueller & Bale,
2008). Male babies are more responsive to prenatal stress during early gestational
periods while female babies are more responsive during late gestational periods.
In terms of exposure to malnutrition, there is also some evidence showing that
males are affected differently than females. For example, Eriksson et al. (2010) find
that boys grow faster than girls in utero, therefore boys need more nutrition from
mothers. If mothers experience malnutrition during pregnancy, boys in utero will
more likely be affected. Moreover, boys in utero tend to develop their brains first. If
exposed to undernutrition, boys’ visceral development will be sacrificed to sustain
the nutrition supply for their brains. In the long run, boys’ kidney development
might be hurt, and some diseases such as hypertension and CVD will incur due to
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the underdevelopment of their kidney functions (see, e.g., Barker et al., 2006).
In this chapter, we will also empirically investigate the gender-specific health
effects of exposure to the CR and the famine to see whether males and females are
affected differently.
4.3 Background
4.3.1 The Chinese Great Famine
The Chinese Great Famine (CGF thereafter) is so far one of the largest famines in
human history in terms of both the severity and the size of the affected population.
The famine occurred mainly between 1959 and 1961, when the grain production
substantially dropped. Given the fact that grain was the major source of food, the
decline in grain production caused 16.5 to 45 million deaths during the famine
period (see, e.g., Meng et al., 2015). In the year 1958, some regions had already
experienced some grain production drops, but it had not yet become a nationwide
disaster. After the famine, grain production increased monotonically until it reached
the normal level.
The famine hit primarily the rural areas. Indeed, during the famine period, China
was running a centrally planned economy, and rural households were only able
to eat in local communal kitchens while urban households were able to consume
normal food products within quotas depending on the household size. Moreover,
rural households were not allowed to store food privately. So when the famine
arrived, rural households were immediately hit by the food shortage shock in the
communal kitchens. What was worse, the grain produced in rural areas was over-
procured by the central government so it exacerbated the starvation of the rural
households.
The famine not only produced substantial deaths nationwide but it also had a
long-term impact on the health outcomes of survivors. With little food available
for rural pregnant mothers, the foetuses in the famine cohort were more likely to
suffer from malnutrition than any other cohorts. In addition, mothers could have
also experienced stress which could have been passed on to the babies.
In Table 4.1, we show the annual province-level deaths rates provided by Lin &
Yang (2000). From the table we observe that during the famine years death rates
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are higher than in other non-famine years. Based on this, we calculate the excessive
death rates and employ them to measure the famine severity across provinces. We
calculate the excessive death rates in 0.1% unit by subtracting the average annual
deaths rates between 1956 and 1958 from those in the famine years (1959-1961).
During non-famine years, the measure of severity equals zero.
Table 4.1. Provincial Excessive Death Rates (unit 0.1%) between 1955 and 1964
Province / year 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Anhui 11.80 14.25 9.10 12.36 16.72 68.58 8.11 8.51 7.92 8.59
Fujian 8.26 8.43 9.02 7.50 7.95 15.61 12.18 8.27 7.51 8.68
Gansu 11.98 10.78 11.33 21.11 17.38 41.32 11.48 8.25 10.38 15.55
Guangdong 10.70 11.19 8.42 9.15 11.76 15.09 10.67 9.32 11.78 8.32
Guangxi 14.80 12.48 12.42 11.98 17.32 29.20 20.37 10.15 10.34 10.55
Guizhou 16.23 13.01 12.35 15.26 20.28 52.33 23.27 11.64 17.14 20.66
Hebei 11.86 11.26 11.59 10.92 12.31 12.19 13.34 8.97 10.66 10.48
Heilongjiang 11.33 10.08 10.45 9.17 12.76 10.52 11.12 8.61 8.56 11.47
Henan 11.75 14.00 11.80 12.69 14.10 39.65 10.10 8.03 9.39 10.65
Hubei 11.60 10.81 9.61 9.60 14.49 21.22 9.08 8.77 9.83 10.94
Hunan 16.41 11.50 10.35 11.58 12.92 29.26 17.48 10.23 10.26 12.88
Inner Mongolia 11.40 7.90 10.50 7.90 11.00 9.40 8.80 9.00 8.50 11.80
Jiangsu 11.65 12.81 10.03 9.33 14.55 18.41 13.35 10.36 9.03 10.13
Jiangxi 16.23 12.49 11.47 11.33 13.01 16.05 11.54 11.00 9.76 10.87
Jilin 9.91 7.53 9.05 9.11 13.43 10.13 11.12 9.96 9.44 12.62
Liaoning 9.40 6.60 9.40 8.80 11.80 11.50 17.50 8.50 7.90 9.30
Ningxia N.A. N.A. N.A. 14.10 15.81 13.88 10.71 8.49 10.22 13.44
Qinghai 13.76 9.34 10.40 12.64 16.29 40.72 11.68 5.35 8.36 15.53
Shaanxi 10.55 9.85 10.31 11.04 12.76 12.27 8.76 9.35 10.55 15.60
Shandong 13.73 12.16 12.05 12.77 18.14 23.51 18.48 12.35 11.78 12.06
Shanxi 12.93 11.60 12.68 11.73 12.84 14.21 12.20 11.34 11.44 13.98
Sichuan 13.26 11.79 11.82 17.37 19.22 47.78 28.01 14.61 12.82 13.87
Yunnan 13.76 15.21 16.29 21.62 17.96 26.26 11.84 10.86 14.14 15.23
Zhejiang 12.58 9.46 9.32 9.15 10.81 11.88 9.84 8.61 7.89 9.21
Note: Date source comes from the National Bureau of Statistics of China and is summarized by Lin &
Yang (2000).
4.3.2 The Cultural Revolution
The Cultural Revolution (CR thereafter) was a major adverse political event which
happened between 1966 and 1976 (see, e.g., Walder & Su, 2003) in China. It is often
called the “lost ten years” in China. In this period, there were millions of victims
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who suffered from various types of political movements and prosecutions, and
the negative impacts persist throughout the victims’ whole life course. A more
detailed description of the CR can be found in Bonnin (2006). The event itself can
be divided into two sub-periods: the Red Guard Army movement between 1966
and 1971, and the rustication programme between 1971 and 1976. The Red Guard
Army movement was accompanied by massive conflicts and associated victims,
while the rustication movement produced very few conflicts and victims. The extant
studies either employ the Red Guard Army movement to study the effect of violence
(see, e.g., Wang, 2019) or employ the Rustication movement to study the impact of
interrupted education (see, e.g., Meng & Gregory, 2002).
In this chapter, we focus on the Red Guard Army movement during the CR
because we would like to focus on the effect of conflicts. During this period, students
were encouraged by Mao to rebel against the central/local governments. Students
worshipped him, followed his extreme-left ideology, and created a lot of violence in
this movement. In response, the governments also repressed those student activities
and produced plenty of victims and deaths. Those massive conflicts, victims, injuries
and deaths were documented by local annals and gazetteers (see, e.g., Walder, 2014).
Pregnant mothers who experienced or witnessed the violence were more likely
to suffer from prenatal stress (perhaps also malnutrition). This stress can be passed
on to the foetuses. Mothers in different regions and in different years suffered from
different levels of violence, and we make use of this geographical and temporal
variation to identify the health effects.
More specifically, we employ the number of collective conflicts as the measure
of violence intensity during the CR (Red Guard Army movement 1966-1971) years.
The measure equals 0 during the non-CR years. In a sensitivity analysis, we also
use an alternative measure based on the number of deaths due to these collective
conflicts . A similar strategy is also employed by Bai (2014) and Wang (2019). In
Figure 3.3, we show the severity of total violence during the CR years by prefecture.
4.4 Data on Health Outcomes and Descriptive Statist-
ics
We draw data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS)
2011 and 2015 surveys. The CHARLS survey is designed to be nationally represent-
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ative, and it focuses only on the population aged 45 and above. It has one national
study with three regular waves (wave 2011, 2013 and 2015) and a retrospective wave
(wave 2014). In this chapter, we use the 2011 and 2015 waves of the national sample
because they are the only waves which include a biomarker section with blood
tests. Biomarkers are powerful preclinical or pre-morbid signals for diseases such as
diabetes or CVD and allow us to construct risk scores.
As the CHARLS data set does not provide suitable measures for the severity
of the CGF and the CR, we merge it with two additional data sources. We use the
province-level excessive death rates from Lin & Yang (2000) to measure the famine
severity, and we use prefecture-level conflicts and deaths counts from Walder (2014)
to measure the CR severity. We merge each individual in CHARLS with these two
additional data sets using information on the prefecture/province and the year at
birth. In CHARLS we also have information on the hukou status at birth, a household
registration system used in China which identifies a person as resident in a rural or
urban area.
4.4.1 Sample Selection
In the original data sets, there are 17,708 observations in the 2011 wave and 21,095
observations in the 2015 wave. Only 11,847 respondents in the 2011 wave and
13,420 respondents in the 2015 wave have participated in the blood-based biomarker
sections. When we merge the different sections of the questionnaire, we are left
with 10,138 observations in wave 2011 and 13,280 observations in wave 2013. We
then construct a cross-sectional data set by pooling the two waves, and we use the
latest information for each individual in the pooled data set. In other words, if a
respondent has been interviewed in both 2011 and 2015, we use the information in
2015, which results in a sample size of 16,674.
Notably, we have dropped some observations, because not all respondents
surveyed in CHARLS have participated in the blood-based biomarker sections.
The response rates of the blood-based biomarker section are around 65%. The
CHARLS team has estimated a Logit regression explaining the participation of the
blood sample (see Zhao et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2019) for details). We have
replicated their results and introduced two core explanatory variables into their
model: the CR violence measure and the famine severity measure. The estimates for
these two variables are insignificant, so the participation does not correlate with the
core explanatory variables. Therefore, there is no evidence of attrition bias in this
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analysis.
We restrict our sample to those who were born between 1950 and 1971, which
leaves us with 10,959 observations. We choose this period for the following reasons:
first, the period not only covers both the CGF (1959-1961) and the Red Guard Army
movement of the CR (1966-1971) but also includes a relatively peaceful time (1950-
1959, 1962-1965). Second, we do not want to include war periods such as the Second
World War (1938-1945) and the civil war (1945-1949).
After merging with the CR violence data and the CGF excessive death rates data,
the sample size reduces to 9,794. We also drop observations with missing values
in hukou status (144 observations), cognitive tests (595 respondents), depression
symptoms (687) and the blood-based biomarkers (483).
In the final sample, there are 7,885 respondents distributed in 254 prefectures in
29 provinces.3 In this sample, there are 4,341 female and 3,544 male respondents.
Of those 7,885 respondents, 7,232 individuals have rural hukou at birth and 653
individuals have non-rural hukou at birth. There are 3,668 individuals who were
born between 1950 and 1958, 799 individuals born between 1959 and 1961, 1,758




Different from the extant studies which employ mostly self-reported health meas-
ures, we use biomarker data to construct risk scores for developing diabetes and
CVD. For type-2 diabetes we consider the 8-year risk score, which clinically can
be served as early monitor for diabetes prevalence after 8 years. We use various
sources of information to construct the risk score from the Framingham Heart Study
(FHS, see, Wilson et al., 2007): age, gender, BMI, blood pressure, blood High Density
Level Cholesterol (HDL Cholesterol), Triglycerides, and fasting blood glucose. The
detailed calculations can be found in appendix 4.A. The risk score works appropri-
ately for undiagnosed patients but works inappropriately for those who have been
diagnosed with diabetes and are taking medications. Therefore, we assign a risk
score of 1 to those who were diagnosed with diabetes but have normal blood sugar
3 Provinces of Xizang, Chongqing (province-level municipality) and Hainan are not included in
CHARLS.
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levels because they are taking medications, which we can identify from the CHARLS
data. The distribution of the risk score can be found in Table 4.2. In our sample, on
average, the risk of getting diabetes in 8 years is 32.5%, and 16.2% of the respondents
have already been diagnosed with diabetes. The figures are comparable with other
data sources or public reports. For example, Xu et al. (2013) report that nearly half of
the Chinese adult population are prediabetic, and the 2015 Report on Nutrition and
Chronic Disease in Chinese Residents reveals that the prevalence rate of diabetes
among Chinese adults aged 40 is 9.7 percent (see, Burns & Liu, 2017, chapter 6). We
also disaggregate the numbers by cohort, gender and hukou status, and the statistics
can be found in Table 4.3. From Panel A of Table 4.3, we find that normally the
younger cohorts have lower diabetes risks except for the famine cohort (1959-1961).
The eight-year diabetes risk for the famine cohort is 35.7%, which is higher than
that of both the pre- and post-famine cohorts (34.1% and 31.9%),4 indicating that
the famine might play a role in increasing the risk of getting diabetes. Panel B of the
table shows that females have lower diabetes risk but higher prevalence rates.
For CVD, we follow D’agostino et al. (2008) and construct a 10-year risk score
from the FHS. Other studies employ the Systematic COronary Risk Evaluation
(hereinafter SCORE) (see, e.g., Conroy et al., 2003; Alessie et al., 2019) but we focus
on the FHS because Selvarajah et al. (2014) shows that it performs better than SCORE
for the Asian population. We refer the reader to appendix 4.B for details on the
construction of the risk score. As for diabetes, we assign value one to the CVD risk
score for respondents with a history of CVD events such as heart failure and stroke.
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 4.2. On average, 8.27% of the sample
has already experienced a CVD event (stroke and heart failures), and the average
CVD risk in the sample is 15.4%. The figure is close to external sources. For example,
the reported prevalence rate of CVD in China is about 20% (one in five adults in
China has a CVD).5 In Table 4.3 we also offer disaggregated statistics of CVD risks
and prevalences by cohort and hukou status. As expected, younger cohorts have on
average lower CVD risk and prevalence compared to older cohorts. Urban-born
residents suffer from higher risks than rural-born residents and the risk is higher for
males than females.
4 The difference between famine and post-famine cohorts are statistically significant.
5 The statistics are provided by World Heart Federation: https://www.world-heart-federation.org.
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Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics CHARLS 2011/15: Born 1950-1971
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Mean S.D. Min Max Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3
Sample size 7,885
Female (0-1) 0.551 0.497 0 1 0 1 1
Rural Hukou (0-1) 0.917 0.276 0 1 1 1 1
Cognition & Depression
Episodic Memory (Word Recall) (0-10) 3.699 1.765 0 10 2.500 4 5
Mental Intactness (TICS) (0-10) 6.815 2.754 0 10 5 7 9
Graphical Cognition (0-1) 0.694 0.461 0 1 0 1 1
CESD-10 (0-30) 7.792 6.295 0 30 3 6 11
CVD & Diabetes
Diabetes 0.162 0.368 0 1 0 0 0
8-year Diabetes Risk 0.325 0.341 3.51e-05 1 0.0478 0.166 0.551
CVD 0.0827 0.275 0 1 0 0 0
10-year CVD Risk 0.154 0.266 0.00220 1 0.0249 0.0572 0.128
Note: Sample size 7,885 include all the respondents in wave 2011 and 2015, and we keep the latest
information if the repondents appear twice. Rural hukou equals one if the repondents have the rural
hukou at birth, zero otherwise. Episodic memory is constructed by asking the respondents recall the ten
words listed on cards, ranging from 0 (no words recalled) to 10 (all words recalled). Mental intactness
is measured through questions which ask the respondent to subtract 7 from 100 and keep subtracting
7 from the result for a maximum of five times and to name the correct date (day of the week, month,
day, year, and season). The maximum score is 10. Graphical cognitive ability is measured by a dummy
which is equal to 1 if the respondent is able to draw a picture showed by the interviewer. CESD-10
measures depressive symptoms, ranging from 0 (no depression at all) to 30 (the most serious depression).
Diabetes is a dummy which equals one if the respondents have been diagnosed with diabetes and/or
taking medications to control the blood sugar level. The 8-year risk score for diabetes is constructed by
following Wilson et al. (2007). CVD is a dummy for actual cardiovascular disease and equals one if the
respondents have been diagnosed with stroke or heart failures. The Cardiovascular Disease 10-year risk
measure is from Framingham Heart Study(D’agostino et al. (2008)).
Cognition and Depression
We employ various measures to describe cognitive abilities and depressive symp-
toms of older Chinese individuals. The first measure of cognition, episodic memory,
uses the word recalling questions in CHARLS (see, e.g., Lei et al., 2012). Respondents
were requested to read ten Chinese words, and then they were asked to recall as
many words as possible at two different moments in time. The first is just after
reading all the words, and the second is after answering several other questions.
We measure the numbers of correct words by taking the average of the two counts.
The second measure of cognition is mental intactness, which is generated from ten
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questions of the Telephone Interview of Cognitive Status (TICS hereinafter), (see,
e.g., Lei et al., 2012; Huang & Zhou, 2013). This measure is constructed based on
whether the respondent is able to subtract 7 from 100 and keep subtracting 7 from
the result for a maximum of five times, and to name the correct date (day of the
week, month, day, year, and season). The maximum score is ten. The third measure
considers graphical cognitive ability, which is a dummy indicating whether the
respondent is able to draw a picture showed by the interviewer.
For depressive symptoms, we employ the well-known CESD-10 measure (see,
e.g., Björgvinsson et al., 2013). Respondents were asked to report how often they
had experienced the following situations: being bothered by small things, having
difficulty in keeping their mind on what they were doing, feeling depressed, being
tired of doing things, feeling hopeful, feeling fearful, feeling restless, feeling happy,
feeling lonely, and feeling hard to get going. The answers were recorded on a
four-point scale from 0 to 3, corresponding to rarely, some days, occasionally, and
most of the time for the negative questions, and reversed for the positive ones. The
total score ranges between 0 and 30, where a cutoff score of 10 or higher indicates
clinically relevant depression.
In Panel A of Table 4.3, we observe that older cohorts have on average lower
cognitive abilities (episodic memory, mental intactness and graphical cognition),
whereas depressive symptoms are more severe among younger respondents. Panel
B shows that females have lower cognitive performance than males, and they have
higher levels of depressive symptoms. Rural-born residents have more depressive
symptoms and less cognitive abilities than their urban counterparts.
4.5 Empirical Framework
The model to be estimated is of the following form:
yigpt = α + β1 · EDRpt · Ruraligp + β2 ·Viogt ·Urbanigp +Xigpγ + λt + θg + εigpt,
(4.1)
where yigpt is one of the health outcomes we have mentioned in section 4.4. The
subscript i refers to the individual, g denotes prefecture (254), p means province (29),
and t stands for year of birth. The dummy Ruraligp equals one if the individual was
born in a rural area (having a rural hukou at birth) and zero if the individual was
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born in an urban area (having an urban hukou at birth). The opposite holds for the
dummy Urbanigp. As we only consider their hukou status at birth, these dummies
are time-invariant. The variable excess death rate EDRpt is the excess mortality rate
in province p in the year in which the respondent was born t for the CGF years
(1959-1961). It is computed by subtracting the average death rate between 1956 and
1958 from the annual death rate during the famine years. During the non-famine
years, EDRpt equals zero. The variable violence Viogt is measured at the level of the
prefecture g in year t during the CR and is the number of conflicts per thousand
individuals during the CR years. It is equal to zero in the non-CR years. Since the
famine mainly hit rural areas and the CR mainly affected urban areas, we interact
EDRpt with Ruraligp and interact Viogt with Urbanigp.
The covariate vector Xigp includes variables like gender and hukou status. The
cross-cohort correlations are captured by the cohort fixed effect λt, and we also
introduce the prefecture fixed effects θg to account for unobserved cross-regional
heterogeneity. The rest of the unobserved shocks are included in the idiosyncratic
error term εigpt. To account for the correlation within each prefecture and each




We estimate model (1) for the full sample, which consists of all individuals who were
born between 1950 and 1971, and the results can be found in Table 4.4. Column (1)
exhibits the regression estimates using the predicted 8-year type-2 diabetes risk as
the dependent variable. Column (2) shows the estimates using the predicted 10-year
CVD risk. Column (3) displays the estimates using depression as the dependent
variable which is measured by the CESD-10 scale. Columns (4-6) are the estimates
for three cognition measures. The results show that mothers’ exposure to a 1% (the
unit of the excess deaths rates in the raw data is 0.1%) more severe famine in rural
areas during pregnancy would increase the risk of type-2 diabetes of the offspring
by 0.03 percentage points (Column (1)) on average, while the effect on CVD risk is
insignificant. These results suggest that exposure to famine might have triggered
the “thrifty genotype” mechanism which induces insulin secretion during adult
Exposure in utero to Adverse Events and Health Late-in-life 87
Table 4.4. Main Results: CHARLS 2011 and 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diabetes CVD Depression Cognition
VARIABLES Predicted 8-year Risk Predicted 10-year Risk CESD-10 Graphical Cognition Mental Intactness Episodic Memory
(TICS) (Word Recall)
% % Score 0-30(Worst) 0-1(Best) 0-10(Best) 0-10(Best)
EDR*Rural 0.00354** 0.000783 0.0597** -0.000878 -0.0112 -0.00961
(0.00170) (0.00122) (0.0291) (0.00220) (0.0123) (0.00805)
Conflicts*Urban -0.0108 -0.0358 -0.0410 -0.0644 0.369 0.0276
(0.0372) (0.0253) (0.677) (0.0437) (0.255) (0.210)
Rural Hukou -0.0325 -0.0185 1.292*** -0.138*** -0.815*** -0.862***
(0.0247) (0.0157) (0.353) (0.0269) (0.129) (0.122)
Female 0.00872 -0.0443*** 2.204*** -0.193*** -1.274*** -0.134**
(0.0120) (0.00781) (0.158) (0.0162) (0.111) (0.0541)
Constant 0.484** 0.216 0.808 1.053*** 10.45*** 5.689***
(0.193) (0.145) (3.487) (0.252) (1.468) (0.964)
Observations 7,885 7,885 7,885 7,885 7,885 7,885
R-squared 0.090 0.149 0.127 0.152 0.191 0.153
Interview Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year of Birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prefecture FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note:
1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture and year of birth levels
and reported in parentheses.
2. In Columns (1-2) we examine the impacts of violence (measured by log of number of collective
conflicts) and famine (measured by excessive death rates) on the predicted 8-year diabetes risk and
10-year CVD risk.
3. Column (3) shows the results using CESD-10 as the measure of depression, and Columns (4-6) use
three measures of cognition: i) graphical cognition, ii) mental intactness, and iii) memory ability using
word recall questions (see the chapter for details).
4. EDR is the province-level excessive death rates in 1959, 1960 and 1961, which is calculated by
subtracting the average death rates between year 1956-1958 from the annual death rates in the three
famine years. The variable Conflicts measures the level of violence in each of the years between 1966 and
1971. It is measured at the prefecture level per thousand population. The variable Rural is the indicator
for rural hukou at birth.
life. The magnitude of the effect is non-negligible because it is around 10.9% of the
sample mean and around 10.4% of a standard deviation. This increase in the risk of
developing diabetes might generate substantial healthcare costs and welfare losses
for the society. A 1% increase in famine severity leads to a 0.6 points increase in the
depression scale, while there is no significant effect on cognitive abilities. Exposure
to conflicts in utero has no significant long-run effects on any of the health outcomes.
4.6.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Gender
Some studies, such as Eriksson et al. (2010), suggest that boys might be affected
differently than girls (see section 4.2.3). To account for potential heterogeneous
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effects between males and females, we interact the famine severity and regional
conflicts with gender. The results can be found in Table 4.5. The results show that the
Table 4.5. Gender Specific: CHARLS 2011 and 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diabetes CVD Depression Cognition
VARIABLES Predicted 8-year Risk Predicted 10-year Risk CESD-10 Graphical Cognition Mental Intactness Episodic Memory
(TICS) (Word Recall)
% % Score 0-30(Worst) 0-1(Best) 0-10(Best) 0-10(Best)
Male*EDR*Rural 0.000457 0.00138 0.0803** 0.00162 -0.0138 -0.00825
(0.00222) (0.00193) (0.0402) (0.00303) (0.0172) (0.0115)
Female*EDR*Rural 0.00566*** 0.000376 0.0454 -0.00258 -0.00937 -0.0105
(0.00210) (0.00170) (0.0348) (0.00260) (0.0147) (0.00962)
Male*Conflicts*Urban -0.00619 -0.0622 0.869 -0.167** -0.421 -0.444
(0.0531) (0.0391) (0.937) (0.0764) (0.395) (0.283)
Female*Conflicts*Urban -0.0138 -0.0189 -0.621 0.00115 0.871*** 0.329
(0.0438) (0.0316) (0.799) (0.0547) (0.319) (0.272)
Rural Hukou -0.0324 -0.0188 1.302*** -0.139*** -0.823*** -0.867***
(0.0248) (0.0158) (0.356) (0.0271) (0.129) (0.121)
Female 0.00638 -0.0442*** 2.231*** -0.192*** -1.286*** -0.139**
(0.0118) (0.00810) (0.163) (0.0161) (0.112) (0.0542)
Constant 0.486** 0.216 0.783 1.052*** 10.46*** 5.692***
(0.193) (0.145) (3.487) (0.251) (1.468) (0.963)
Observations 7,885 7,885 7,885 7,885 7,885 7,885
R-squared 0.091 0.149 0.127 0.153 0.192 0.153
Interview Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year of Birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prefecture FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note:
1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture and year of birth levels
and reported in parentheses.
2. This table show the gender-specific estimates with the full sample.
3. In Columns (1-2) we examine the impacts of violence (measured by log of number of collective conflicts)
and famine (measured by excessive death rates) on the predicted 8-year diabetes risk and 10-year CVD
risk.
3. Column (3) shows the results using CESD-10 as the measure of depression, and Columns (4-6) use
three measures of cognition: i) graphical cognition, ii) mental intactness, and iii) memory ability using
word recall questions (see the chapter for details).
4. EDR is the province-level excessive death rates in 1959, 1960 and 1961, which is calculated by
subtracting the average death rates between year 1956-1958 from the annual death rates in the three
famine years. The variable Conflicts measures the level of violence in each of the years between 1966 and
1971. It is measured at the prefecture level per thousand population. The variable Rural is the indicator
for rural hukou at birth.
effect of the famine on diabetes risk matters only for females, and a 1% increase in
excessive death rate would imply a 0.06 percentage points higher risk of getting type-
2 diabetes. The effect is around 17.5% of the sample mean and 16.7% of a standard
deviation, which is statistically and economically relevant. The effects for males are
statistically insignificant. The results might also be driven by selective mortality,
namely males were more likely to die earlier. In terms of the impact on CVD risk, we
also find insignificant results. The pattern for depression is different: a 1% increase
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in famine-induced deaths increases males’ depression score by 0.8, suggesting that
boys’ emotionality is more affected by the adverse prenatal environment, especially
prenatal stress.
Two mechanisms could explain the results that significant effect appears only on
females. The first is that, according to section 4.2.3, boys grow faster than girls do
in utero. Therefore, boys need more nutrition during pregnancy than girls. When
their mothers experience malnutrition during pregnancy, boys kidney functions
will be underdeveloped, which triggers the onsite of various metabolic diseases
(Eriksson et al. (2010)). The second is selective mortality. Since boys are more
vulnerable to adverse events, they are more likely to die in utero (Di Renzo et al.
(2007); Ingemarsson (2003)). Therefore, those males who survived in the sample are
biologically stronger than their female peers.
4.6.3 Robustness Checks
We conduct two robustness checks to ensure that the effects are not spurious. First,
since the number of conflicts might not capture the full damage during the CR, we
use an alternative violence measure: the (log) number of deaths due to the collective
conflicts. Second, since the results might be sensitive to the choice of the control
group, in a sensitivity analysis we restrict the control group to those who were born
after 1955 (the original sample include all respondents who were born after 1949).
In Table 4.6 we report the results when we replace the measure of CR violence
with the log of number of deaths. Using an alternative measure does not substantially
alter the effect of the famine on diabetes and CVD risk scores. The estimated effects
of violence on cognition are less robust, although both results in Columns (4-6) of
Table 4.4 and 4.5 show that cognition is negatively affected by violence exposure.
The results for the second robustness check are exhibited in Table 4.7. In this
table, we restrict the sample to those who born after 1955. From the table we can
find that the estimates do not qualitatively change from the ones in Table 4.5. For
instance, the estimated coefficient in Column (1) for the female-EDR-rural interaction
term changes from 0.00566 to 0.00558. The effect of the male-EDR-rural interaction
term in Column (3) does not change at all. The coefficient on the male-conflict-
urban interaction term changes from -0.167 to -0.128. Overall, the results are robust
to changes in the size of the control group. To further examine how control
group composition affects the sensitivity of our results, we estimate a specification
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Table 4.6. Gender Specific: CHARLS 2011 and 2015 Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diabetes CVD Depression Cognition
VARIABLES Predicted 8-year Risk Predicted 10-year Risk CESD-10 Graphical Cognition Mental Intactness Episodic Memory
(TICS) (Word Recall)
% % Score 0-30(Worst) 0-1(Best) 0-10(Best) 0-10(Best)
Male*EDR*Rural 0.000443 0.00133 0.0807** 0.00163 -0.0135 -0.00790
(0.00222) (0.00194) (0.0402) (0.00303) (0.0172) (0.0115)
Female*EDR*Rural 0.00566*** 0.000327 0.0458 -0.00262 -0.00934 -0.0104
(0.00209) (0.00169) (0.0348) (0.00260) (0.0147) (0.00962)
Male*Deaths*Urban -0.891 -0.691 15.00 -2.562 -7.533 -7.455*
(0.883) (0.667) (15.98) (1.753) (6.729) (4.416)
Female*Deaths*Urban 0.390 0.880 -30.04* -0.318 16.24** -1.765
(1.106) (0.737) (16.78) (1.210) (7.067) (5.082)
Female 0.00601 -0.0442*** 2.230*** -0.191*** -1.282*** -0.134**
(0.0119) (0.00808) (0.163) (0.0162) (0.112) (0.0544)
Rural Hukou -0.0321 -0.0142 1.266*** -0.136*** -0.837*** -0.881***
(0.0247) (0.0157) (0.352) (0.0269) (0.127) (0.115)
Constant 0.486** 0.216 0.790 1.051*** 10.45*** 5.686***
(0.193) (0.145) (3.486) (0.251) (1.468) (0.963)
Observations 7,885 7,885 7,885 7,885 7,885 7,885
R-squared 0.091 0.149 0.128 0.153 0.192 0.153
Interview Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year of Birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prefecture FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note:
1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture and year of birth levels
and reported in parentheses.
2. This table shows the results using the log of number of deaths due to Cultural Revolution as the
measure of violence.
3. In Columns (1-2) we examine the impacts of violence (measured by log of number of deaths due to
collective conflicts) and famine (measured by excessive death rates) on the predicted 8-year diabetes risk
and 10-year CVD risk.
4. Column (3) shows the results using CESD-10 as the measure of depression, and Columns (4-6) use
three measures of cognition: i) graphical cognition, ii) mental intactness, and iii) memory ability using
word recall questions (see the chapter for details).
5. EDR is the province-level excessive death rates in 1959, 1960 and 1961, which is calculated by
subtracting the average death rates between year 1956-1958 from the annual death rates in the three
famine years. The variable Deaths measures the number of deaths due to CR violence in each year
between 1966 and 1971. It is measured at the prefecture level per thousand population. The variable
Rural is the indicator for rural hukou at birth.
with only the Chinese Great Famine indicator on the subsample 1950-1965 and a
specification with only the CR violence measure on the subsample 1960-1975. The
coefficient estimates from these two specifications are very similar to the results in
Table 4.5. The effects of exposure to famine on diabetes risk for rural females are
always around 0.005, and the effects of exposure to the CR on the graphical cognitive
ability for urban males are always significantly negative. Therefore, the results are
quite robust.
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Table 4.7. Robustness Check: Born after 1955
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diabetes CVD Depression Cognition
VARIABLES Predicted 8-year Risk Predicted 10-year Risk CESD-10 Graphical Cognition Mental Intactness Episodic Memory
(TICS) (Word Recall)
% % Score 0-30(Worst) 0-1(Best) 0-10(Best) 0-10(Best)
Male*EDR*Rural -0.000245 0.000773 0.0803** 0.000921 -0.0182 -0.00691
(0.00223) (0.00202) (0.0401) (0.00293) (0.0168) (0.0115)
Female*EDR*Rural 0.00558** -0.00135 0.0429 -0.00414 -0.0204 -0.0136
(0.00218) (0.00147) (0.0348) (0.00271) (0.0144) (0.00976)
Male*Conflicts*Urban -0.00514 -0.0385 0.815 -0.128* -0.212 -0.367
(0.0549) (0.0365) (0.932) (0.0750) (0.387) (0.285)
Female*Conflicts*Urban -0.0137 -0.00579 -0.705 0.0311 0.942*** 0.435*
(0.0449) (0.0296) (0.831) (0.0541) (0.314) (0.253)
Female -0.0133 -0.0270*** 2.221*** -0.166*** -1.118*** -0.0744
(0.0149) (0.00696) (0.170) (0.0170) (0.105) (0.0604)
Rural Hukou -0.0246 -0.00868 1.362*** -0.102*** -0.675*** -0.724***
(0.0258) (0.0173) (0.425) (0.0266) (0.154) (0.154)
Constant 0.290 0.119 -0.510 1.042*** 10.23*** 5.723***
(0.233) (0.164) (4.183) (0.299) (1.736) (1.173)
Observations 5,355 5,355 5,355 5,355 5,355 5,355
R-squared 0.100 0.144 0.136 0.134 0.188 0.143
Interview Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year of Birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prefecture FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note:
1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture and year of birth levels
and reported in parentheses.
2. This table shows the gender-specific effects using the subsample of people who were born after 1955.
3. In Columns (1-2) we examine the impact of violence (measured by log of number of collective conflicts)
and famine (measured by excessive death rates) on the predicted 8-year diabetes risk and 10-year CVD
risk.
4. Column (3) shows the results using CESD-10 as the measure of depression, and Columns (4-6) use
three measures of cognition: i) graphical cognition, ii) mental intactness, and iii) memory ability using
word recall questions (see the chapter for details).
5. EDR is the province-level excessive death rates in 1959, 1960 and 1961, which is calculated by
subtracting the average death rates between year 1956-1958 from the annual death rates in the three
famine years. The variable Conflicts measure the level of violence in each of the years between 1966 and
1971. It is measured at the prefecture level per thousand population. The variable Rural is the indicator
for rural hukou at birth.
4.7 Conclusion
We estimate the long-run impact of exposure in utero to the Chinese Great Famine
and the Cultural Revolution on physical and mental health later in life. We merge
data on the regional violence during the Cultural Revolution and the excessive
death rates during the Chinese Great Famine with data from the China Health and
Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) survey. While the Chinese Great Famine
was responsible for severe malnutrition and a stressful environment for pregnant
mothers in rural areas, the Cultural Revolution mainly affected pregnant mothers in
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urban areas.
The results show that in utero exposure to the famine increases the risk of getting
type-2 diabetes later in life, and that the effect is more pronounced for females. A 1%
increase in excessive death rates increases diabetes risk by around 0.06 percentage
points for girls who were exposed to famine. Boys exposed to the famine are shown
to have a higher tendency to develop depressive symptoms later in life, while
exposure to the Cultural Revolution has a negative effect on their cognitive abilities.
As in our data we only observe those who survived into adulthood, our results are
likely to underestimate the negative effect of adverse events at birth on health later
in life.
Overall, our results suggest that early life intervention is crucial. Future research
should focus on disentangling the mechanisms through which adverse conditions
around birth translate into poor health outcomes later in life, which is crucial to
identify potential targets for prevention and intervention strategies.
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4.A Eight-year Diabetes Risk Calculation
For the eight-year diabetes risk calculation, we use the prediction model in Table 4
of Wilson et al. (2007) which is reproduced in Table 4.A.1 . We adopt the prediction
model using continuous explanatory variables. The general prediction model for
the 8-year risk p̂Diabetes is
p̂Diabetes =
1
1 + exp(−∑mi=1 γ̂iXi)
, (4.A.1)
where the m risk factors include age, gender, parental history of diabetes mellitus,
BMI, systolic blood pressure, HDL cholesterol level per mg/dL, triglyceride level per
mg/dL, waist circumference in cm, and fasting glucose per ng/dL. Notably, because
in the data set we do not have information on parental history of diabetes, we use
the default value 0.17 suggested by Wilson et al. (2007) for all respondents. Similar
to the calculation of CVD, we assign value 1 to the risk score if the respondents have
been diagnosed with diabetes or are now taking the medications to control the blood
sugar levels.
Table 4.A.1. Diabetes Risk Factors, Table 4 of Wilson et al. (2007)
Variable OR (95% CI) p-value
Age, y 0.99 (0.97-1.01) .42
Male 0.65 (0.41-1.02) .06
Parental history of diabetes mellitus 1.55 (1.01-2.38) .04
BMI 1.04 (0.97-1.11) .24
Systolic blood pressure, mm Hg 1.01 (1.00-1.02) .11
HDL-C level per mg/dL 0.96 (0.95-0.98) <.001
Triglyceride level per mg/dL 1.00 (1.00-1.00) .16
Waist circumference, cm 1.05 (0.97-1.12) .22
Fasting glucose level, mg/dL 1.15 (1.12-1.17) <.001
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4.B Ten-year CVD Risk Calculation
The procedures for calculating the 10-year CVD risk can be found in the appendix of
D’agostino et al. (2008). The study estimates a simple CVD risk prediction model and
provides the regression coefficients of the model using data from the Framingham
Heart Study. We reproduce the estimates in Table 4.B.1. The general formula for
calculating the CVD risk p̂CVD is




i=1 β̂i X̄i), (4.B.1)
where S0(10) is the baseline survival rate in 10 years. In this chapter, we use the
same baseline gender-specific survival rates as D’agostino et al. (2008), which is
0.95012 for females and 0.88936 for males. The covariate vector Xi includes the log
of the ith risk factor where i ranges from 1 to k. Vector X̄i stands for the sample
means of the covariates. The risk factors include age, total cholesterol, high density
level cholesterol, a dummy for whether being undertreated for hypertension, a
dummy for whether smoking or not, and a dummy for whether being diagnosed
with diabetes or not. The regression coefficients β̂ are provided in the Table 2 of
D’agostino et al. (2008). For those who were diagnosed with CVD, we assign value 1
to the risk score.
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Table 4.B.1. CVD Risk Factors, Table 2 of D’agostino et al. (2008)
Variable β̂ p-value
Women (S0(10) = 0.95012)
Log of age 2.32888 <.0001
Log of total cholesterol 1.20904 <.0001
Log of HDL cholesterol -0.70833 <.0001
Log of SBP if not treated 2.76157 <.0001
Log of SBP if treated 2.82263 <.0001
Smoking 0.52873 <.0001
Diabetes 0.69154 <.0001
Men (S0(10) = 0.88936)
Log of age 3.06117 <.0001
Log of total cholesterol 1.12370 <.0001
Log of HDL cholesterol -0.93263 <.0001
Log of SBP if not treated 1.93303 <.0001
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Als leefomstandigheden en de technologie in de zorg verbeteren, stijgt de indivi-
duele levensverwachting. Dit patroon doet zich niet alleen voor in ontwikkelde
landen, maar ook in ontwikkelingslanden als China. Volgens het rapport World
Population Prospect 2017 van de Verenigde Naties is de gemiddelde levensverwach-
ting bij geboorte in China gestegen van 69,7 in de periode 1990-1995 naar 76,5 in
de periode van 2015-2020, en zal zij voor de periode 2045-2050 verder stijgen naar
81,1. De volksgezondheid draait echter niet alleen om kwantiteit, maar ook om
kwaliteit van leven. Mensen leven tegenwoordig langer, maar willen dat wel in
goede fysieke en financile gezondheid doen. Uit de literatuur blijkt steeds meer dat
omstandigheden in de vroege levensfase belangrijke determinanten zijn voor het
welzijn op oudere leeftijd. Om te weten hoe we de financile, fysieke en geestelijke
gezondheid van ouderen kunnen verbeteren, moeten we dus naar de levenscyclus
als geheel kijken. In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik de omstandigheden in de vroege
levensfase die van invloed zijn op het welzijn op oudere leeftijd. Daarbij richt ik me
met name op twee factoren die mogelijk van invloed zijn op het welzijn van ouderen:
steun van kinderen en tegenslagen op jonge leeftijd. China kent een minder royaal
socialezekerheidsstelsel dan wij, en dus moeten arme huishoudens daar andere
vormen van ondersteuning zoeken om op oudere leeftijd in hun levensonderhoud
te kunnen voorzien. Een voor de hand liggende oplossing is dat ouders hulp krijgen
van hun kinderen. De mate waarin kinderen hun ouders economisch ondersteunen,
zou verder bepaald kunnen worden door het menselijk kapitaal dat ouders in hun
kinderen genvesteerd hebben toen die de schoolgaande leeftijd hadden. Een tweede
factor is de rol van tegenslagen op jonge leeftijd. In China heeft het huidige cohort
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ouderen de Grote Chinese Hongersnood en/of de Culturele Revolutie misschien
nog meegemaakt, wat mogelijk heeft geleid tot verlies van inkomsten tijdens hun
leven en negatieve langetermijngevolgen voor de gezondheid. De belangrijkste ge-
gevens zijn ontleend aan de China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS,
longitudinaal onderzoek naar gezondheid en pensionering in China). CHARLS is
een nationaal representatief onderzoek gericht op mensen boven de 45 jaar en omvat
gegevens over intergenerationele overdracht, het arbeidsverleden van individuele
personen tijdens hun levens, en bloedgerelateerde biomarkergegevens.
Waarom investeren ouders te weinig in onderwijs voor
hun kinderen?
In hoofdstuk 2 bestuderen we de steun die kinderen hun ouders op hun oude
dag bieden. De steun van kinderen aan hun oude ouders wordt, met name in
ontwikkelingslanden, gezien als een goede aanvulling op sociale verzekeringen van
de overheid (zie, bijv., Cai et al., 2006; Oliveira, 2016). De mate waarin kinderen hun
oude ouders ondersteunen, hangt af van de mate waarin de kinderen in hun eigen
levensonderhoud kunnen voorzien, wat weer wordt bepaald door het menselijk
kapitaal dat de ouders in het onderwijs van hun kinderen hebben genvesteerd
toen die de schoolgaande leeftijd hadden (zie, bijv., Alessie et al., 2014; Cai et al.,
2006; Raut & Tran, 2005). Het verband tussen menselijk kapitaal dat door ouders
in kinderen is genvesteerd en de steun die kinderen hun ouders bieden, wordt
mogelijk ook benvloed door bepaalde sociaaleconomische en omgevingsfactoren
toen ouders beslissingen moesten nemen over investeren in het menselijk kapitaal
van hun kinderen. Twee belangrijke omstandigheden zijn liquiditeitsbeperking en
vaste kosten voor onderwijs (zie, bijv., Keane & Wolpin, 2001; Lochner & Monge-
Naranjo, 2011). Zo kan het zijn dat ouders, hoewel ze bereid zijn te investeren,
toch onvoldoende investeren omdat ze financieel te zwak zijn om geld van banken
of buren te lenen, of omdat de instapkosten om in het menselijk kapitaal van hun
kinderen te investeren, te hoog voor hen is. Daardoor wordt er te weinig genvesteerd
in het menselijk kapitaal van hun kinderen. Het is van groot belang deze twee
omstandigheden te betrekken bij het verhaal van intergenerationele overdracht en
de voorspellingen te toetsen aan de hand van Chinese gegevens, omdat we dan
kunnen achterhalen welke omstandigheden ouders beletten te investeren in het
onderwijs van hun kinderen. De overheid kan dan gericht ingrijpen. De eerste
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onderzoeksvraag is daarom:
In hoeverre worden de mate waarin ouders investeren in het menselijk kapitaal van hun
kinderen en de steun van kinderen aan hun oude ouders benvloed door het bestaan van
liquiditeitsbeperking en vaste kosten voor onderwijs?
Om deze onderzoeksvraag te bestuderen, wordt in dit hoofdstuk gebruikge-
maakt van een kader voor intergenerationele overdracht op basis van wederzijds
altrusme, zoals voorgesteld door Raut & Tran (2005). We breiden het model uit door
de liquiditeitsbeperking van ouders en de vaste kosten voor onderwijs er ook in op
te nemen, en we toetsen de voorspellingen op empirische wijze aan de hand van
de onderzoeksgegevens van de 2013 China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study
(CHARLS).
De resultaten tonen, in de eerste plaats, aan dat er, ook als er geen sprake is van
niet-bindende liquiditeitsbeperking en vaste kosten, te weinig wordt genvesteerd
in het menselijk kapitaal van kinderen wegens het onderhandelingsproces tussen
ouders en kinderen, die allen niet volmaakt altrustisch zijn. In de tweede plaats
worden investeringen in menselijk kapitaal nog verder beperkt door de bindende
liquiditeitsbeperking van ouders. Ten slotte tonen we aan dat het bestaan van vaste
kosten voor onderwijs de overdracht van kinderen naar hun oude ouders versterkt.
Effect van de Culturele Revolutie op het inkomen tij-
dens de levensloop
In hoofdstuk 3 kijk ik naar het effect van blootstelling, op jonge leeftijd (5-19 jaar), aan
ongunstige politieke gebeurtenissen op het inkomen tijdens de levensloop, waarbij
ik de Chinese Culturele Revolutie (1966-1976) als natuurlijk experiment gebruik.
De Culturele Revolutie had in elke prefectuur een andere uitwerking, en ik kan de
variaties in geweldpleging in de prefecturen dus gebruiken om het langetermijneffect
van de Culturele Revolutie vast te stellen. Ook zijn er verschillende partijen bij de
Culturele Revolutie betrokken: de algemene bevolking, de slachtoffers, en de mensen
die geweld creerden door zich aan te sluiten bij de Rode Garde. Het is daarom ook
van belang te onderzoeken of leden van de Rode Garde op vergelijkbare wijze
worden getroffen als mensen die geen lid waren van de Rode Garde. Bestaande
studies meten inkomen aan de hand van transversale inkomensgegevens (zie, bijv.,
Meng & Gregory, 2007), maar ik ga uit van inkomen tijdens de levensloop, waarbij
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het menselijk kapitaal gedurende de levenscyclus wordt gemeten. In hoofdstuk 3 is
mijn onderzoeksvraag:
Wat is het effect van blootstelling aan de Culturele Revolutie tijdens de schoolgaande
leeftijd (5-19) op het individuele inkomen tijdens de levensloop? Zijn er wat dit betreft
verschillen tussen leden van de Rode Garde en mensen die geen lid waren van de Rode
Garde?
Om deze onderzoeksvraag te bestuderen, maak ik gebruik van gegevens uit de
dataset van de CHARLS-enqułte over levensgeschiedenissen. De CHARLS-enqułte
over levensgeschiedenissen verzamelt informatie over alle levensgebeurtenissen,
zoals werk- en onderwijsperiodes, van respondenten die aanvankelijk in 2011 en
2013 zijn ondervraagd. Op basis van deze gegevens kunnen twee criteria worden
opgesteld voor inkomen tijdens de levensloop: gemiddeld inkomen tijdens de le-
vensloop per gewerkt jaar, en inkomensgroei tussen de eerste en de laatste baan in
het beroepsleven. Vervolgens voeg ik de variaties, op prefectuurniveau, in geweld-
pleging tijdens de Culturele Revolutie (1966-1976) toe aan het individueel inkomen
tijdens de levensloop.
Uit de resultaten blijkt dat het gemiddeld inkomen tijdens de levensloop per
gewerkt jaar van mannen die hebben blootgestaan aan 1% meer geweld, 8 procent-
punten lager is, maar dat dit effect bij vrouwen verwaarloosbaar is. Bovendien is
niet iedereen in dezelfde mate getroffen. Mannen die actief lid zijn geweest van de
Rode Garde, profiteerden in feite van de Culturele Revolutie omdat hun gemiddeld
inkomen tijdens de levensloop per gewerkt jaar met 16% toenam. Ik constateer ook
dat groei van het individueel inkomen tijdens de levenscyclus niet wordt benvloed
door blootstelling aan de Culturele Revolutie.
Blootstelling in de baarmoeder aan ongunstige gebeur-
tenissen, en gezondheid op latere leeftijd
In dit hoofdstuk kijken we naar de effecten van blootstelling in de baarmoeder
aan ongunstige gebeurtenissen op de gezondheid op latere leeftijd. In dit onder-
zoek maken we gebruik van twee natuurlijke experimenten: de Grote Chinese
Hongersnood, die vooral het platteland trof, en de Culturele Revolutie, die vooral
de stedelijke gebieden trof. Om de gezondheid te meten, maken we gebruik van
bloedgerelateerde biomarkergegevens en stellen we risicoscores voor diabetes en
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hart- en vaatziekten vast. Dat is belangrijk omdat we zo de onderliggende risico’s
voor het krijgen van diabetes en hart- en vaatziekten kunnen achterhalen, met name
wanneer deze chronische ziekten zich nog niet hebben geopenbaard. Behalve voor
de fysieke gezondheid stellen we ook criteria op voor de geestelijke gezondheid,
zoals depressie en cognitie. Omdat uit de biomedische literatuur blijkt dat jongetjes
op een andere manier weefsel en organen ontwikkelen in de baarmoeder dan meisjes
(zie, bijv., Eriksson et al., 2010), doen we ook afzonderlijk onderzoek per sekse. De
derde onderzoeksvraag is daarom:
Wat zijn de effecten van blootstelling in de baarmoeder aan de Grote Chinese Hongers-
nood en de Culturele Revolutie op de fysieke en geestelijke gezondheid op oudere leeftijd? Is
het patroon van die effecten seksegebonden?
Om de dataset op te stellen, meten we de hoogte van de oversterftecijfers op
provincieniveau, die worden vastgesteld door de gemiddelde sterftecijfers in de
jaren waarin er geen hongersnood was, af te trekken van de sterftecijfers tijdens
de jaren van de hongersnood, en maken we gebruik van dezelfde criteria voor
het meten van geweldpleging op prefectuurniveau als in hoofdstuk 3. Vervolgens
voegen we deze gegevens toe aan de individuele gezondheidsresultaten uit de
CHARLS-enqułtes van 2011 en 2013, waarbij we gebruikmaken van geboorteplaats-
en het geboortejaargegevens. Wat betreft gezondheidsresultaten stellen we een
risicoscore over acht jaar op voor diabetes, aan de hand van het algoritme uit Wilson
et al. (2007), een risicoscore over tien jaar voor hart- en vaatziekten, aan de hand van
het algoritme uit D’agostino et al. (2008), en verschillende criteria op het gebied van
cognitie en depressie.
Uit de resultaten blijkt dat meisjes die in de baarmoeder hebben blootgestaan
aan een 1% hoger, door hongersnood veroorzaakt oversterftecijfer, 0,06 procentpunt
meer kans hebben om diabetes type 2 te krijgen. Voor jongetjes zijn de effecten
verwaarloosbaar. Jongetjes die tijdens de Culturele Revolutie hebben blootgestaan
aan meer geweld, blijken bovendien minder goede cognitieve vaardigheden te
hebben.
Beleidsadvies
Om de problemen door vergrijzing en de daarbij behorende stijgende zorgkosten
het hoofd te bieden, moeten overheden proactief beleid opstellen en uitvoeren.
Mijn proefschrift biedt enkele inzichten voor het opstellen van relevant beleid. De
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belangrijkste boodschap is eenvoudig: ingrijpen in de vroege levensfase levert meer
voordelen op de lange termijn op, zeker voor mensen die te maken hebben gehad
met tegenslag.
Algemeen beleidsadvies
In hoofdstuk 2 van mijn proefschrift constateren we dat zowel bindende liquidi-
teitsbeperkingen als het bestaan van vaste onderwijskosten een verklaring kunnen
vormen voor het feit dat ouders te weinig investeren in het onderwijs van hun
kinderen. Het verlichten van de bindende liquiditeitsbeperking bij de ouders en het
wegnemen van de vaste kosten kunnen dus bijdragen aan meer investeringen in het
onderwijs van de kinderen. Wat betreft het verlichten van de liquiditeitsbeperking
van huishoudens zouden de huidige, landelijk uitgerolde armoedebestrijdingspro-
grammas (zie, bijv., Meng, 2013) de onderwijsresultaten van kinderen uit arme
gezinnen kunnen verbeteren. Overheden kunnen echter nog meer doen om vaste
onderwijskosten te verlagen. Die kosten kunnen materieel van aard zijn, bijvoor-
beeld vervoerskosten en lesgeld, en kunnen dan verlicht worden door uitbreiding
van studieleningen tegen lage rentes voor studenten of door andere beleidsinstru-
menten. Sommige ontwikkelde landen hebben al bepaalde beleidsmaatregelen
gemplementeerd. Zo krijgen Nederlandse studenten korting op het openbaar ver-
voer (studentenreisproduct).1 Vaste kosten kunnen ook immaterieel van aard zijn,
bijvoorbeeld ongelijke kansen voor studenten uit gezinnen met een laag inkomen
wat betreft het volgen van hoogwaardig universitair onderwijs. Zo bieden kust-
provincies studenten uit de buurt meer kansen om naar goede universiteiten te
gaan, terwijl studenten uit provincies in het westen of midden van het land intensief
moeten concurreren voor schaarse kansen (zie, bijv., Zhang & Kanbur, 2005). Als de
investering in menselijk kapitaal stijgt naar een optimaal niveau, doen de resultaten
in hoofdstuk 2 vermoeden dat de overdracht naar ouders op hoge leeftijd ook zal
toenemen. Dit is belangrijk omdat ouderen in een land als China, waar het pensi-
oenstelsel minder goed ontwikkeld is, in hoge mate afhankelijk zijn van financile
ondersteuning van hun kinderen. In hoofdstuk 3 van mijn proefschrift constateer ik
dat mannen die in de schoolgaande leeftijd hebben blootgestaan aan de Culturele
Revolutie, hun gehele leven te maken hebben gehad met verlies van inkomsten. De
resultaten impliceren dat het effect van de Culturele Revolutie op het inkomen de
gehele levenscyclus doorwerkt. Met andere woorden: wanneer het proces van inves-
1Zie bijvoorbeeld: https://www.duo.nl/particulier/aanvragen-studentenreisproduct.jsp.
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teren in menselijk kapitaal eenmaal is onderbroken, is het lastig de achterstand in
het beroepsleven na de Culturele Revolutie weer in te halen. Als het onderwijs van
kinderen dus wordt onderbroken, ofwel door binnenlandse conflicten ofwel door
schoolsluitingen, is het belangrijk moeite en geld te steken in kinderen die het meest
zouden profiteren van fysiek onderwijs. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt verder geconstateerd
dat mensen die zich hebben aangesloten bij de Rode Garde en die meestal al een
gunstige sociaaleconomische achtergrond hadden, een veel hoger inkomen tijdens
de levensloop hebben. Dit resultaat wekt de suggestie dat gebeurtenissen als de
Culturele Revolutie de ongelijkheid op lange termijn zou kunnen versterken.
In hoofdstuk 4 constateren we dat meisjes die in de baarmoeder hebben bloot-
gestaan aan hongersnood, meer kans hebben om diabetes type 2 te krijgen, en dat
mensen die blootgestaan hebben aan de Culturele Revolutie op latere leeftijd minder
goede cognitieve vaardigheden hebben. De algemene conclusie is dat ongunstige
omstandigheden rondom de geboorte aanzienlijke negatieve gevolgen kan hebben
op de gezondheid op latere leeftijd. Dit doet vermoeden dat er al op zeer jonge
leeftijd, zelfs al tijdens de zwangerschap, moet worden gestart met preventie. In
sommige ontwikkelingslanden waar sprake is van binnenlandse conflicten of hon-
gersnoden is het daarom belangrijk prioriteit te geven aan voedselvoorziening aan
en het bieden van een veilig onderdak voor zwangere vrouwen.
Beleidsadvies in verband met COVID-19
De recente wereldwijde uitbraak van het coronavirus (COVID-19) heeft in veel
landen ernstige bedreigingen op het gebied van de volksgezondheid en de economie
veroorzaakt. In de meeste Europese en Oost-Aziatische landen zijn veel mensen
overleden aan de gevolgen van deze pandemie. Na een beleid van lockdowns en
afstand houden lijkt de situatie in deze landen nu onder controle.
Maar aan de andere kant van de wereld verslechtert de situatie juist. Miljoenen
burgers in (ontwikkelings)landen in Afrika en het Midden-Oosten hebben volgens
een recent rapport van het Wereldvoedselprogramma niet alleen te maken met de
wereldwijde gezondheidscrisis maar ook met zware hongersnoden.2 Naast het
voeren van een beleid van lockdowns en afstand houden is het van groot belang
dat overheden onmiddellijk ingrijpen om de voedselvoorziening, met name aan




dat baby’s meer kans hebben om op oudere leeftijd chronische ziekten als diabetes
te ontwikkelen als hun moeders te kampen hebben met ernstige voedseltekorten.
De dreigende hongerpandemie zal niet alleen pasgeborenen treffen maar kan ook
voor de huidige generaties kinderen in de schoolgaande leeftijd verlies van inkomen
tijdens de levensloop veroorzaken. Dit rapport van het Wereldvoedselprogramma
toont aan dat landen die meer risico lopen op grootschalige hongersnoden, meestal
conflicthaarden zijn. Volgens de resultaten uit hoofdstuk 3 hebben mensen die
op jonge leeftijd vaker hebben blootgestaan aan conflicten, meer kans om tijdens
hun levensloop een lager inkomen te hebben. Overheden moeten bij de aanpak
van voedseltekorten ook een veilige leef- en scholingsomgeving bieden voor jonge
mensen in de leeftijd van 5 tot 19 jaar.
